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ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Dennis Lynch

Despite much interest in scholarship on affect and emotion in the field of rhetoric
and composition in the last several decades, scholars have not yet used this
scholarship to revise or extend rhetorical understandings of pathos. In our field,
pathos is still primarily conceived as a linguistic tool and is rarely theorized as
more than a rhetorical appeal. This conception of pathos overlooks the varied
roles of emotions in rhetorical situations (e.g., how embodied or mediated
emotions persuade). I argue that extending studies of pathos to include affect
theory reveals more complicated rhetorical functions of pathos. But rather than
treat “affect” and “emotion” as separate concepts and phenomena (like many
scholars in our field), I argue it is the relationship between affect and emotion
that ought to be better theorized to complicate current understandings of pathos.
After close analysis of how affect and emotion have been studied in our field, I
put forth a theoretical framework for rhetorical study of affects and emotions
which 1) approaches rhetoric ontologically, 2) reconnects affect to assemblage
theory, and 3) defines bodies (human and nonhuman) via their capacity to affect
and be affected. I apply this framework to a case study of an outbreak of mass
psychogenic illness (previously called “mass hysteria”) among a group of mostly
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high school girls in LeRoy, NY in 2011. I begin my analysis of this case by looking
for the affects and emotions at its center. Looking for pathos beyond the texts
and discourses surrounding the case, this project examines the rhetoricity of
bodies, bodily processes, assemblages, and media. This project seeks to broaden
current understandings of pathos, to illustrate what it might look like to study
pathos as the core of rhetorical studies.
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Introduction

Rhetorics of Emotion

In October 2011, a high school cheerleader in upstate New York woke up
from a nap with a stutter. Before long, Thera Sanchez’s stutter escalated into
Tourette-like symptoms; twitches, jerks, and vocal outbursts became so
disruptive that Thera had to stop going to school. In the following weeks, eleven
more girls at LeRoy High School presented similar symptoms, and parents
became frantic as the school district rushed to determine the cause of the illness.
The New York State Department of Health began an investigation but concluded
no environmental or infectious causes could be found. By the spring of 2012,
twenty-four people1 in the area had developed the same debilitating symptoms,
and the national news media began reporting on the case, calling it a “mystery
illness.” Several of the girls appeared on the Today Show, CNN, and Dr. Drew.
Through stutters, jerks, and snorts, the girls plead for answers to their “mystery”
symptoms.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Reports suggested the final count of afflicted people may have even been higher.
In addition to the high school girls in LeRoy, several other people reported
symptoms in the neighboring Town Cornith, NY, including a 36-year-old woman
and boy.
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Shortly after the case gained national attention, several experts and
physicians came forward to claim the illness was not mysterious at all. It was a
case of mass hysteria. Despite centuries of documented cases, outbreaks of mass
hysteria continue to transfix us.2 In part, this is likely because mass hysteria is a
diagnosis of exclusion. Such diagnoses are made only when all other potential
causes are ruled out since symptoms vary from case to case. But it also seems to

be the nature of the illness—it is psychologically rooted, manifests physically, and
yet arises and is transmitted among a group people—that makes it such a
compelling site for analysis.
Public and media response to this story was, not surprisingly, great.
Healthy girls, with bright futures, were stricken suddenly with a debilitating
syndrome—girls who seem like they could easily be our daughters, sisters, or
friends. And the inability to identify a more tangible cause for the outbreak only
intensified the reaction. There seemed to be no rational explanation: how can
what seems to be a psychological disorder be contagious? Susan Sontag’s words
in Illness and Metaphor ring true: “Any disease that is treated as a mystery and
acutely enough feared will be felt to be morally, if not literally contagious” (6).
Not only did it appear that the disease was actually contagious as more girls
developed symptoms, but the moral mythology of this particular disorder took its
toll. We tend to think of hysteria as an excess of emotion—a crazed and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 New cases of mass hysteria are reported monthly. Some of the most recent
publicized cases include over 300 students in Portuguese schools who suffered
symptoms of rashes, difficulty breathing, and dizziness (2006); female students
at a Catholic School in Mexico City who had difficulty walking, fever, and nausea
(2007); and students at an all-girls school in Brunei who suffered from
screaming, crying, and shaking (2010).
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uncontrollable outpouring of feeling. While the sole hysterical woman doesn’t
pose much of a threat to society at large, an episode of “mass hysteria” seems to.
Groups of girls, in themselves, often evoke fear; we hear stories of pregnancy
pacts, social bulimia, and cutting parties—similar to masochistic behavior
depicted in Hollywood portrayals like The Virgin Suicides. Rather than read
these incidents as narratives of self-loathing, depression, or peer pressure,
incidents like these are often read as unpredictable examples of girlhood

irrationality. Fear of contagion, but also what this event says about girlhood, “the
world today,” and “this generation” dominated stories about the LeRoy girls.
Learning one’s diagnosis, Sontag suggests, can be “demoralizing.” Several
of the girls and their families publicly rejected hysteria as a diagnosis and
embraced alternative theories. Anti-vaccine groups suggested the HPV vaccine
Gardasil was responsible; Erin Brockovich and her team insisted the outbreak
was a result of a train that derailed in the ‘70s, spilling thousands of gallons of
cyanide and trichloroethylene only three miles away from LeRoy High School;
and one doctor publicly declared the phenomenon an outbreak of PANDAS
(pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorders associated with streptococcal
infections). Some internet commenters—in something of a digital witch hunt—
even suggested the girls were possessed by the devil.
For several news cycles, the media was transfixed. Exposés in the New
York Times and Slate delved into the girls lives, creating narratives that often
embodied elements of Aristotelian tragedy: using “language embellished with
each kind of artistic ornament” and arguably, “through pity and fear effecting the
proper purgation of these emotions” (bk. VI). As videos of the girls’ interviews
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were spread around mainstream and social media, a complicated dialogue
emerged as voices of experts, conspiracy theorists, family members, and TV
personalities intersected. And a careful viewer could see the girls’ words and
movements co-adapt with the various strands of discourse they consumed.
Rhetorically, there are a lot of interesting aspects to this case; there is
much to consider about how the discourse of physicians, news media, and the
girls themselves interacted to create the rhetoric surrounding this event—a

rhetoric that captivated audiences, spread suspicion and fear, and kept this story
relevant for several weeks. When looking specifically at the emotional and
affective elements of this case, of which there are many, rhetoric scholars might
first ask, what kinds of emotions and affects have been attributed to the girls?
Among all of the professional and popular discourses, we might consider how the
girls are variously represented and how those tropes and archetypes reflect a
historical tendency to mark young women with psychological illness as hysterical
or mad. We might look at the persistence of these archetypes and tropes, given
the advent of youtube, where girls posted videos of themselves and where the
public could easily follow, interpret, annotate, and diagnose the
text/performance/mediation publicly. An even more critically-minded
rhetorician might consider the politics of this event: who benefits from particular
representations of the girls and why? How do particular kinds of media propagate
various views and what rhetorical devices do they draw on to convince audiences?
And to what ends?
Still, another question remains, one that is less frequently pursued in
rhetorical study: not where is the rhetoric located (in this case, of mediated mass
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hysteria) and what does it do, but how is it transmitted and circulated? The latter
question is of particular interest to those studying affect and emotion, and it is
one of the main questions that is pursued in the following chapters. Put
otherwise, pathos plays a clear role in the rhetoric of this event; it was central in
portraying the girls, depicting the illness, and in capturing the attention of the
viewing public. But are current conceptions of pathos complicated enough to
untangle and capture affect and emotion’s roles in this event?
This dissertation takes up this question carefully and, in short, I suggest
the answer is no. Despite an increased interest in affect and emotion scholarship
in the field, these new advances haven’t been used to reshape the concept pathos;
pathos is still conceptualized in terms of discrete rhetorical situations made up of
autonomous rhetors and audiences. But the event in LeRoy is made up of many
rhetors, audiences, and other environmental, material, and mediated influences.
It doesn’t have a clear, linear progression. The origins and purposes of the affects
and emotions in the event are often ambiguous, and some “emotions” even seem
to be operating separately from human intervention. Take for example, the
pervasive fear that surrounds this event. There is no single, clear object that
inspires fear nor is there one source of fear; rather it emerges from places like
news media scare tactics, the cultural mythology surrounding hysteria, the fear of
contagion, fear of the unknown, wild conspiracy theories, the girls; interviews,
the school board’s lack of answers, etc.
The movement of fear is similarly dispersed among many constituents in
the event; the rhetorical direction, purpose, and effect of fear can’t be easily
determined. This pervasiveness of emotion, I assert, is better captured through
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joint theories of affect and emotion which emphasize how emotions and
situations overlap, are recursive, and malleable. As an addition to studies of
emotion in the field, affect theory better addresses how people and things gather
together to create what we understand to be a rhetorical event. Affect theory, I
suggest, supplements emotion theory to expand current notions of pathos—not

just expanding our understanding of how pathos works but also helping us figure
out how we, as rhetoricians, might more productively intervene in complex
rhetorical events like the one in LeRoy.
Studying a complex event like this rhetorically means expanding our
understanding of rhetorical situations (or objects of study), not only outward (as
scholars like Jenny Edbauer Rice, Thomas Rickert, and Byron Hawk have
suggested) to include environments, objects, and matter, but also to extend our
understanding backward and forward temporally, to account for the unfolding of
an event whose beginning and end may extend years beyond its “center.” The
LeRoy outbreak doesn’t end once the news media goes quiet, just as it didn’t
begin with the first news story. While public interest in the story has waned, there
remains much to consider in this case, as several scholars from other disciplines
have begun to explore (e.g., neurologist Thomas Pollak’s (2013) critique of how
psychogenic movement disorder was diagnosed in LeRoy; anthropologist Ryan
Cook’s (2013) ethnographic study of the case; or historian Robert Bartholomew
and psychologists Simon Wessely and G James Rubin’s (2012) analysis of the role
social media played in transmitting symptoms).
What I’m suggesting, then, is that rhetorically we might shift our focus
from studying the discourse external to the cause and medium of the outbreak
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itself to studying the affects and emotions at its center; to consider the rhetorical
event not just in the aftermath of this psychological phenomenon but as
beginning years before the first tic; and to see the girls not as victims of a
convergence of psychological, social, and physical variables—and then the
sometimes-cruel exploitation of their experience—but to see them as rhetorical
agents (drawing on recent reconfigurations of agency, e.g. by Jane Bennett and
Marilyn Cooper). While I’m not suggesting that the girls consciously chose to
develop the illness, they weren’t randomly afflicted. An article from Slate even
hints at the girls’ agency: “Some scholars have also argued that hysterical
episodes allow women to take a break from daily drudgeries, or to rage against
patriarchal cultures within the safe bounds of demon possession or poisoning. If
girls can find no outlet for reckless abandon, in other words, they’ll create one.”

Though these claims are sweeping, they also suggest we might see the girls tics as
(rhetorically) purposeful, in a sense, just as we might see their bodies as unique,
central sites of inquiry.
Of course, bodies and embodied rhetorics aren’t new to rhetorical studies.
Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley’s 1999 collection Rhetorical Bodies marked a
heightened rhetorical interest in bodies and materiality, yet therein bodies are
often considered only as points of origin and articulations of positionality. In the
“Afterword,” Crowley asserts that one of the most important things about body
theories is that they highlight “the interestedness of boundary-drawing and
distinction-making” (363). This is useful in showing that some one profits when
distinctions and boundaries are made; she asserts, “no body is disinterested”
(363). While this is certainly true, considering bodies primarily in terms of their
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positionality (as they wear culturally constructed significations like race, class,

and gender) prohibits us from thinking of bodies as always moving and changing,
as Brian Massumi has argued. To accept bodies as the static point of origin for
rhetoric, rather than seeing bodies as co-adapting along with environments,
movements, and feelings, is to accept a narrow view of bodies. More recently,
Debra Hawhee has echoed this concern in Moving Bodies:
The bind for body theorists is that bodies become a problem when
they come to ‘stand in’ for subject positions . . . Contemporary
theory thus has a tendency to freeze bodies, to analyze them for
their symbolic properties, thereby evacuating and ignoring their
capacity to sense and to move through time. (7)
The frozen body is particularly problematic for studies of pathos, which for too
long have considered “the body” to be its container—literally and figuratively
containing emotion. In this formulation, emotion either originates within the
body, becomes the impetus for rhetoric, and moves outward, or someone else’s
emotion is taken into the body through rhetorical means.
No doubt a study of bodies will run up against what Hawhee calls “the
limits of humanistic approaches to the body,” yet I, like she and others, see
pushing those limits as a rhetorically useful exercise (7). 3 If we restrict our
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 We can also see this sentiment in debates about agency, from, for example
Marilyn Cooper (2011) who writes, “I suggest that neither conscious intention nor
free will—at least as we commonly think of them—is involved in acting or
bringing about change” (421), and in debates about the rhetorical situation, from,
for example, Jenny Edbauer Rice (2005): “Rather than primarily speaking of
rhetoric through the terministic lens of conglomerated elements, I look towards a
framework of affective ecologies that recontextualizes rhetorics in their temporal,
historical, and lived fluxes” (9).
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understandings of what is rhetorical to the verbal and written discourse
surrounding an event, we risk seeing bodies as static texts or as emotion’s point
of origin; we fail to see how bodies’ movements and affects could be considered
rhetorical and how more traditional forms of discourse are consumed by and
reflected in bodies. To see bodies as generative rhetorical sites rather than static
texts and/or social positions is important for understanding how rhetoric

manifests and moves. These considerations are necessary for revising a theory of
pathos.

A Note on Terminology
Already in this chapter, I’ve used a range of terminology to describe the
sensory, embodied, visceral, and noncognitve aspects or dimensions of rhetoric.
My choice to use and move among three terms—pathos, emotion, and affect—
might be puzzling. However, this choice doesn’t mean I’m using them
interchangeably or without concern for their differences and how they’ve been
used in the past, commonly, and by other rhetoricians. Rather it is precisely these
differences, I suggest, that allow us to study—to dig deeper into—complex
rhetorical studies. In other words, this dissertation relies on harnessing the
differences and possible relationships between these terms to suggest a
theoretical framework for a revised approach of pathos—an approach that doesn’t
just take pathos into account but puts it at the center of any investigation into
complex rhetorical objects of study.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The main task of this dissertation—drawing out a more complicated theory
of pathos—requires a close examination of how emotion and affect scholarship in
other fields has been received and used to various ends in our field. Ultimately, I
want to present pathos as an umbrella term that both emotion and affect
inform—for rhetorical purposes. While emotion scholarship already fits under
that umbrella in many ways (advances in cognitive and social approaches to
emotion, for example, mostly align with how pathos has been traditionally
understood), scholars often place affect scholarship purposefully outside of that
umbrella. This is because pathos is generally understood to be an appeal the
human rhetor uses, and affect is generally understood as being external to human
control—and often even external to human (re)cognition. Both of these
assumptions are precisely what I hope to trouble.
Definitions of “affect” and “emotion” are plentiful inside and outside our
field. In the pages that follow, I’m not interested in privileging one over the other
as much as considering what various definitions may offer rhetorical studies.
When I use the terms “affect” and “emotion,” I’ll be referring primarily to
particular theories of each concept (e.g. cognitive-evaluative and social
constructionist approaches to emotion, and affective theories inspired by
Massumi, Jameson, and Lacan).
My definition of pathos is, of course, more important for the work that
follows. I understand pathos, first and foremost, as a rhetorical term. When I use
“pathos,” I’m referring to the rhetorical concept that has traditionally been
understood as an appeal to emotion, the third intrinsic proof (alongside ethos
and logos). I see pathos as intimately tied to practical reasoning and public
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deliberation, reflecting Edward Corbett and Rosa Ebberly’s (2000) claim that

pathos is the “emotional impact of reasoning or argument on the listener reader”
(72). But I also recognize the sometimes-intangible power of pathos, echoing
sentiments like Cicero’s: “the two principal qualities required in an orator, are to
be neat and clear in stating the nature of his subject, and warm and forcible in
moving the passions; and as he who fires and inflames his audience, will always
effect more than he who can barely inform and amuse them” (Brutus 89). To
inflame the minds of an audience, to dwell in pathos, the rhetorical tradition
suggests, a rhetor interprets the emotional state or disposition of an audience and
then inspires emotions or emotional patterns that turn the audience in whatever
direction the case demands. Because emotions have objects, following Aristotle’s
approach, a savvy rhetor can alter the temporal and spatial proximity to those
objects and change an emotion’s intensity within the audience’s ongoing
reactions to a discourse or text. The ethical responsibilities of invoking pathos are
also important to note, since use of pathos is always attached to a rhetorical
purpose, which ideally contributes to community and civic wellbeing. In this
regard, it is good to remember the close etymological relations among ethos,
ethics, and dwelling and their inseparable relations to feeling. 4
Traditionally, pathos has been associated with the emotions—not affects.
When I use “pathos” in the first two chapters of this dissertation, I’m using it as it
has been conventionally understood. In the final two chapters, wherein I attempt
to revise a concept of pathos, I suggest we can also identify affects (variously
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This is emphasized in Martha Nussbaum’s work on emotion and ethics, which I
discuss briefly in Chapter One.
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defined as bodily intensity, becomings, the aesthetic feeling of an era,

identifications, exigences, and constraints) in rhetorical situations. It’s important
to note that I don’t see the realm of affect as beyond the scope of emotion or as
“logically” independent of emotion (as Massumi seems to suggest); this realm
simply hasn’t been pursued extensively within the framework of emotion studies
nor have the respective terminologies of affect and emotion been explored in
proximity. Affect scholarship, taken as a whole, captures some aspects of
experience that haven’t yet been explored in emotion scholarship but not because
of something inherent in either concept, or so I will argue.
Two other terms—rhetorical situation and rhetorical event—will be used in
this dissertation to discuss how pathos has been traditionally theorized and to
name and study the outbreak of mass hysteria in LeRoy. When I write about the
“rhetorical situation,” I am using it as Lloyd Bitzer has defined it (as structured
by exigence, audience, and constraint); I use this understanding as an example of
a common or traditional way that the rhetorical situation has been defined in the
field. I recognize that there have been many critiques5 of Bitzer’s theory; some
have suggested that Bitzer has a too realist worldview (that his theory seems to
capture an essential structure in real-world interactions rather than being an
analytic tool) and others have suggested the spatiality and temporality of the
situation he defined is too limiting. In order to acknowledge these critiques
without abandoning what is structurally useful about Bitzer's rhetorical situation,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Richard Vatz’s “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation” is, of course, the most
famous critique of Bitzer, but scholars like Barbara Biesecker in “Rethinking the
Rhetorical Situation from within the Thematic of Difference” and Jenny Edbauer
Rice in “Unframing Models of Public Distibution: From Rhetorical Situation to
Rhetorical Ecologies” have also addressed the limitations of Bitzer’s theory.
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I use the provisional term, “rhetorical event,” when discussing my case study.

While “situation” has often been understood to mark a discrete, isolated period of
time, “event” seems, to me, to be more spatially and temporally expansive. It may
also allow me to keep some of the structural coherence of Bitzer's situation, while
at the same time attending to the ways in which situations layer and overlap.

The Pathetic Tradition, in Brief6
Pathos has always been at the core of rhetoric. In classical rhetoric, pathos
or the passions are portrayed both in Plato’s chariot allegory as the dark horse
which “has a share of badness is heavy, sinking toward the earth and weighing
down the charioteer by whom he has been not beautifully reared” (Phaedrus
247b) and in Aristotle’s Rhetoric as intimately tied to persuasion: “The emotions
are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are
also attended by pain or pleasure” (bk II, ch. 1, 1378a). Even though Aristotle’s
approach to pathos—based on a tripartite logic7 to analyze the structure of
emotions—brought emotion within the sphere of enthymemic reasoning, the
passions still were more often described as out of our control: passion is
described throughout The Republic, for example, as “intoxicating,” “lawless,” and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Given the brevity of this introduction, I’m admittedly skipping over many
important historical influences that inform current understandings of emotion,
including Christianity, Descartes, psychoanalysis, faculty psychology, etc. For a
brief historical overview, see “The “History of Emotion’ and the Future of
Emotion Research” by Anna Wierzbicka.
7 Aristotle describes how he will analyze each emotion in Book II: “In regard to
each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt; (b) the
people towards whom it is felt; (c) the grounds on which it is felt” (bk. II, ch 1,
1378a).
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“slavish” (bk. IX). Or in contrast to Aristotle’s suggestion that we make use of

emotions rhetorically, Gorgias highlights the more sinister role emotions play in
rhetoric: “For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body,
and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of
speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers
bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion”
(Ecomium 42). Here, Gorgias compares the effects of speech to the effects of
drugs on a body, suggesting the emotions (distress, delight, fear) are what
“bewitch” us. Logic, it seems, doesn’t enrapture our bodies and minds in the same
way.
Speed forward two millennia and scholars continue to rely on classical
understandings of pathos, though developing them in accord with the mission of
the “new rhetorics.” Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification, for example, in
which “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech,
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” has
clear affective implications (Motives 55). To identify with someone in this way
acknowledges the emotional dimension and embodied nature of lived experience,
but it also points to something more, something recent theories call “affective
investment.” Similarly, Edward Corbett (1969) noted the increased focus on—but
also the risk of—a rhetoric that privileges pathos. He makes a clear distinction
(using the metaphor of a hand) between traditional and “new” kinds of rhetorics:
The open hand might be said to characterize the kind of persuasive
discourse that seeks to carry its point by reasoned, sustained,
conciliatory discussion of the issues. The closed fist might signify
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the kind of persuasive activity that seeks to carry its point by non-

rationale, non-sequential, often non-verbal, frequently provocative
means. (“Rhetoric” 288)
The closed fist (perhaps a contemporary dark horse in Plato’s chariot allegory),
he suggests, attends to the emotional dimension, yet there is an element of
volatility that makes the closed fist seem more than just emotional; it is
provocative, if not untamed.
In the last few decades, we’ve seen a surge of scholarship on emotion in
our field. Some of the earliest works on emotion in rhetoric and composition
emerged in the late ‘80s from Susan McLeod (1987, 1995) and Alice Brand (1989,
1990). Their work focused primarily on the emotions that writers feel before and
during the act of composing; they suggested that if we could examine expert
writers’ emotions, we might be able to help our students compose better, more
efficiently, or even find a cure for writer’s block. Two important collections for
this area of scholarship were published during this time: Presence of Mind:
Writing and the Domain Beyond the Cognitive (1994) edited by Alice Glarden
Brand and Richard Graves and The Spiritual Side of Writing: Releasing the
Learner’s Whole Potential (1997), edited by Regina Paxton Foehr and Susan
Schduring. These early works on emotion have clear expressivist undertones;
they suggest that writers might be more successful and produce more “authentic”
writing if they can tap into their emotions for inspiration. These works tend to
consider emotions as personal, internal forces.
Not surprising, given composition’s social turn in the following decade,
work on emotion became more concerned with the social construction and
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political stakes of experiencing and expressing emotion in the contexts of reading
and writing. Lynn Worsham (1998) and T.R. Johnson (2001) are among those
who consider how we are schooled in emotion and its political implications; they
see emotion as embedded in our social and educational structures and
dispositions. These considerations are taken up additionally by scholars who have
examined the emotional labor of writing program administration and the
emotional effects of disciplinary marginalization (see Micciche and Jacob’s 2003
collection, A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion & Composition Studies). More
recently, scholars like Micciche (2007) and Edbauer Rice (2005) have applied
emotion and affect scholarship from across the humanities and social sciences to
our field, suggesting emotions and affects exist between people, in language, and
in our bodies. While the late ‘90s and early ‘00s saw an increased interest in
emotion studies, it seemed to wane when scholars’ attention turned to studies of
affect. In the last decade, the great influx in affect scholarship in our field would
seem to suggest that affect theories offer the field something emotion theories
don’t. I’ll suggest, however, that the influx of “affect” and waning of “emotion”
reflects less about the usefulness of each concept and more about how each
concept has been brought into, used, and theorized in our field.
The main theoretical move that has contributed to the decline in emotion
scholarship is the conceptual divorcing of affect from emotion. Many scholars
attribute this move to this oft-cited distinction from Brian Massumi:
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Affect is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion. But one
of the clearest lessons of this first story8 is that emotion and affect—
if affect is intensity—follow different logics and pertain to different
orders . . . Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional,
consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and
semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable actionreaction circuits, into function and meaning. (Parables 27-8).
Since affect is most closely defined as intensity, emotion is affect tamed and
named. The distinction Massumi makes between affect and emotion, which many
scholars in the field have held onto so very tightly, keeps us from developing
more complicated notions of pathos. When scholars accept Massumi’s distinction
as fixed, they often see no need to consider emotion at all, since emotion is
“qualified,” “conventional,” or “captured.” Given its long pathetic tradition,
rhetoric is already primed for participating in the affective turn,9 yet rather than
using affect theory to extend theories of pathos, most scholars seem to have
abandoned emotion for affect.
However, exploring the distinction between affect and emotion, what
exists between feeling and articulation, is of great interest to rhetoric as we
pursue nonrational and nonlinguistic forms of persuasion and communication.
As Michael Hardt explains in the Forward to The Affective Turn,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Here Massumi is referencing the first case study in his book, which I will discuss
in detail in Chapter Two.
9 The “affective turn” was coined by Patricia Clough in her 2007 collection of the
same name.
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[T]he perspective of the affects requires us to constantly pose as a

problem the relation between actions and passions, between reason
and the emotions. We do not know in advance what a body can do,
what a mind can think—what affects they are capable of. The
perspective of the affects requires an exploration of these as yet
known powers. (x)
From the perspective of the affects, we can see how pathos in the LeRoy case is
not to be found just in the language of mystery and contagion, in the scare tactics
used to engage audiences, in bating interview questions, or in the discourse
among experts and the girls’ families. We are similarly persuaded emotionally by
bodies fighting to control themselves, whose symptoms mimic and evolve
together. Beyond language, beyond discourse, and yet interwoven within them,
we’re persuaded emotionally through the bodies in this event. This dissertation—
through examination and critique of how emotion and affect have been studied in
the field—offers a framework for studying pathos that acknowledges emotion’s
and affect’s work within and beyond the rhetorical appeal.

Chapter Overview
Despite many scholars in rhetoric and composition who have embraced
the resurgence of emotion studies in the last few decades, pathos is still primarily
theorized as a rhetorical appeal. This formulation is useful only for studying
rhetorical situations with discrete borders, beginnings and endings—not the
rhetoricity of an event like the one in LeRoy wherein pathos plays many roles.
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Chapter One, “Pathos Reconsidered,” begins by looking at two of the major

advances in studies of emotion in the last few decades—cognitive-evaluative and
social constructionist approaches to emotion—and examines how these advances
have been received in our field.
These approaches have been taken up in two primary ways: rereading
Aristotle’s concept of pathos and creating pedagogies that call our attention to or
invoke emotions. I suggest that while the practice of rereading (which often
brings cognitive and social approaches to emotion to bear) has brought our
attention to often-overlooked areas of Aristotle’s theory, this scholarship hasn’t
yet considered what it would mean to use this more nuanced understanding of
pathos in practice. Through a look at two examples of pedagogies of emotion
from Laura Micciche and Megan Boler, I illustrate the difficulties of reconciling
cognitive and social approaches to emotion. Micciche and Boler incite particular
emotions (empathy and discomfort) in their students, but the structural logics of
these particular emotions seem unequipped to meet the goals of their
pedagogies—to create more critical readers and writers. Finally, I’ll suggest that a
revised theory of pathos also requires reconsidering the rhetorical situation.
Emotion is often considered to be the cause and effect of a rhetorical situation,
yet as advances in emotion studies detailed in this chapter suggest, emotions play
more varied roles (cognitively and socially) in persuading us. I end this chapter
by suggesting affect theory allows us to imagine more complicated
understandings of pathos, in which emotions and affects are organizing
rhetorical forces.
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Chapter Two, “Rhetorical Affects: Invoking Affect Theory in Rhetorical

Studies,” examines how scholars in our field have primarily understood and used
affect theory. I begin by considering the wave of affect theory that has seemed to
overtake studies of emotion, and I look more closely at the conceptual distinction
between affect and emotion in our field. Through a close reading of Massumi’s
definitions of affect and emotion, I suggest that it’s the very relationship between
the two concepts that Massumi and we might be more interested in. Because
Massumi’s theory of affect focuses on bodily intensity—a force that cannot be
captured in language—it often seems to describe a phenomenon that exists
beyond the scope of rhetorical study; thus, I suggest we also consider other
theories of affect that might be more easily integrated in our field. Fredric
Jameson’s theory of affect (which describes the affects embedded in the
postmodern era) highlights how we can see affects as recursive in a rhetorical
situation, complicating traditional conceptions of rhetorical situations. Finally,
because neither Massumi’s nor Jameson’s theories of affect deal with the
individual’s affective experience, I turn to Jacques Lacan’s concept of desire
(which is closely related to affect) to give insight into why and how individuals
become affectively invested in groups, things, and events. To set up the work of
the following chapter, I suggest that a revised theory of pathos should also
consider the role affects and emotions play in defining projects, sustaining
rhetorical events, and in applying rhetorical theories to studies of objects and
events that might not always have been considered rhetorical.
Chapter Three, “Persuasive Bodies, Phantom Rhetorics: A Theoretical
Framework,” begins with a look at theories of phantom limbs to reveal several
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ways of theorizing bodies that prohibit their study, for example making finite
distinctions between what is and is not of a body, clinging to an idea of a whole

body, and defining bodies by what is visibly present. I suggest we resist theorizing
affect and matter as antithetical (in other words, accepting that matter is seen,
touched, and used, and that affect is not). This chapter puts forth a framework to
better study affect, by 1) approaching rhetoric ontologically, 2) reconnecting
affect to assemblage theory, and 3) defining bodies (human and nonhuman) via
their capacity to affect and be affected. In order to study something like an
outbreak of mass hysteria, we have to figure out first what to study. Taking an
ontological approach (and specifically invoking John Law and Vicky Singleton’s
theory of “fire object”) allows us to identify how mass hysteria’s multiple objects
have different (and sometimes conflicting) rhetorical aims and effects, in addition
to different emotional and affective influences. To address a common complaint
in our field—that we can’t ascertain what affect does rhetorically—I argue that
revisiting Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s assemblage theory (specifically
looking at the concepts “double articulation” and “territorialization”) makes
affect rhetorically visible and purposeful, highlighting that affect assembles
rhetoric, bodies, objects, etc. Finally, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of bodies can
help us see affect as transitive and not representational; affect is captured in a
body’s movement from one state to another, correlated with an increase or
decrease in a body’s (rhetorical) power to act.
The final chapter, “A Rhetorical Analysis of Mass Hysteria,” applies the
theoretical framework put forth in the previous chapter to the LeRoy case. I begin
by describing what makes this case a particularly unique incident of mass
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hysteria. In addition to the news media playing a large role in contributing to the
diagnosing of the girls and in shaping the narrative on a national scale, social
media (specifically faceboook and youtube) became central sites for both the
transmission of symptoms but also for the girls’ attempts to take control of their
own story. Following much of the scholarship that is the basis for this
dissertation, I explain my methodology for the analysis of the case is somewhat
unorthodox. Rather than focusing my analysis solely on the central texts of the
case (e.g., the New York State Department of Health’s report and news media
coverage), I use these texts (in conjunction with historical and medical
scholarship on hysteria and the very recent scholarship on the case) to identify
places in the development of this event that are particularly interesting for a
rhetorical analysis of affect and emotion. Through an application of the
framework put forth in Chapter Three, I conclude that 1) the way we choose and
define complex rhetorical projects has emotional and affective repercussions, 2)
assemblage theory helps us understand how particular parts of the event that
might have seemed external are subsumed in it, and 3) an understanding of affect
that grows out of Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari places affect at the very core of
rhetoric and what is rhetorically possible. Through this configuration, we can
imagine pathos as the very basis for what is rhetorically possible, as discourses
and bodies come into being through their affects. This framework reveals pathos
as an entry point into studying complex rhetorical events and asks us to construct
different kinds of rhetorical projects that might consider, for example, a tic,
verbal outburst, or illness as rhetorical.
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I end with a Postscript that briefly summarizes what I consider to be the
main tenets of a revised theory of pathos. I suggest this would involve 1)

accepting affect and emotion as intimately related, 2) acknowledging and making
rhetorical use of the varying theoretical approaches to affect and emotion, and 3)
seeking out the study of rhetorical objects that are malleable, mediated, qne
bodily, in order to better capture the central roles of affect and emotion in
rhetoric. Finally, I offer three openings that might be pursued in future research,
including 1) the ethical implications of a revised theory of pathos, 2) further
analyses of psychoanalytic theories of affect, and 3) more serious studies of bodily
processes as rhetorical.
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Chapter One

Pathos Reconsidered

I suspect in fact that one of the reasons so much
research on the emotions has appeared in the
academy over the last twenty years is that it has
served as compensation for the anesthetization of the
emotions in academic life, a profession saturated with
stringent rules of emotionless rationality in relation to
research itself and to writing.
–Kathleen Woodward, Statistical Panic
There is nothing reprehensible about being moved to
action through our emotions; in fact it is perfectly
normal.
–Edward Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student

There’s no doubt that studies of emotion and affect have become more
pervasive in the humanities and social sciences in recent decades. The first
epigraph to this chapter reminds us that the turn to emotion and affect isn’t an
accident; given our particular historical, cultural, and academic positionings,
studies of emotion have become more relevant, perhaps even necessary. Yet the
second epigraph reminds us that even though theories of emotion have been
greatly complicated in recent years, it wasn’t that long ago that persuasion via
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emotion could be considered “reprehensible.” It wasn’t that long ago that

emotional appeals were treated as suspect, as appealing to something “lower” in
our nature.
While Corbett highlights the lingering mistrust of emotions, Woodward
echoes a theme that resonates especially in rhetoric and composition—where
many scholars (e.g., Susan Miller (1992); Eileen Schell (2006); Kathleen Welch
(2003); Janine Rider and Esther Broughton (2004)) have written about the
physical and emotional marginalization of our discipline. These scholars draw on
rhetoric and composition’s history and struggle to become recognized as a
discipline and touch on the lingering emotional effects of working in English
departments or across campuses with academics who might still see rhetoric and
composition as concerned more with service10 than serious scholarly pursuits.
This marginalization has not just material repercussions (as academics fight for
resources) but also emotional repercussions if rhetoric and composition scholars
feel they need to prove their legitimacy.
Focusing more on the emotional work in our classrooms, scholars like
Lynn Worsham (1998), T.R. Johnson (2001), and Thomas Rickert (2007) have
called our attention to how contemporary culture and media shape our work as
composition teachers. Suggesting that the emotional experiences of learning and
writing are fundamentally different given technological advances and the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For scholarship on the emotional labor of writing program administration see
Tom Kerr’s, Alice Gillam’s, and Mara Holt, Leon Anderson, and Alber Rouzie’s
essays in A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and Composition Studies, eds.
Laura Micciche and Dale Jacobs. See also Chris Drew et al.’s “Affect, Labor, and
the Graduate Teaching Assistant: Can Writing Programs Become ‘Spaces of
Hope’?” for considerations of the emotional labor of graduate students.
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seeming influx of violence in educational settings, these scholars suggest we find
better ways to help students learn and write in settings that might be more
emotionally complicated (student emotions ranging from complete apathy to
rage) than in previous generations. The fact that so many scholars have been
interested in examining the emotions attached to our disciplinary and
pedagogical work suggests that attention to emotion helps us better investigate a
number of overlooked areas in our field.
Given the influx in scholarship on affect and emotion in the humanities
and social sciences, we might expect rhetorical theories of pathos to be greatly
expanded in recent years. We might expect that scholars would use the studies of
emotion in neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, etc. to reform a theory of
pathos, but this has not yet been the case. While scholars in our field have used
this burgeoning area of scholarship to reread canonical texts and to consider
more carefully how emotion plays into our teaching (for students and teachers),
they don’t easily translate into, or in aggregate compose, a theory of pathos that
would provide clues for how we can better read and move an audience
emotionally. This scholarship informs a more nuanced understanding of the
nature of emotions but is usually discussed separately from theories of pathos.
This chapter begins by explicating the two major movements in
retheorizing emotion in the last several decades (cognitive-evaluative and socialconstructionist approaches to emotion) and then considers how they’ve been
received in the field. Through a look at examples of rereading the concept pathos,
I’ll suggest that scholars have used advances in emotion scholarship primarily to
bolster—extend somewhat but certainly not transform—existing theories of
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pathos. Then I’ll draw out some of the difficulties of reconciling cognitive and
social theories in practice by looking at pedagogies of emotion. I’ll end this

chapter by suggesting a revised theory of pathos would need to account for how
pathos works in emergent, malleable rhetorical events.

Influential Emotion Scholarship
Two theoretical approaches have dominated scholarship on emotion in the
humanities and social sciences in the last several decades: cognitive and social
approaches. The first, influenced mostly by scholarship in psychology, philosophy
and neuroscience,11 suggests that emotion is intelligent, rational, and intentional;
it opposes an understanding of emotion as an unsophisticated, natural force. It
asserts that rather than being at the mercy of emotional waves and whims,
humans have the ability to recognize how emotion works practically and
existentially. The second move emphasizes the cultural, political, and historical
aspects of emotion. Coming from disciplines like anthropology, cultural studies,
and women’s studies, this vein of scholarship emphasizes the contextuality of
emotion and its relation to social position and identity. This social and cultural
approach highlights the emotional structures and customs that are embedded in
a particular place and time and experienced differently depending on one’s social
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio in Descartes’ Error, for example, wrote
extensively on emotions, claiming that feelings functioned no differently in the
brain than other percepts. His main contribution was perhaps the speculative
connection he formed between emotion and practical reasoning, arguing that
emotions help fill in the inevitable gaps between what we know and what we
would need to know to make a certain judgment or decision to permit practical
judgment in an imperfectly understood world.
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position and identity. Unlike cognitive theories which emphasize individuals’
reasoning and evaluative faculties (albeit in social contexts), social and cultural
theories turn us outward to see how emotional pedagogies and mores are and

become embedded in our culture. This section examines the major tenets of each
approach as they might inform rhetorical studies.
One of the central claims of cognitive theories of emotion is that emotion
is an evaluative judgment. Philosopher Robert Solomon in his seminal book The
Passions Emotions and the Meaning of Life (1976) asserts: “An emotion is a basic
judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the
values and ideals, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and
through which we experience our lives” (126). Emotions, then, are a structured
way of understanding our worlds, based on beliefs, judgments, and values.
Rather than understanding emotions as separate from the actions and
interactions we experience, emotions make sense of those experiences:
“[Emotions] are not reactions but interpretations. They are not responses to what
happens but evaluations of what happens. And they are not responses to those
evaluative judgments but rather they are those judgments” (127). Emotion,
therefore, is a “conceptual scheme,” “a worldview and a system of metaphors”
(Solomon 61). Solomon goes on to explain the logic of particular emotions,
analyzing their specific direction, scope, strategy, mythology, etc. (mirroring but
developing Aristotle’s tripartite analysis of emotions in Book II of the Rhetoric).
Both Solomon and Aristotle highlight that emotions have objects and occur
because of certain kinds of circumstances, interactions, and power dynamics.
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Extending Solomon’s theory, philosopher Martha Nussbaum in Upheavals
of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001) claims emotions are not only
evaluative in nature but also emphasizes the centrally moral dimension of
emotion: “Instead of viewing morality as a system of principles to be grasped by
the detached intellect, and emotions as motivations that either support or subvert
our choice to act according to principle, we will have to consider emotions as part
and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning” (1). Nussbaum sees emotions as a
call to respond ethically; they are a part of “the good life”—our conception of what
it means to live well with others. This resonates especially with pathos since
rhetoricians have long debated the importance of invoking emotion ethically and
responsibly.
However, cognitive theories, critics12 have argued, in privileging the
mental aspects of emotion, often ignore—or are too quick to dismiss—the role of
bodies. Because they are responding to prominent influences like the JamesLange theory and the hydraulic model of emotion13—which reinforce that
emotion is based in bodies and more importantly, that bodies cannot be trusted—
Solomon and Nussbaum emphasize that emotions are mental phenomena with
direction and intention. Early bodily theories of emotion reinforce what Solomon
calls “The Myth of the Passions,” wherein emotions are “animal intrusions and
physiologically based disruptions,” “sporadic and ‘irrational’ intrusions,” or
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Some of cognitive theory’s major critics are William Lyons (1980), Ronald de
Sousa (1987), Peter Goldie (2000).
13 For more on the James-Lange theory and the hydraulic model see Michael
Hyde (1984), Matthew Ratcliffe (2005), Robert Solomon (2007). Solomon uses
the “hydraulic model” to serve as a visual reminder that his opposition indulged
in a too mechanical view of human existence.
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”threatening or overwhelming ‘forces’” (xiv). Nussbaum similarly identifies “the
adversary” to cognitive theories: “emotions are ‘non-reasoning movements,’
unthinking energies that simply push the person around” (24). If emotions are
movements that can push and pull us to do things outside of rationality, bodies
become the wild vehicles of emotion. Thus, in distancing themselves from The
Myth of the Passions, many cognitive theories favored minds over bodies—
resulting in what some critics have called an inverse validation of the Cartesian
binary.
The claim that made cognitive approaches resonate with so many scholars
at the time—that emotion is a judgment—is also a point of contention,14 since
judgment is so closely associated with mental processes. Solomon (2004),
himself, nearly thirty years after he published The Passions admits that his
cognitive theory “veered too far in the other direction,” overlooking the role of
bodies (85). He suggests that “judgment” is often misunderstood as “overly
detached and intellectual” but that he’s always recognized that judgments are
bodily. Instead he claims, “‘Judgment’ is less than adequate not because it is too
detached or cerebral but because it fails to make fully explicit our active
engagement in the world” (83). Thus, Solomon focuses his later cognitive theory
of emotion on highlighting how our (emotional) judgments have a recursive
relationship with our surroundings, such that they interpret but also influence
the world around us.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 David Weberman (1996) for example has called Solomon’s cognitive view of
emotion “subjectivist” because it’s concerned mostly with the individual subject’s
world, holding that all perceived things are shaped by our subjectivity.
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Similarly, “judgment” also seems to imply, perhaps inaccurately, conscious
awareness and intentionality. Because of this association, Ronald De Sousa
(1987) suggests that the cognitive view of emotion is best understood as a model
of perception rather than a model of knowledge or judgment: “an emotion can
genuinely affect not just behavior but even our whole orientation to the world and
the events of our lives, without the subject having any particular insight into
either the identity of the emotion or the nature of its influence” (64). The
problem with accepting emotions as judgments is that we often translate that to
mean we are fully aware of the emotions we have; accepting emotions as
perceptions, though, highlights how emotions are a way of understanding the
world around us without committing us to a too-cognitive, or mentalistic,
approach. We can never hold all of the emotions that shape us in our minds at
once. As both Solomon and Aristotle point out, particular emotions function in
different ways; they have different objects and last for different periods of time. I
feel love for my mother, but that love isn’t always the foremost emotion I
experience; it is likely often overshadowed by a series of other more temporally
and spatially close emotions I experience every day. My love may abide but it is
always foregrounded; it isn’t reducible to a number of episodes or times when I
am more aware of my love.
The second major movement in recent emotion scholarship addresses
some of cognitive theories’ blind spots and focuses on the cultural, political, and
historical15 construction of emotion. Many social theorists work against the same
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For more on the history of emotion in rhetoric, see Daniel Gross’ Secret
History of Emotion.
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Cartesian assumptions about emotion that the cognitive theorists oppose;
anthropologist Catherine Lutz, for example, in Unnatural Emotions rejects an
“overly naturalized and rigidly bound concept of emotion”; instead she sees

“emotion as an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an
essence to be distilled” (4). The Western distinction between nature and culture,
Lutz suggests, in which culture is taken to be civilized and rational, contributes to
the idea that emotion is natural (paradoxically, perhaps even mechanical):
“emotion can be viewed as a cultural and interpersonal process of naming,
justifying, and persuading by people in relationship to each other. Emotional
meaning is then a social rather than an individual achievement—an emergent
product of social life” (5). An individual’s emotional experience always reflects
the culture in which she lives—its language for emotion and the ways she is
taught to understand, feel, and express emotions, given her age, social
positioning, race, sexuality, etc. In pointing to the constructedness of emotions,
social theorists often suggest that we are all complicit in regulating our and
others’ emotions and that paying attention to this regulation might undo some of
the emotional construction that has had particularly troublesome
consequences.16
Feminist scholar Sara Ahmed in Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004)
builds on this approach to the emotions, suggesting that “emotions are not ‘in’
either the individual or the social, but produce the very surfaces and boundaries
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 One poignant example is psychologists Dan Kindlon and Michael Thompson’s
Raising Cain: Protecting the Emotional Life of Boys, which details the
(sometimes violent) consequences of a lack of emotional literacy in American
boys. See also Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod’s collection Language and
the Politics of Emotion.
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that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as objects” (10). Here,

Ahmed recognizes the limitations of locating emotion primarily within or beyond
the individual and offers instead metaphors of surface and boundary to
emphasize how experiences with emotion divide and categorize individuals into
social groups and cultures.
Many social theories of emotion also point out the ways in which a
person’s social and cultural positioning both enable and constrain the expression
of and experience with emotion. One obvious way we are positioned is through
gender. In “Engendered Emotion: Gender, Power, and the Rhetoric of Emotional
Control in American Discourse” (1996), Lutz contends that any discourse on
emotion is ultimately a discourse on gender:
As both an analytic and an everyday concept in the West, emotion,
like the female, has typically been viewed as something natural
rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather
than ordered, subjective rather than universal, physical rather than
mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and hence
often dangerous. (69)
Studies show, according to Lutz, that children as young as preschool age have
learned gendered emotional stereotypes; emotion for women is especially
culturally constructed, functioning to keep women subordinate and labeled as
irrational (87). Because women are expected to be more emotional, they are often
held responsible for the emotional lives of those who surround them. This is a
common claim that feminist scholars studying emotion address; philosopher
Alison Jaggar, for instance, supports Lutz’s assertion about the gender disparity
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in emotional expression: “emotionally inexpressive women are suspect as not
being real women” (157). Jaggar calls emotions that are incompatible with

dominant values “outlaw emotions”; anger, for example, is an outlaw emotion for
women, although the propensity for anger is an important component for male
expressions of dominance and masculinity. Both Lutz and Jaggar, by pointing out
the systemic nature of emotions, emphasize emotions as culturally embedded; we
grow up in patterns of emotional expression and experience that teach us which
emotions are more or less acceptable, given our identities.
Each of these approaches presents unique opportunities for theories of
pathos. The cognitive approach suggests that a closer study of how particular
emotions work could help a rhetor more easily incite them or work with them.
For example, because emotions always have an object, if a rhetor wants to incite
anger, she might bring the object of anger into presence through anecdotes or
imagery, but if a rhetor wants to inspire forgiveness toward the object of that
anger, she might try to distance her discourse from that object and instead
conjure an object that inspires sympathy. Depending on the emotion, spatial and
temporal distance from the object of the emotion might intensify or ameliorate it.
Rhetors are often tasked with trying to either incite an emotion to inspire action
in an audience or quell an emotion to appease an audience; thus, understanding
the structures of emotions can be useful when a rhetor decides which emotions
might be best to invoke and how to work (with) them. If emotions are structured
cognitively as judgments and serve primarily evaluative purposes, opportunities
emerge for rhetoricians. Studying the judgments that structure an emotion
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related to its object gives rhetoricians a clearer place to start when they plan
pathetic strategies and integrate them with a larger plan and purpose.
Likewise, social approaches to emotion provide the rhetor with a better

idea of how social and political contexts might shape the emotions of an audience
or their willingness (perhaps susceptibility) to developing other emotions.
Because rhetorical situations always have cultural, contextual constraints,
thinking more carefully about these constraints might offer clues about which
emotions would be best to appeal to. For example, many took advantage of the
emotions inspired by 9/11, perhaps most egregiously George W. Bush who used
the dynamics of anger and fear to further his purpose in his national addresses.
Though an extreme case, Bush’s use of pathos,17 combined with an understanding
of the emotions that dominated American culture at that time, was arguably
effective. Similarly, following social theorists who assert our emotions are tied up
in our cultural identities and affiliations, a rhetor might pay particular attention
to the identities and affiliations of an audience to determine which emotions
might be most effective in persuading that audience. For example, a rhetor
addressing a group of female pro-choice activists might incite feelings that are
accepted and valued in that group (anger, empowerment, strength). Studying the
cultural contexts of a rhetorical situation as they are attached to the identities of
those in an audience might help a rhetor more carefully choose her emotional
appeals.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee even discuss Bush’s use of pathos in their
Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. They suggest it was important for
Bush to take advantage of the immediate intensity of emotions following 9/11,
reflecting a spatial and temporal understanding of emotions.
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However, it’s not difficult to imagine the potential trouble of invoking

these two approaches, as scholars try to reconcile emotion as part of the cognitive
processing of the individual and emotion in social and cultural constructs. When
we imagine these two forces in a situation, they seem to be heterogeneous:
cognitive emotions originate inside the individual and social emotions originate
outside the individual and are imposed on him. This makes it difficult to imagine
how, in practice, we can integrate these forces within a coherent way of
addressing emotion rhetorically, as the individual seems to be situated as a
screen through which emotions unilaterally move in and out. Of course both
cognitive and social theories are more complicated than this, as scholars from
both approaches have argued in addressing critiques. Yet there’s little precedence
for how a rhetor might embrace both approaches to emotion in practice. In part,
this is a disciplinary issue, since philosophers and social scientists are invested in
studying particular sites. Rhetoricians who deal with individual rhetors and
audience members within social and cultural contexts would be interested in how
these approaches work and interact with each other. A theory of pathos should
grow out of an understanding of emotion on both cognitive and social levels. In
the following sections (rereading and pedagogy), we can see how difficult it is to
integrate productive, coherent ways of invoking these two influences, especially
in practice.
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Rereading Aristotle’s Pathos
Cognitive and social approaches to emotion have inspired rereadings of
pathos (mostly but not all neo-Aristotelian) that 1) heighten our awareness of its
many roles in persuasive communication and 2) complicate our understanding of
the concept itself. Rereading has, of course, been an important practice in our
field and there are many varied examples of it;18 here, I’ll turn to a few brief
examples to exemplify how cognitive and social approaches have influenced
relatively recent studies of pathos.
The first kind of rereading takes the influx in emotion scholarship as an
occasion to recognize the (often overlooked) role of pathos in the rhetorical
tradition. We can see this, for example, in Susanna Engbers’ (2007) rereading of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s use of pathos in her speeches. While several scholars
have attributed Cady Stanton’s success to her mastery of masculine discourse
conventions, Engbers asserts that it was also her mastery of feminine-seeming
appeals to emotion—specifically her ability to conjure sympathy through use of
vivid, sensory language—that made her speeches so effective. Engbers builds off
of the social and feminist work of reclaiming emotion, and asserts that pathos has
often been systemically ignored in the rhetorical tradition. Because, as Krista
Ratcliffe (1996) has suggested, the Western tradition names emotion as “illogical,
irrational, nonsensical, untrue, invalid” (19), pathos has often been a more
cursory focus in rhetorical analysis. The practice of rereading, as many feminist
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Janet Atwill’s Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition
(1991) or Susan Jarrett’s Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured
(1991).
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rhetorical scholars19 have illustrated, often serves to identify and reconsider

rhetorical and discursive traditions that might be considered more feminine (like
emotion). Although this vein of scholarship takes advances in emotion
scholarship as an occasion to highlight the role of pathos, it doesn’t necessarily
consider the concept anew; while it emphasizes the importance of understanding
emotions as gendered, it gives few clues as to how we might use that
understanding in practice.
The second kind of rereading, however, aims to use cognitive and social
approaches to more directly reconsider how pathos (especially the Aristotelian
concept) has been defined and developed rhetorically. This is, of course, a
delicate task because we have to be careful not to produce anachronistic
rereadings, as Jeff Walker (2000) reminds us. He asserts, for example, that “the
Aristotelian account of pathos implies a rhetoric that is not quite ‘Aristotelian,’ at
least not in the usual neo-Aristotelian sense, and that is quite probably at odds
with what Aristotle himself preferred” (“Pathos” 76). The recent surge of
cognitive theories that portray emotions as intentional, he says, is not likely true
to Aristotle’s original purposes, since the common Greek understanding was that
emotions could not be “consciously willed or ‘commanded’ into existence”
(“Pathos” 83). In rushing to reread Aristotle through recent trends in emotion
studies, some scholars, Walker asserts, have ignored the heart of his theory.
However, Walker illustrates through careful study of the enthemyme, in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 For example, Cheryl Glenn’s Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from
Antiquity through the Renaissance (1997), and Gesa Kirsch and Jacqueline
Royster’s Feminist Rhetorical Practices: New Horizons for Rhetoric,
Composition, and Literacy Studies (2012).
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his 1994 article “The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the Enthymeme,” how
cognitive and social approaches to emotion can be better invoked. Because the
root of enthymeme (thymos or heart) is the “seat of emotions and desires or
motive, of the sometimes uncontrollable forces of desire and wish that drive

human intentionality,” Walker suggests pathos had a more important role in the
enthymeme (or enthymeme construction) than scholars once thought (“Body”
48-9). He asserts, “the three traditional sources of persuasion-ethos, logos,
pathos-are not separate kinds of ‘proof’ but simultaneous dimensions of the
enthymeme” (“Body” 60). Through etymological and historical work, Walker
emphasizes that Book II of Aristotle’s Rhetoric already uses a social and cultural
approach to emotion along with a cognitive one. Walker uses contemporary
theories to highlight what has always been present in and central to Aristotle’s
work.
Similarly, Ellen Quandahl (2003) carefully acknowledges the cultural
context of ancient Greece to assert that Aristotle’s writing on emotions is based
on his observations of others in his culture. She draws on Aristotle’s identity as a
teacher of rhetoric to suggest his take on emotions was centrally or substantially
pedagogical in nature. Aristotle is “an indispensable predecessor for
acknowledging and working with rather than against emotion in rhetorical
education” (11). His writing recognizes emotions as situational, yet they also have
an underlying pedagogical purpose that always considers what is best for citizens
and orators. Quandahl’s rereading emphasizes the political landscape of
Aristotle’s time—in addition to considering his daily life and investments in
Greek society. Like Walker, Quandahl uses the recent resurgence of studies in
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emotion to reread the role emotions played for Aristotle in his writing—but more
importantly in his teaching.
Taking up what has arguably been the most promising rereading of
Aristotle’s concept pathos to date, Michael Hyde and Craig Smith (1991) examine
Book II of the Rhetoric in conjunction with Heidegger’s analysis of mood. The
problem with the (mostly neo-Aristotelian) way Book II is often read, they assert,
is that it fails to recognize that “emotions function primordially as vehicles for the
active sensibility of human beings, that they are interrelated and exist along
continua, and that they have the power to transform the temporal and spatial
existence of our publicness, our everyday being-with-others” (461). Hyde and
Smith emphasize that Aristotle presented his discussion of emotions, not as a
mere list of independent examples, but in pairs (anger-calm, friendship-enmity,
fear-confidence, shame-shamelessness, kindness-cruelty, pity indignation, and
envy-emulation) that each form a dynamic continuum. This mode of presentation
suggests that our attention should be less on the causes of discrete emotions and
more on the relations between emotions, the dynamic interactions between
emotions, and how all that affects our experience with them. Thus, a rhetorical
study of emotions should consider not just how emotions are appealed to but how
speakers move audiences between emotional pairs. As Hyde and Smith assert,
“Touching one pathe affects others that are part of the human emotional web; the
webbing runs along continua that help bring listeners into the same frame of
mind” (456). If emotions exist on continua, the rhetor’s job is either to push the
listeners along a continuum from one end to the other or to keep them in a more
settled, “least affected” state.
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To accept Hyde and Smith’s reading means that our concept of the
emotional appeal needs to be expanded to recognize 1) that we are dealing with
emotional dynamics or patterns of emotion and not discrete emotional

episodes/states, and 2) that our grasp of what emotions do (push and motivate) is
deficient and needs to include an understanding of how—exactly—emotions open
up aspects of the world, rhetorically operating complexly with affect and bodily
movement. Put otherwise, emotional appeals, they suggest, do not just “motivate”
thought, belief, and action; they have a much richer role to play in our discursive
(rhetorical) lives. While Hyde and Smith make a compelling call to reconsider
and expand Aristotle’s concept pathos, no one has yet responded.
While Walker and Quandahl’s rereadings use advances in emotion
research to offer a more nuanced portrayal of Aristotle’s concept of pathos, these
aspects of his theory of pathos have been there all along. Walker and Quandahl
don’t reshape the concept pathos as much as they use recent advances in emotion
research to point out how much of it was overlooked in the first place. Though a
relatively new focus in rhetorical studies, many scholars across disciplines have
turned back to point out the complexities of Aristotle’s theory.20 Long before
cognitive and social approaches, Heidegger famously called Book II “the first
systematic hermeneutic of everydayness of being with one another,” and it
became the basis of his theory of Dasein (178). He asserts, “the fundamental
ontological interpretation of affects has hardly been able to take one step worthy
of mention since Aristotle” (138).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Even Freud claimed that psychoanalytic theories of verbal suggestion
resonated with Aristotle’s Book II.
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Rereadings of Aristotle’s concept pathos have pointed our attention back
to the concept itself and how nuanced it is, but except for the yet-pursued
openings Hyde and Smith’s rereading offers, we don’t get a sense of how to take
advantage of these rereadings rhetorically. Arguably, this is a matter of the
purpose of rereading; it’s a practice that puts forth new interpretations of texts
and doesn’t necessarily put those interpretations into practice. However,
cognitive and social approaches to emotion have also contributed to recent
pedagogies in the field.

Pedagogies of Emotion
We might expect that in practice, in pedagogy, it might be easier to invoke
both cognitive and social approaches to emotion, yet the trends I detail in this
section show how emotion scholarship has been used primarily in cultural
studies-like analyses of our discipline and pedagogies—an approach that while
valuable fails to address how we can rhetorically respond to or change these
emotional conditions. An extension of social inquiries into emotion, much of this
line of scholarship considers how emotion is disciplined—both on a societal level
and within the academy. In the collection A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion
& Composition Studies, editors Dale Jacobs and Laura Micciche assert: “the
personal and the professional are always interconnected, making the
commonplace idea that emotion is solely ‘personal’ an untenable and insufficient
claim because it fails to consider the way emotion refuses to be contained in our
‘personal’ lives” (6). This resonates with scholars who have written about
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experiences with professional emotions, for instance shame (J. Brooks Bouson
(2005), Schell (2006), and Di Leo (2006)). Bouson describes ours as “a time

when, as the job market is collapsing and tenure is being slowly eroded, the Ph.D.
degree is becoming an emblem not of intellectual pride but of failure for those
forced into the dismal world of the adjunct instructor” (625). She asserts a
“decline of civility in the profession” contributes to public ridicule at conferences,
disparaging those on the bottom of the academic hierarchy (627). This vein of
scholarship explores the emotional, social conditions that academics navigate
and in naming particular emotions, brings the scholarship within the purview of
cognitive approaches to emotion. While these inquiries into disciplinary and
academic emotions are important for better understanding our (emotional) work
in this culture, they don’t discuss the role pathetic appeals or strategies might
have in the (re)construction of these emotional conditions.
Several scholars assert that academic emotional conditions might be most
tangible in our classrooms.21 The most frequently cited work on pedagogies of
emotion in the field is Lynn Worsham’s “Going Postal” which critiques our
cultural education in emotion, describing the “hidden curriculum” of emotion in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Another important consideration for theorizing pathos in the classroom is
through our use of textbooks. See Gretchen Fletcher Moon’s 2003 article “The
Pathos of Pathos: The Treatment of Emotion in Contemporary Composition
Textbooks” for an overview of how textbooks in the field tend to deal with pathos.
A particularly strong example of introducing pathos to students is Sharon
Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students.
They achieve an important balance in presenting emotions as personal,
embodied, rational, and intelligent. They reframe the way pathos has been
situated historically, suggesting the ancients often attached emotional appeals to
the logical and thought emotions had “heuristic potential” to move an audience
from one place to the next.
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capitalist society; emotions like “grief, hatred, bitterness, anger, rage, terror, and
apathy” dominate our affective lives (217). Composition and cultural studies
responded to this violent emotional culture with “radical pedagogy,” but
Worsham asserts it rarely accomplishes the decolonization it intends. Both
critical and experiential pedagogies tend to still ascribe to uncomplicated theories
of emotion, if they attend to emotion at all:
Critical pedagogy fails to be sufficiently critical; it does not carefully
consider, through a subtly articulated discourse of emotion, how
students have been taught to name their affective lives, how they
might begin the process of renaming and rephrasing. Critical
pedagogy does not make emotion and affective life the crucial
stakes in political struggle. With its rhetoric focused on pleasure
and empowerment, critical pedagogy works against itself to
remystify not only the objective conditions of human suffering but
also the varied experience of suffering. (235)
Worsham gets closest to explaining how these larger cultural/emotional
phenomena play out in our everyday work, yet she also points to several obstacles
that stand in the way of more nuanced applications of emotion studies, for
example, a lack of attention to primary schooling in emotion, a lack of emotional
vocabularies,22 or the gendered division of (emotional) labor. Worsham’s main
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Many affect and emotion scholars have made the claim that a lack of
vocabulary to describe affective and emotional experience prevents us from more
complicated understandings. Teresa Brennan (2004), for example, asserts, “It
then behooves us, as a species, to reconnect language and understanding with the
fleshly and environmental codes from which our consciousness had split by
fantasy and illusion” (148-9). Additionally, see Massumi (2002), Boler (1999),
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critiques of critical pedagogy lie in the penchant to recognize emotion as either a
positive or negative force. In highlighting the relationship between being
“sufficiently critical” and cultivating “pleasure and empowerment,” we see the
tendency to align emotion either with the negativity of critique or the positivity of
empowerment.23
This tendency underlies much of the scholarship on pedagogy and emotion
in the humanities, as we can see in, for example, Dale Jacob’s (2005) a pedagogy
of hope, Laura Micciche’s (2007) a pedagogy of wonder, Megan Boler’s (1999)
pedagogy of discomfort, or Katarzyna Marciniak’s (2010) pedagogy of anxiety.
Through the “difficult emotions” of fear or discomfort, scholars suggest students
will recognize truths about the world, conjure more self-awareness, and learn to
be more “critical” about the discourses that surround them. Through pedagogies
that focus on more positive (e.g., hope, wonder) emotions, scholars suggest
students will develop a kind of curiosity that allows them to see their worlds
anew. Both of these sets of pedagogies promise a kind of emotional
enlightenment, forged through a path of negative emotional analysis or positive
emotional invention. Focusing on emotion as inherently positive or negative
distracts us though from grasping a more complicated understanding of
emotion—one that a concept of pathos could grow out of. I’ll describe an example
of a positive and a negative emotional pedagogy, and then show how they
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Micciche (2007), and “Contemporary Vocabularies of Emotion” by Ellen
Bersheid, or “Emotion and Culture: Arguing with Martha Nussbaum,” by Anna
Weirznicka.
23 Interestingly, “affect” also tends to be theorized as either “good” or “bad,” as
Claire Hemmings (2005) has noted; she asserts scholars tend to use “affect” with
“the pessimism of social determinism (including bad affect) or the optimism of
affective freedom (good affect)” (551).
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struggle to reconcile an understanding of emotion as simultaneously cognitive
and social.

The primary emotions considered in Micciche’s Doing Emotion: Rhetoric,
Writing, Teaching are empathy and wonder. Because she emphasizes how
emotion is performative, enacted and embodied, she writes about a “deep
embodiment pedagogy,” which grows out of cultural and performance theory,
and which asks students to embody or perform others peoples’ emotions. One of
the exercises asks students to record someone else’s everyday conversation,
transcribe it, and then perform it. This exercise encourages students to feel
empathy for what it’s like to live in another person’s body and social position:
“Rather than studying emotioned bodies as textual features for analysis, a
performative approach attempts to make physical the realities of being a certain
kind of body in the world” (56). In another example, students record themselves
reading a passage of a text aloud, compare their reading to others, and then
perform others’ readings. Taking on another person’s physical and cultural
identity through performing a text pushes students out of passive interpretation
and analysis: “Deep embodiment . . . opens us to experimentation with
inhabiting, as much as possible, another’s embodied emotions through an
intimate relation to words as well as through bodily-based performance of those
words” (60). Micciche uses a social approach to emotion by emphasizing that all
bodies are situated in social and cultural contexts. The empathy that students
experience, Micciche suggests, can fuel students’ critical and rhetorical work,
drawing on the inventive capacities of emotion. Courses that are “highly charged”
and “emotionally sensitive,” she suggests, might benefit from “classroom
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activities that ask students to perform one facet of an illness, character, or author
(as well as what they perceive to be an alternative characteristic) with a particular
focus on the emotionally entailed in each performance” (69). Through the
practice of empathy and in cultivating wonder (efforts that reflect a cognitive
approach of identifying particular emotions but also a social approach by
emphasizing that bodies are always socialized), deep embodiment pedagogy
promises to incite new experiences and ideas for students.
Focusing, instead, on inciting critical readings through more negative
emotional experience, education scholar Megan Boler puts forth her theory of a
“pedagogy of discomfort” in Feeling Power: Emotions and Education. Boler
asserts fear is the primary emotion when it comes to not seeing, ignoring, and
dismissing the injustices that surround us. This “emotional selectivity” is what we
use to repress and sanction “unacceptable” emotions, but we must, she says,
“examine how our modes of seeing have been shaped specifically by the dominant
culture of the historical moment” (179). Thus, Boler makes the practice of what
she calls “collective witnessing” central in her pedagogy of discomfort; to engage
in an emotional critical inquiry students must “collectively witness” (rather than
individually reflect on) “how emotion shapes what and how they see—and don’t
see” (177). Boler gives examples of looking at photos of lynchings or the video of
Rodney King’s beating to examine the privileges of spectatorship. Essentially, this
pedagogy asks students and instructors to collectively question their beliefs and
values, to reveal “visual habits” or “habits of inattention” that keep us from
witnessing our surroundings. In asking students to recognize and name the
emotions felt in witnessing violence, Boler emphasizes a cognitive approach to
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emotions, alongside considerations of the historical and cultural moment. The

goal of Boler’s pedagogy is to create a collective experience of discomfort that she
hopes will help students dwell in ambiguity, to inspire more critical readings of
cultural events.
What these pedagogies offer, unlike the scholarly practice of rereading
rhetoric’s past, is a look at what it means to incite emotion. While Boler and
Micciche aren’t in a conventional rhetorical situation per se, they use pathos to
incite particular emotions through the scenarios and experiences they ask
students to participate in. Boler and Micciche use both cognitive and social
approaches to emotion in the hopes of inciting discomfort and empathy, albeit
with different emphases in each case. In choosing particular kinds of emotion,
they suggest they are invoking a cognitive understanding of emotion, yet neither
spends the time to consider the logics of these emotions—how they work and are
best developed. Rather Micciche’s and Boler’s logics seems to rely on socially
expected responses to particular objects. For example, the social expectation is
that witnessing violence makes you feel uncomfortable, and “taking a walk in
another person’s shoes” makes you feel empathy. And upon this witnessing or
embodying, Boler and Micciche hope students will be propelled into
social/political action of some kind. However, we know from cognitive theory
that an emotion like empathy, for example, is very complicated. Empathy can
quickly turn into resentment or relief depending on the object of empathy. As
Dennis Lynch has suggested in his writing on empathy:
Those who start from positions of privilege seem to have no clear
motivation to empathize with others less fortunate, at least
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motivation that is in line with “their” interests, while those who

start from positions of relative disadvantage only stand to lose more
ground by giving ground— through empathy—to their opposition.
The social field is not even, and, given this critique, the call to
empathize can suddenly seem inadequate, as if hidden in that call
were the bound-to-fail message, “Just listen, and in time the
dynamics of power will flatten themselves out” (9).
The uneven social field Lynch mentions would likely play out in the composition
classroom: if I’m performing/embodying the actions of someone who I deem is
better off, my empathy can quickly turn into resentment; if I’m
performing/embodying the actions of someone who I deem is worse off, my
empathy can quickly turn into self-satisfaction or even relief as I’m reminded of
my good fortune. Empathy is also a difficult emotion to maintain; in the moment
of the embodiment exercise and shortly thereafter, I might feel empathy but with
temporal and spatial distance from the object of empathy (the experience of the
exercise), it diminishes. Thus, empathy alone—or reduced in this manner of
execution—might not be best suited to inspire social and political engagement.
Without a more detailed analysis of empathy, Micciche fails to fully take
advantage of a cognitive approach to emotion. In hoping that the “positive”
experience of empathy will result in a classroom environment that is both more
critical but also aware of their social stratification, Micciche seems to ascribe to
what Lynch calls the “bound-to-fail message”: “Just listen, and in time the
dynamics of power will flatten themselves out.”
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Similarly, a cognitive look at “discomfort” uncovers the potential difficulty
of invoking it in the classroom. In part this is because discomfort works more like
a mood than an emotion; its object tends to be broad or ambiguous. We can
imagine how a first-year student might view something like the video of the
Rodney King beating and feel discomfort, yet the object of that discomfort is
likely broad or undetermined. That discomfort could arguably be directed at
police officers, Rodney King, the history of American racism, the justice system,
the teacher who is showing the video, etc. Like depression or anxiety, discomfort
rarely has a clear object. This discomfort could easily manifest as a vague
mistrust or suspicion of society in general—hardly the kind of emotional
experience that would inspire one to enact social and political change. Because
discomfort functions more like a mood than an emotion, it tends to be more
difficult to identify and change.
These pedagogies hope emotional experience will inspire students to feel
something new that will lead to more critical, socially aware reading and analysis.
However, it’s unclear the extent to which the emotional structures of empathy or
discomfort will incite the kind of change that is desired. The tendency to cast
emotion as primarily positive or negative overshadows the more subtle work of
emotion. The assumption seems to be that a positive or negative emotional
experience will lead to more complicated reading and writing. But couldn’t a
neutral emotional experience (sans shock value) or more complex patterns of
emotion also produce more complicated reading and writing? Though both
Micciche and Boler clearly benefit from cognitive and social approaches to
emotion, it becomes clear in their writing how difficult it is to invoke both of
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these approaches together in practice; both scholars lean on a tenuous

understanding of emotions as cognitive in hopes it will reveal social and cultural
disparities and manifestations of emotions.

The Current State of Pathos
Though it was likely the hope of Walker, Quandahl, and Hyde and Smith
that scholars would take up and carry forward their work to reconfigure a theory
of pathos, that hope has not yet been realized. Their work—scholarly and
provocative as it is—just left us wanting more to figure out what it might mean to
put into practice claims like “reason and affect are inseparably interwoven”
(Walker 60), “our study of the moral/emotions must be centered in discourse”
(Quandahl 21), or “[t]he use of [Aristotle’s] complex and subtle descriptions [of
the emotions] allow critics to correct past analyses of emotional appeals by
adding dimensions that have been ignored for too long and, as we hope we have
made clear, are absolutely crucial to the public character of our being-withothers” (462). Likewise, scholars who’ve investigated pedagogies of emotion
likely hoped that a better understanding of how we are educated in and through
emotion would lead to more careful and productive understandings of emotions
for students and instructors. While progress has been made in this regard, this
line of scholarship doesn’t easily translate into better understandings of how we
or our students can better use pathos in our own works.
The scholarship on rereading pathos and emotional pedagogies point out
the opportunities and obstacles that cognitive and social approaches to emotion
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present for rhetoric. Because cognitive approaches to emotion are more focused
on the circumstances that give rise to particular emotions, as the subject
experiences them, it’s less clear what happens to these seemingly private
emotions as they relate to the environment, people, and objects that surround,
pervade, or constitute the subject. Cognitive theories are less equipped to theorize
collective experiences with emotions, to explain how personal, evaluative
judgments influence the world outside of the subject. Social approaches also raise
obstacles, particularly for rhetors making assumptions about the identities of an
audience; we have to be weary of Hawhee’s warning about freezing bodies.
Reading bodies primarily in terms of their social positionality ignores how bodies
are in constant movement—moving among situations and taking on varying
identities. When we make assumptions about the emotions that persuade a prochoice woman, for example, we risk freezing her, forgetting about the many other
identities and bodies in which she has lived and will live. We know that emotions
function simultaneously on the levels of the cognitive and social; the task that
remains is figuring out how these two different views of the emotions relate to
and influence each other.
Pathos has always been concerned with movement: moving an audience
from one emotional state to another or moving an audience toward a judgment or
action. The movement of emotion in cognitive and social approaches is still
relatively uncomplicated, however (as it is perceived primarily moving in and out
of the human subject). Social and cognitive approaches inspire an understanding
of the rhetorical situation that upholds a distinct division between the human and
outside world. Within this relatively fixed situation, emotions move in a few
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directions: from the context of the situation to the rhetor and audience, from the
audience to the rhetor, and from the rhetor to the audience. With an identifiable
rhetor, audience, and argument, the work of pathos is easier to identify.
However, in complex situations, when emotion is not clearly emanating from an
audience or imposed by the rhetor, when it would seem emotion exists externally
from human intervention, the work of pathos is diverse and often oblique.
Current theories of pathos aren’t designed to untangle emotion in a case like
LeRoy, in which there are so many overlapping situations and pervasive emotions
that don’t have clear origin points, rhetorical purposes, or that have varied
rhetorical purposes.
Accounting for the many roles emotion plays in a case like LeRoy might
seem like a better job for affect theory, which is primarily concerned with the
emergence of affects, feelings, and emotions—as they form relations among
human and nonhuman bodies. However, affect has often have been studied
separately from (if not considered in opposition to) studies of emotion in our
field. But as I’ll suggest in the next chapter, affect and emotion are not actually in
opposition. Turning to affect theories reveals different rhetorical manifestations
of emotions and affects that are useful for a revision of pathos. Because affect is
focused on an emergence and movement that is often separate from the human
subject, affect theory gives a better account of how emotions come into being in
complex situations, when emotions aren’t clearly emerging from a rhetor or
audience.
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Chapter Two

Rhetorical Affects:
Invoking Affect Theory in Rhetorical Studies

Just as scholarship on emotion was taking hold in rhetoric and
composition in the late ‘90s and early ‘00s, a wave of affect scholarship washed
over our field. This wave, which has been prominent in disciplines across the
humanities, has in many ways replaced interest in emotion studies in our field. A
brief look at articles published in the last decade suggests that scholars see a lot
of potential in affect, especially as rhetoricians have pursued the study of
nontraditional texts and discourses, e.g. music (Rickert 2005; Hawk 2010;
Halbritter 2010), animals (Hawhee 2011; Muckelbauer 2011; Davis 2011), and
objects (Barnett 2010).
If the difficulty of invoking advances in emotion scholarship could be
summed up as a struggle to reconcile two varied approaches that capture two
(seemingly separate) parts of the rhetorical situation, the difficulty with invoking
affect theory is that it’s often defined such that affect can’t be contained or
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expressed in terms of the rhetorical situation, at least traditionally defined.

Because affect is commonly understood as being nonlinguistic and pre-cognitive,
it seems to exceed the capture of rhetorical theory—an impression that usually
grows out of Massumi’s work on affect and his influence on the field. The
integration of Massumi’s work in our field frequently focuses on a distinction
between affect and emotion, using it to suggest that affect is separate from
emotion and thus has more potential. This chapter, through a closer look at
Massumi’s work on affect, troubles that distinction which is so often cited in
affect scholarship in our field.24
Massumi’s theory gives us some vocabulary to talk about the more
visceral, bodily, or fleeting aspects of rhetoric, yet because it aims to capture
something noncognitive, beyond language and discourse, it isn’t easily explained
in rhetorical terms. However, other theories of affect have been used in the field
to highlight different roles for affect in rhetoric, namely Fredric Jameson’s. His
affect theory has been used primarily for pedagogical purposes, but I’ll suggest
that we can also use Jameson’s theory to better understand the recursivity of
affect in the rhetorical situation—how affect both propels and contains a
rhetorical situation. However, because both Massumi and Jameson theorize
affect as impersonal, it’s often difficult to imagine how the individual becomes
tied up in affect (aside from a vague understanding of how affect operates
through a kind of crowd mentality), so I’ll turn finally and briefly to Lacan’s

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 For example in Cory Holding (2007), Jenny Edbauer Rice (2008), Ashley
Falzetti (2008), Catherine Chaput (2010), Byron Hawk (2004).

56!

!
concept “desire” to consider how affects manifest in the investments and
motivations of a rhetor or audience.
Before I turn to Massumi, Jameson, and Lacan, I’ll look at how affect

theory has primarily been defined and used in the field. In this brief explication I
hope to show why it has thus far seemed to be beyond the purview of the concept
pathos. Because “affect” is often used in the field to denote another realm25 (like
the social, cultural, material, or environmental), much of this scholarship focuses
on acknowledging its existence and influence but stops short of considering how
we can take advantage of affect rhetorically. A rhetorical understanding of affect
requires a study of the role affects play in the production, development, and
movement of rhetoric—the sort of study I begin in this chapter.

Affect: Defining the Indefinable
“Affect,” as any scholar devoted to studying the phenomenon will likely tell
you, breaks us out of a humanistic approach to rhetoric. Unlike emotion which
struggles with the long standing (mis)conceptions of being too personal,
irrational, or weak to be worthy of study, affect by definition can never be
personal, irrational, or weak; its indeterminacy makes it a force whose influence
can never be fully grasped and whose effects can never be fully represented. And
it is this very indeterminacy that makes affect theorists see such great social and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Take for example Sharon Crowley (2006), Donna Strickland (2007), Jonathan
Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes (2010), or Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey (2011)
who call attention to affective features of writing and rhetoric but only as
tangentially produced by or related to the main focus of their projects.
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political potential in its study. Historian Ruth Leys in “The Turn to Affect: A
Critique” asserts that what motivates affect scholars is their desire to reveal a
kind of alternate history, contesting the historical privileging of rationality.
Political, ethical, and aesthetic judgments have always had an affective
component that we are only just recently willing to acknowledge. Leys writes of
the affect scholarship, generally:

The claim is that we human beings are corporeal creatures imbued
with subliminal affective intensities and resonances that so
decisively influence or condition our political and other beliefs that
we ignore those affective intensities and resonances at our peril—
not only because doing so leads us to underestimate the political
harm that the deliberate manipulation of our affective lives can do
but also because we will otherwise miss the potential for ethical
creativity and transformation that “technologies of the self”
designed to work on our embodied being can help bring about
(436).
For many affect scholars, there are real ethical and political stakes in ignoring our
affective lives. Summarizing the work of “the new affect theorists” (Nigel Thrift,
Eric Shouse, Brian Massumi, and William Connolly), Leys asserts that affect is
seen as separate from and prior to ideology, giving affect a unique position from
which to critique and transform ideology. For these theorists, Leys claims, affects
“are nonsignifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of
conscious awareness and meaning . . . affects are ‘inhuman,’ ‘pre-subjective,’
‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments but are
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separate from these” (440). Affects are noncognitive bodily states or processes,

yet they can also extend through and beyond bodies, as Patricia Clough suggests
in her introduction to The Affective Turn, “Affect is also theorized in relation to
the technologies that are allowing us both to ‘see’ affect and to produce affective
bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic physiological constraints” (2). Thus,
affects are not exclusive to humans; they don’t belong to anyone or anything but
rather circulate among us.
While the influence of affect theory in our field has been clear for some
time, figuring out what it means—or has meant—for us is less so. As theories of
affect gained attention across the humanities in the last several decades, scholars
have taken up “affect” and used it as synonymous with emotion or to describe
physical feeling, social force, or intensity.26 Likewise, when scholars in rhetoric
and composition first started writing about affect, it was often used
interchangeabley with or as a supplement to emotion. Susan McLeod (1987,
1995) and Alice Brand (1989, 1990) published a number of articles on the
affective aspects of writing and teaching, wherein affects were, or seemed,
undifferentiated from emotions. Richard Fulkerson (1998), Lynn Worsham
(1998), and Robert Hariman and John Lucaites (2001) similarly tended to
conflate affect and emotion. Worsham’s oft-cited reference to emotion as “the
tight braid of affect and judgment, socially and historically constructed and
bodily lived” illustrates how fused affect and emotion were for scholars at that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 For example, Christa Albrecht-Crane (2003), in her description of the concept,
captures the visceral, sensual connotations that affect often has in our field:
“Affect, then, involves sensations and resonances we engage in, on a daily basis,
that act on our bodies in such a way that we feel a sort of vibration with other
bodies” (“Affirmative” 577).

59!

!
time (“Going” 216). Only since scholars in the field have begun to invoke
Massumi’s theory of affect in the last decade has a stark and more clearly
delineated distinction between affect and emotion emerged.

Reviewing Affect
Marking perhaps the height of interest in affect in the field, between 19982008 CCC, JAC, and QJS published extended book reviews whose purposes were
in part to introduce readers to the term “affect” but also to consider its purpose in
the field. These reviews27 expose a number of reasons why affect hasn’t yet been
harnessed specifically to re-evaluate the concept pathos—ranging from assertions
that affect is not rhetorical to acknowledging the complicated disciplinary and
political choice of choosing “affect” over “emotion.”
The first and most amusing review suggests that affect isn’t rhetorical, or
rather that the concept affect takes us beyond the purview of rhetoric, proper.
Richard Fulkerson’s 1998 review “Call Me Horatio: Negotiating Between
Cognition and Affect in Composition”28 in CCC marks the very beginning of affect
theory entering the field. As his subtitle suggests, Fulkerson sees affect and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 An additional review by Jeff Pruchnic (2008) in Criticism, “The Invisible
Gland: Affect and Political Economy,” won’t be detailed in this section since the
audience for the review extends beyond those in our field, yet it’s another strong
example of a scholar trying to make sense of the implications of the “affective
turn.”
28 Fulkerson reviews Presence of Mind: Writing and the Domain Beyond the
Cognitive, eds. Alice Glarden and Richard Graves; The Spiritual Side of Writing:
Releasing the Learner’s Whole Potential, eds. Regina Paston Foehr and Susan
Schiller; Notes on the Heart: Affective Issues in the Writing Classroom by Susan
McLeod; and Getting Restless: Rethinking Revision in Writing Instruction by
Nancy Welch.
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cognition as competing forces, and he asserts that we attend to affect at the
expense of the cognitive and rhetorical. When he imagines what a composition
class inspired by noncognitive/affective practices might look like, he writes:

Clearly, the goal would change. Instead of trying to make students
more effective users of language to have rhetorical impacts on
others, I would be interested in the effects writing could have on the
students themselves. Students might still write for readers, but the
goal would be rendering experience for sharing rather than
informing or persuading. (113)
Fulkerson is, of course, working with an early understanding of affect that grows
out of expressivist approaches to composition; his weariness toward affect
exemplifies both the difficulty affect and emotion scholarship had being accepted
into the mainstream (especially with the dominance of social and cognitive
approaches to teaching composition) and the scholarship’s inability to dissociate
from an expressivist tradition. Fulkerson laments the danger of an affective
pedagogy: “This would not be a postmodern or socially engaged classroom. By
and large it wouldn’t have students writing about issues of class, race, and
gender, or public policy (unless from a purely personal point of view)” (113). For
Fulkerson, affect is not only too personal but also too spiritual, whimsical, and
meditative to be of much use in rhetorical studies and education.
Nine years later, however, we can see that the affective terrain has shifted,
as scholars in the field have a more centralized understanding of affect—one that
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is not simply personal—or emotional. Cory Holding in “Affecting Rhetoric”29 in
CCC asserts, affect is rhetorical but almost impossible to harness. Turning to
Corbett’s distinction between the rhetoric of the open hand and the closed fist,

she explains how the closed fist is emblematic of a “body rhetoric” or a “gut force”
that affect propels. Because affect theory turns our attention to beginnings and
becomings, Holding sees it as particularly useful in considering bodies’ role in
rhetorical invention. She suggests there’s a lot of potential in studying bodily
experiences like entrainment30 as rhetorical. This kind of study, Holding writes,
in turn can be said to position bodies (if, for instance, pheromones
and images can serve as direction-givers to the subject that absorbs
them), which, when taken to the political domain, does present
something of a case for attending to visceral force through
rhetorical invention. (322)
Holding asserts we can’t afford to ignore the “gut” or visceral forces in rhetoric,
but acknowledges the difficulty of harnessing it rhetorically or fully
understanding the range of its influence.
The third review highlights the political and disciplinary investments in
choosing “affect” vs. choosing “emotion” as key methodological terms in our
studies. In 2008, JAC published a review by Ashley Falzetti, “Political Affects:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Holding reviews The Transmission of Affect by Teresa Brennan; Toward a
Civil Discourse: Rhetoric and Fundamentatlism by Sharon Crowley; and
Impersonal Passion: Language as Affect by Denise Riley
30 A process through which bodies synchronize with internal/biological and
external rhythms, e.g. your body’s adjustment to the cue of sunlight in the
morning.
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Transdisciplinary Trajectories of Affect and Emotion.”31 Falzetti asserts that what
“affect” means in the literature is “highly contested,” “[y]et it is apparent that
those who study affect are interested in close analysis of the body, emotion, and
social politics” (302). While scholarship on affect and emotion overlaps in
methodology and scope, scholars studying these two veins have little interaction.
This contentious relationship is perhaps the most obvious reason why affect
hasn’t been used to extend our understanding of pathos, since pathos has always
been theorized in terms of emotion.
The final review most thoroughly explores affect in rhetorical terms. Jenny
Edbauer Rice’s review “The New ‘New’: Making a Case for Critical Affect
Studies”32 (2008) in QJS makes a case for what she calls “critical affect studies”
(CAS) in rhetoric, considering affect’s potential in public and civic interaction.
Rather than conceptualizing the public sphere solely as a “deliberative space” in
which people communicate directly and transparently, she asserts we ought to
consider the “affective linkages and associations” that already exist in any public;
affect encourages us, in other words, to consider what underlies and slips
between our various civic interactions.
Unlike most of the previously cited work in this chapter on affect—which
emphasizes its inaccessibility through language and cognition—Edbauer Rice
maintains that affect can be rearticulated in public discourse; she, like Holding,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Falzetti reviews Marlene Sokolon’s Political Emotions: Aristotle and the
Symphony of Reason and Emotion and Kathleen Stewart’s Ordinary Affects.
32 Edbauer Rice reviews The Cultural Politics of Emotion by Sara Ahmed, The
Transmission of Affect by Teresa Brennan; Impersonal Passion: Language as
Affect by Denise Riley; and The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social ed. Patricia
Clough.
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offers an opening for rhetorical intervention. She asserts, “Theories of affect

suggest a process of disarticulation, or an unsticking of those figures that seem to
be glued together, followed by a rearticulation, or a new way of linking together
images and representations that is less oppressive” (210). Rhetorically analyzing
the discourses around AIDS, Edbauer Rice claims that activists changed the
public discourse surrounding AIDS away from death and disgust toward life and
celebration through campaigns and advertisements; the activist community
reshaped the affectivity attached to AIDS discourse and by extension those
suffering from AIDS. This process of rearticulation (in this case making images of
happy, lively people with AIDS the focal point of the public discourse) makes use
of pathetic strategies to move a public audience from associating AIDS with one
set of emotions to another. Edbauer Rice thereby gives us our first hint of what it
looks like to reshape affect rhetorically, and she raises a compelling question that
captures one dilemma surrounding the study of affect in our field:
Thus, what underscores civic or rhetorical deliberation is arguably
an affective element. It is unclear whether merely accounting for
this characteristic will lead to more critical analyses, although
expanding our understanding of public affect might help us
understand why certain rhetorics retain powerful circulation. (211)
Most of the affect scholarship in the field seems to have “accounted for” the
“affective element,” yet this hasn’t led to more critical analyses of how rhetorical
concepts like pathos, for example, work in rhetoric. This distinction is central in
delineating the work that has been done and remains to be done with affect in our
field. The more difficult, but I think more fruitful, task is figuring out a better
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rhetorical understanding of affect and how it works, which is what Edbauer Rice’s
description of affective rerticulation begins to do.
Very few scholars have taken up the challenge of studying affect in
conjunction with rhetorical theories. In respect to pathos, Byron Hawk (2004)
highlights a common conceptual distinction in our understanding of pathos and
affect in the field: “Pathos is about using ideas/feelings in an audience to ground
persuasion or about creating those emotions in an audience. But affect moves us
toward relations among bodies, which is critical to understanding (discourse in)
network culture” (“Toward” 843). Traditional theories of pathos don’t account for
how “bodies also respond ‘emotionally’ not just minds” (“ Toward” 842). Hawk
captures a general consensus in the field that affect exceeds the work of pathos,
that pathos, traditionally conceived and talked about, fails to account for
emotioned bodies and the interrelatedness of bodies. Pathos has been thus far
used to explain a conscious and intentional understanding of human interaction
in a rhetorical situation, which doesn’t yet account for the roles affect and
emotion play in the “media environments” Hawk suggests we can no longer
afford to ignore. These media environments—which play a central role in not just
portraying the case of mass hysteria in LeRoy but also in the progression and
transmission of symptoms—might be best explicated by theories of affect, but as I
hope to show in later chapters, these rhetorical considerations of affect might also
become part of our use and analysis of pathos in mediated rhetorical events.
However, figuring out how affect fits into a theory of pathos requires a better
understanding of the relationship between affect and emotion. This relationship
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is largely understood through Massumi’s distinction, which I’ll detail in the
following section.

The Massumi Affect
To understand how affect has been brought into the field, we have to begin
with the oft-cited source: Massumi. Often recognized as the preeminent scholar
in affect studies since (and interpreter of) Deleuze, Massumi develops his theory
of affect most extensively in “Autonomy of Affect” (1996), which later became the
first chapter in Parables for the Virtual (2002). The primary goal of the book is
to address bodies, their movement, and sensations—considerations that he
maintains have been neglected in critical and cultural theory. A response to the
linguistic traditions so popular in poststructuralism, he aims to put bodies back
in cultural materialism. Theorizing affect, Massumi asserts, can help us achieve
this. In a little over 20 pages, Massumi uses scientific studies and cultural
examples to identify affect as a phenomenon that cannot be satisfactorily
explained solely with recourse to contemporary understandings of bodies, senses,
or emotions.
When scholars in the field reference Massumi’s definition of affect, they
often begin with his distinction between affect and emotion. Even though
Massumi spends just a few paragraphs detailing the difference between the two
in this text, it has arguably become his most prominent contribution to the study
of affect (quoted, cited, or presumed), as those passages are widely referenced
across disciplines. In those passages, Massumi makes one of the most direct and
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urgent claims to come out of his otherwise circuitous writing: “It is crucial to

theorize the difference between affect and emotion. If some have the impression
that affect has waned, it is because affect is unqualified. As such, it is not ownable
or recognizable and thus resistant to critique” (28). Referencing Jameson’s claim
about the “waning of affect” in our time. Massumi points out the paradox
inherent in theorizing affect: we ought to study affect but when we bring it into
consciousness, into language, we qualify it, and through this process, affect is no
longer affect but is brought into the realm of emotion. One of the problems, he
says, is that we have no cultural-theoretical vocabulary to discuss affect; we are
left with theories of signification which adhere to the kinds of structures that
affect transcends. This almost cryptic definition has been critiqued by a number
of scholars. Claire Hemming (2005), for example, asserts, “While many will
concur with Massumi’s scepticism of quantitative research in its inability to
attend to the particular, we are left with a riddle-like description of affect as
something scientists cannot detect the loss of (in the anomaly), social scientists
and cultural critics cannot interpret, but philosophers can imagine” (“Invoking”
563).
Given the bluntness of the claim that “It is crucial to theorize the
difference between affect and emotion,” amid writing that is famously
paradoxical and oblique, it’s no surprise that a lot of scholars in our field have
hung onto this distinction so tightly. Yet, the distinction is often read and
appropriated as a claim that we ought to theorize affect over or against—or at
least in addition to but separately from—emotion, suggesting that our
theorization of emotion has gotten in the way of seeing and appreciating affect.
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But a closer look at his writing reveals that Massumi sees affect and emotion as
closely related. Though he clearly privileges affect by bringing it to the fore, it

turns out, upon closer look, he doesn’t discourage studying emotion. Massumi’s
distinction between affect and emotion is not of value but degree. What Massumi
doesn’t like about emotion is what he doesn’t like about poststructuralist theories
of signification: we already have symbolic structures of emotion that are laden
with meaning, and thus we lack the power to express or relate to emotion in ways
that aren’t already confined by symbolic structures. Affect exceeds these symbolic
structures, but “Emotion is the most intense (most contracted) expression of that
capture,” the capture of affect (28). Thus, rather than seeing affect and emotion
as logically distinct, in order to theorize affect at all, we need emotion; we are
dependent to some extent on emotion, to use its vocabulary to attempt to better
explicate affect. As further evidence, Massumi’s own affect-focused vocabulary
isn’t devoid of emotional connotations and resonances: intensity, movement,
autonomy, fullness, aliveness, etc.
Massumi illustrates through his examples how closely affect and emotion
are related. His first example in “Autonomy” is a study of children who watched
variations of a short film about a snowman melting and his human “friend” who
leaves him in the mountains so that he could stay “alive” (one version had factual
narration, one an emotional narration, and one no narration). When attempting
to measure the affective reactions of the children, intensity (our best way for
understanding affect) is measured in part through a spectrum of emotions:
happy-sad. When describing the version of the snowman film that had an
emotional narrative, he explains:
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The qualification of emotional content enhanced the image’s effect,
as if they resonated with the level of intensity rather than
interfering with it. An emotional qualification breaks narrative
continuity for a moment to register a state—actually to re-register
an already felt state, for the skin is faster than the word. (25)
Thus, an emotional qualification, in this case a narrative, intensifies reactions to
the text or increases the affective response to it; the emotional narrative (the use
of emotional language; affect captured in language) is not in opposition to the
production or existence of affect. Instead, they seem to work in tandem like
waves.
Massumi’s methodology and general attitude toward conceptual
distinctions similarly suggests that the relationship between affect and emotion
shouldn’t be interpreted as finite, clear, distinct, or absolute. In his introduction
to Parables, Massumi explains his approach to writing and research: “when you
are busy critiquing you are less busy augmenting. You are that much less
fostering” (13). “Foster or debunk,” he asserts. Though, of course, there is a time
for both processes, Massumi is much less interested in dismissing past theory
than in cultivating new theory. This is how he approaches writing:
The writing tries not only to accept the risk of sprouting deviant,
but also to invite it. Take joy in your digressions. Because that is
where the unexpected arises. That is the experimental aspect. If you
know where you will end up when you begin, nothing has happened
in the meantime. You will have to be willing to surprise yourself
writing things that you didn’t think you thought. Letting examples
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burgeon requires using inattention as a writing tool. You have to let
yourself get to caught up in the flow of your writing that it ceases at
moments to be recognizable to you as your own. This means you
have to be prepared for failure. For with inattention comes risk of
silliness or even outbreaks of stupidity. But perhaps in order to
write experimentally, you have to be willing to ‘affirm’ even your
own stupidity. (18)
Massumi asserts that he doesn’t devise a theory and then apply it, since
application just alters the object of study and says nothing about the new theory
itself; instead, he starts with examples and writes and meditates his way through
them. An unorthodox approach to academic writing and research, through
experimentation, Massumi thinks against the traditions and beliefs that have
bound poststructuralist thought in cultural studies. Thus, for scholars to
appropriate any of Massumi’s distinctions or concepts as finite (without
questioning or seeing them as provisional, as becomings, as rhetorical), to pull
them out of the context of Massumi’s complications, musings, and testings misses
his argument all together. Making the affect-emotion distinction, for example, is
useful for Massumi to demarcate the terrain of “affect,” a word that means a lot of
things to a lot of scholars, but the distinction should also be recognized as an
experiment in opening our systems of thought. Massumi says of his experimental
writing and the writing in Parables: “The desired result is a systematic openness:
an open system” (18). To focus so closely on one aspect of affect (at the expense of
the carefully layered context) is to close that system.

70!

!
The nuanced relationship between affect and emotion becomes even
clearer in Massumi’s 2005 article “Fear (The Spectrum Said).” In it, Massumi

details how the color-coded terror alert system introduced by George W. Bush’s
administration following 9/11 modulated fear in the American public. While
people became affectively attuned to fear, they expressed and acted on it in
different ways:
The system addressed the population immediately, at a
presubjective level: at the level of bodily predisposition or
tendency—action in its nascent state … It was less a communication
than an assisted germination of potentials for action whose
outcome could not be accurately determined in advance—but whose
variable determination could be determined to occur, on hue (33).
Here, Massumi explains how fear emerges on the “presubjective level” of “bodily
predisposition tendency.” Massumi references William James’ famous example of
fear in which a body reacts to fear before it is consciously aware of it: “We have
already begun to experience fear nonconsciously, wrapped in action, before it
unfurls from it and it felt as itself, in its distinction from the action with which it
arose” (36). So while scholars often point out that the difference between affect
and emotion is conscious awareness, here, Massumi suggests that is not always
the case. He spends several pages detailing the fear event, which begins with a
bodily response: “The experience is in the fear, in its ingathering of action, rather
than the fear being the content of an experience. At the starting line, the affect of
fear and the action of the body are in a state of indistinction. As the action
unfolds, they begin to diverge” (37). The affective intensity continues to grow and
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it’s only when the action stops that fear is recognized as a feeling of fear. Fear

before this point is just a growing mass of intensity that “ingathers” or germinates
potential for action, and it is only when we have a moment to “recollect,” to scan
the environment that we take note of the object or cause of our fear. Fear
becomes the content of an experience only after the intensity has lowered.
Massumi also makes a form-content distinction in Parables, similarly explaining
it in terms of intensity-qualification, which is then mapped onto affect-emotion.
But here, we see that an emotion can also be the form or intensity and can occur
preconsciously. Fear pauses in what Massumi calls the “stop-beat” (during which
the immediate bodily action has ceased and reflection takes place); in this beat,
fear turns from intensity to magnitude, and it is no longer lived just through a
body but is now compared to other experiences with fear. Massumi’s focus on the
stop-beat shows he’s less interested in pulling affect and emotion apart; rather,
he’s interested in the exact point of difference, the pause in between: “The
separation between direct activation and controlled ideation, or affect in its
bodily dimension and emotion as rationalizable subjective content, is a reflective
wonderland that does not work this side of the mirror” (40). It’s not so much
“difference” as the “between” that intrigues Massumi.
While many have interpreted Massumi’s call to “theorize the difference
between affect and emotion” as a call to separate and pull those concepts apart,
we could read it as a call to theorize “the difference,” the complex relations
between affect and emotion. The complexities of this connection emerge in the
way he discusses emotions’ relationship to activation. When the fear event is
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encoded in the memory and we gain distance from it, we begin to see emotion as
separate from bodily reaction:
To treat the emotion as separable in this way from the activationevent from which it affectively sprang is to place it on the level of
representation. It is to treat it, fundamentally and from the start, as
a subjective content: basically, an idea. Reduced to the mere idea of
itself, it becomes reasonable to suppose that a private subject, in
representing it to itself, could hold it and the aleatory outside of its
arising as well as the body in live-wire connection with that outside,
at a rational, manageable distance. It makes it seem comfortably
controllable. (39)
Here, we can see how the narrative quality of emotion refigures affect in
recollection. It is the representational aspect of emotion that makes it less
powerful than the immediate visceral, affective force. Yet in these examples,
emotion is a necessary and important part of the overall emotive-affective
experience.

Affect in Rhetoric
Divorcing affect from emotion does more than just take liberties with
Massumi’s theories; it also contributes to a number of other assumptions about
affect in our field. The divide between affect and emotion extends to how both of
those concepts are studied rhetorically. Affect a la Massumi is often discussed as
an unnamable force, an ungraspable excess; thus, this affect becomes useful only
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in demarcating a dimension we can never access except very indirectly or after
the fact. Naming an affect at all—as this story goes—brings it into the realm of
signification and suppresses its unique power. And yet, this exemplifies what
Edbauer (2005) has called the “false binary between signification and affect,”

wherein emotion is stuck in the realm of signification and affect embodies all that
transcends it (“(Meta)Physical” 135). If we hold onto this binary, we fail to see
that all rhetorical processes involve both affect and signification. The supposed
theoretical divide between affect and emotion prevents conversations between
scholars who study either concept, as scholars in the field often devote
themselves to the pursuit of one over the other.33 Insofar as pathos has been
attached to emotion, it has seemed that studies of affect are incompatible with
any rhetorical approach. Even if we accept that Massumi’s definition of affect is
more dependent upon emotion than scholars in the field often give it credit for,
where does that leave us in regards to affect and rhetoric?
More than just highlighting the role of bodies, Massumi’s description of
affective loops is particularly useful in imagining affect as emergent, and coadapting along with the many actors in a rhetorical situation. Our tendency to
accept emotion primarily as representational prevents us from recognizing the
organizing properties of emotion: “What we sloppily think of as the idea of an
emotion, or the emotion as an idea, is in fact the anticipatory repetition of an
affective event, precipitated by the encounter between the body’s irritability and a
sign” (“Fear” 40). Because of emotions’ attachment to memory and narrative, we
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 A common theoretical move is to choose one term, “affect” or “emotion,” and
to claim that one term is more useful given the project. See, for example, Laura
Micciche (2007) pp. 14-16 or Megan Boler (1999) pp. xvi-xvii.

74!

!
tend to anticipate emotional responses that align with our prior experience. Yet
affect has what Clough (2007) calls “self-reflexivity” in which
information/communication systems, archiving machines, capital flows, and
biopolitical networks are “processes turning back on themselves to act on
themselves” (“Introduction” 3). This self-reflexivity helps us understand how
emotion emerges. Often when we think of the role of pathos in the rhetorical
situation, it is the mark of the beginning and the end, as the rhetor moves the
audience from one emotion to another. But understanding the rhetorical
situation as self-reflexive or looped allows us to see emotion as pulling forward

past emotional experience and fueling future emotional experience. Rather than
thinking of rhetorical situations as independent, “new” opportunities for
persuasion, a rhetor might pay particular attention to how past emotional
experiences shape or set up the audience’s response to pathetic strategies.34
A self-reflexive or looped understanding of affect responds to one of the
common critiques of affect—that because it’s preconscious, we have no way to
access or control it. Leys (2011), for example, asserts, the “new affect theorists”
believe
there is a gap between the subject’s affects and its cognition or
appraisal of the affective situation or object, such that cognition or
thinking comes ‘too late’ for reasons, beliefs, intentions, and
meanings to play the role in action and behavior usually accorded to
them. The result is that action and behavior are held to be
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34 I’ll explore this in more detail in Chapters Three and Four.
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determined by affective dispositions that are independent of
consciousness and the mind’s control. (“Turn” 443)

In this account of affect, we are entirely at its mercy, since cognition and planning
come too late. However, Leys seems to be describing affect in a linear fashion
(echoing others who say, for example, affect comes first, emotion second) that
suggests cognitive and affective processes are happening independently. By
contrast, Massumi’s articulation of “anticipatory repetition” highlights a system
in which history, memory, context, and environment emerge and loop together.
Seeing emotion (and by extension pathos) in terms of loops, networks, or
systems allows us to see it beyond the normal confines of cause and/or effect; a
repetitive, narrative, self-reflexive, and co-adapting concept of pathos is much
more nuanced than the traditional “rhetorical appeal” (seen as a stimulus in
search of a response). Following Leys’ critique, we might lament that rhetors
cannot anticipate, control, or make use of affect in a rhetorical situation, but we’d
be naïve to suggest that rhetors have ever had much overt control over the
emotions. While networks and systems are complex, they are not random; in
order to hold their structure, repetition and patterns emerge (of course, networks
and loops break down, but another or others emerge to take its place). Paying
attention to affective loops and networks is one way to access and harness affect
rhetorically; the AIDS activists Edbauer Rice described, for example, were able to
intervene in and reroute the affective loops surrounding the public discourse on
AIDS.
Of course, tracing and anticipating the affective loops in a rhetorical
situation is no easy task. Perhaps Massumi’s theory of affect might be best
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integrated in the field as it usually is—as part of invention. After all, his theory is
based on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) assertion that “Affects are becomings”
(Thousand 256). Following this sentiment, several scholars have begun to
reshape theories of invention with affect theory.35 But we’d be remiss to think
that Massumi’s is the only theory of affect worth considering in our field. As I’ll
illustrate in the following section, Fredric Jameson’s theory of affect has the
potential to help us better explicate a looped or reflexive nature of the rhetorical
situation.

The Waning of Affect: Another Approach
Following his famous claim in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of
Late Capitalism (1990) about the “waning of affect” in the postmodern era,
Jameson goes on to define affects as “free-floating and impersonal” (16). Because
Jameson asserts we are no longer “centered subjects”—postmodernism is the end
of the “bourgeois ego” or “monad”— affects don’t belong to us but are external
and embedded in cultural practices and values (15). They circulate like capital
through mediated contact. Jameson’s theory of affect, of course, grows out of the
Frankfurt School’s critiques that technologies of mass production and
postmodern aesthetics in general contribute to a culture industry that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Thomas Rickert (2007), for example, explores affect’s role in invention through
Plato’s concept chora—what he considered “the matrix of all becoming.” Rather
than thinking of rhetorical concepts as clear and distinct, in this paradigm, mind,
body, and environment are fused: “minds are both embodied, and hence
grounded in emotion and sensation, and dispersed into the environment itself,
and hence no longer autonomous” (251). Thus, invention is immersed in and
springs from any confluence of forces. See also Holding (2007), Hawk (2007),
Davis (2010) for discussions of affect and invention.
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fundamentally alters the affective resonances of art and our perceptions of it. For
example, he compares Vincent Van Gogh's “A Pair of Boots” (1887) with Andy
Warhol's “Diamond Dust Shoes” (1980), saying that a viewer can imagine when
viewing Van Gough’s weathered, beaten, loosely-tied boots what the leather
would feel like, how it would feel to put them on and walk around in them. You
imagine their history, where they’ve been, and where they might be going. In
contrast, Warhol’s screen-printed representation of monochromatic shoes
appears flat; there’s a lack of visual depth to the shoes that are juxtaposed against
a black background. A viewer can’t imagine the shoes’ history or putting them on,
and the medium of screen-printing makes Warhol’s piece easy to duplicate; it’s
not unique. This marks:
the end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique and the
personal, the end of the distinctive brushstroke (as symbolized by
the emergent primacy of mechanical reproduction). As for
expression and feelings or emotions, the liberation, in
contemporary society from the older anomie of the centered subject
may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation
from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a
self to do the feeling. (Jameson 15)
Jameson asserts that affectively and emotionally we’ve traded depth for intensity,
history for fleeting ecstasy. Affective experiences in the postmodern age are
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reproduced;36 we seek out synthetically created affective experience through
mass produced media, advertising, even drug use. Just like the reproduction of
brushstrokes in a mass produced piece of art, our feelings, our emotions are no

longer unique, personal, or subjective. For Jameson, the waning of affect is also a
waning of emotions, and he describes a kind of affective background, in which
many of us are unknowing participants. Affects are not becomings for Jameson;
they already exist in our time. Affects are structurally imbedded in our media, art,
and culture, which seep into our moods, feelings, and dispositions.
Jameson’s theory of affect has been primarily used in the field to discuss
how we are culturally schooled in emotion. Worsham (1998) suggests “the
pedagogy of postmodernism offers an extreme version of the dumb view of
emotion, where emotion no longer can have any appropriate objects, aims, or
interests” (“Going” 229). The dumb view, which she borrows from Elizabeth
Spellman, “silences emotion—restricts emotion to the realm of the body (to
sensation, physical feelings, and involuntary bodily movements) where it remains
a purely private and internal event” (224). Worsham and Jameson point to a
generation of people who seek out intense, artificial emotions—a trend especially
evident in the increase in prescription or illegal drug use. People are chasing what
Jameson calls “a peculiar kind of euphoria” (16).
Since the waning of affect is something that we’ve historically and
culturally inherited, it might seem that we can have little influence on it
rhetorically as affects seem somewhat imposed on us. But as several scholars in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 We might be reminded here of Walter Benjamin’s “Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction” or Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s critique of
the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment.
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the field have shown, we can and should respond to (in our teaching) this less or
differently affected era in which we live, in order to address, for example, what
Worsham calls the hidden curriculum of emotion (“Grief, hatred, bitterness,
anger, rage, terror, and apathy as well as emotions of self-assessment such as
pride, guilt, and shame” (“Going” 216)), what Thomas Rickert (2007) calls “the
climate of resignation” (Acts 191), or what Johnson (2001) identifies as “student
rage” (“School” 624). Acknowledging the impact of the affective milieu of our era
might help explain and reframe some of the resistant behavior we see in our
classrooms and in our students. In a reading of David Bartholomae’s infamous
Quentin essay37, for example, Rickert (2001) asserts that Quentin’s response
might be better characterized as “transgressive,” a refusal to communicate in
ways sanctioned by the university. In refusing to address the assignment or the
imagined rubric, Quentin subverts academic expectations and conventions and
performs what Rickert says is an “act”–not merely a writing assignment (“Hands”
310). What some call “violence” in our classrooms, mostly in the form of
aggressive or resistant writing, might actually reflect some of the difficulties
contemporary students face when they try to express emotions in a culture that
has discouraged personal, unique emotional and affective experiences.
Jameson’s theory has untapped potential for theorizing emotions and
affects in a rhetorical situation that is looped, self-reflexive, or generally more
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Bartholomae describes a student he calls “Quentin” in “The Tidy House: Basic
Writing in the American Curriculum” who wrote what some might consider
vitriolic responses to writing prompts. For example, in response to the prompt,
“If existence precedes essence, what is man?” Quentin wrote: “About man and
good and evil I don't care about this shit fuck this shit, trash, and should be put in
the trash can with this shit” (6).
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complicated. Emotions and affects are frequently understood to be bound up
with exigences in rhetoric—what incites or impels a rhetorical situation.38 The
audience’s emotions toward the event at hand are the impetus for the rhetor’s
argument, following Bitzer’s (1968) definition of exigence as “an imperfection
marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a

thing which is other than it should be” (6). By this understanding, emotions seem
to mark the beginning and end of a rhetorical situation, as the beginning emotion
is an “imperfection” and the end emotion is no longer “waiting to be done.”
However, this role for emotions isn’t very nuanced; we know emotions play a
larger role than being bookends to the rhetorical situation. In fact, emotions and
affects also align with Bitzer’s list of common constraints: “beliefs, attitudes,
documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives” (8). The emotional and
affective attachments of the individual—which grow out of Jameson’s culturally
embedded affective background—also contain the rhetorical possibilities of the
situation.
As both exigences and constraints, affects and emotions both incite and
contain the situation; they both drive and restrict its possibilities. As such, we can
see how one emotion can be both an exigence and constraint, and how an
emotion can be an exigence for one rhetorical situation and a constraint in
another. For example, we could take Rickert’s “climate of resignation” in the
classroom not just as a “something waiting to be done,” the impetus for a new
pedagogy, but also as a constraint we have to work with, within, and against.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 We can see this especially in how frequently affect and emotion are considered
in terms of invention.
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Taking what we might usually consider an affective exigence as a constraint
broadens our understanding of the rhetorical situation, acknowledging that the

rhetorical situation is recursive—its constituents always transforming and folding
into each other. If we consider the rhetorical situation surrounding Jameson’s
argument in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism as an
example, we can see how the dulling of the affects and emotions in our era
embodies both an obstacle to be overcome but also an attitude or feeling that
limits the possible outcomes of his argument, possible ways of imagining how
things might be otherwise. In this way, affect recursively fuels more complicated
kinds of invention,39 as we see new issues and exigences coming to the fore.
This kind of affective looping is especially useful in theorizing complex
rhetorical events that encompass what traditionally might have seemed to be
multiple rhetorical situations. For example, the pervasive fear surrounding the
LeRoy case was a constraint that prevented the girls from initially accepting their
diagnosis (doctors were unable to persuade them of a diagnosis), but that same
fear is an exigence for the news media to shape their stories about the “mystery
illness”— to persuade the girls of other possible causes and to persuade the public
audience that this story is significant. A revised theory of pathos invoking this
understanding of affect would consider more carefully emotional exigences and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Several scholars in the field have made arguments for more complex theories of
invention. For example, Anis Bawarshi (2001) suggests, “invention is less an
inspired mysterious activity and more a location and mode of inquiry, a way of
positioning oneself in relation to a problem and a way of working through it” (6).
Debra Hawhee makes a similar claim, asserting that just as the rhetorical subject
invents an encounter, the encounter invents the rhetorical subject. She calls this
kind of process “invention-in-the-middle,” which “assumes that rhetoric is a
performance, a discursive-material-bodily-temporal encounter, a force among
forces” (24).
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constraints—and more importantly their recursitvity, how they relate to one
another, and how they fuel overlapping situations.

But the work of pathos in rhetoric is more than just reading exigences and
constraints. It’s also about understanding (in a Burkean sense) the motivations of
the audience and their emotional attachments. Similar to Massumi, Jameson says
that affects are free-floating and impersonal, thus these theories of affect don’t
help us imagine how to tap into the motivations of the individual. However, a
brief look at the Jacques Lacan’s concept of desire better explicates how we
personally experience and make affective investments.

The Desiring Subject
The psychoanalytic tradition—and its take on affect—is another influence
on the field, as we can see in the work of, for example, Susan Wells (1996),
Marshall Alcorn (2002), Christa Albrecht-Crane (2003), and Christian Lundberg
(2012). Rickert (2007) asserts, “Psychoanalytic theory provides an early but quite
sophisticated attempt to theorize how affective factors structure communication
in ways that we are only partially aware of at any given moment” (Acts 35).
Because we know audiences have affective investments, it would seem that
figuring out what drives those investments—where they come from, how they are
formed, and thus might be changed—might help us better explicate how, if
pathos is concerned with motivation (with moving an audience emotionally), we
can better identify and respond to affective investments rhetorically.
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In addition to “affect,” psychoanalysis makes use of several other key

terms, including desire, enjoyment, pleasure, and emotion. Since explicating the
differences among these terms would be a dissertation in itself, I’ll focus on
Lacan’s concept of “desire” here because it seems most useful in uncovering
rhetorical, affective motivations.40 A look at desire further allows us to consider
not just what affect is but what it does rhetorically. Lacan’s concept of desire is
especially interesting in thinking about how the subject desires to identify with
(to be) the other.
On the most fundamental level, desire, Lacan asserts throughout his
Écrits, is the desire for the other. We desire mimetically: both what the other
desires but also to be the other, meaning that desire stems from identifying with
the other. During entrance into the symbolic order (for Lacan, the mirror stage),
the subject experiences lack (when the infant realizes its needs will not always be
met) and this produces desire, which will never be entirely fulfilled. The symbolic
order positions us and our desiring; thus, our desires and affective investments
are not so much our own as the desires and investments of others. Lacan’s theory
of desire is an incredibly complicated phenomenon, but through just this brief
look we can see the implications of desire in Burke’s (1969) theory of
identification, in which “you persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying
your ways with his” (55). All of those gestures, tones, and attitudes are tied up in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Because “desire” isn’t a key concept in this dissertation, it may seem odd that I
focus on it here. Given more time, I would more carefully integrate and explicate
this section. However, I think it’s worth taking at least a cursory look at “desire,”
since it offers another account of how we become affectively engaged with
rhetoric.
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any number of symbolic orders in which the rhetor and audience is a part. The
rhetor doesn’t just desire to persuade the other; she also desires the other,

identifies with the other. This suggests that identification is not just one avenue
for persuasion; it’s a necessary avenue for persuasion, a primary mode of
functioning in the world. Wells (1996) describes Lacan’s theory of desire in
narrative terms:
the distance of the desiring subject from the object in which he or
she is constitutes incites a swerve toward the object of desire, a
motion which never culminates in triumphant arrival. Desire has to
do with the unconscious, with what is radically beyond direct
knowledge, manifesting itself instead in the perturbations of daily
activity, in unguarded and accidental performances, and in dreams
(81).
As Wells points out, the Lacanian understanding of desire is propelled by lack, of
constantly trying to fulfill an insatiable desire. But this desire isn’t something the
subject experiences in isolation; desire is what pulls the subject into collectives
and compels the subject to identify with particular groups.
Sara Ahmed (2004) describes this circular process of lack and desire
through the metaphor of “affective economy,” wherein desire is similar to
demand and emotion is akin to capital. She explains that emotions circulate
among signifiers rather than actually residing in the subject or in the object of an
emotion. Ahmed analyzes an excerpt from the Aryan Nation’s website which
continually attaches feelings of fear, disgust, and rage to the signifiers of
nonwhite people (immigrants, interracial couples, those incarcerated, etc.) and
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attaches feelings of love and purity to “white.” Emotions, she says align people
with communities: “Rather than seeing emotions as psychological dispositions,

we need to consider how they work, in concrete and particular ways, to mediate
the relationship between the psychic and the social, and between the individual
and the collective” (“Affective” 119). Ahmed asserts emotions make people
“adhere” and “cohere” together. Unlike the ways Massumi and Jameson describe
affects as impersonal, the metaphor of the affective economy encourages us to see
affects as deeply personal but fundamentally attached to the desires and affective
investments of others. Ahmed describes,
This is what I would call the rippling effect of emotions; they move
sideways (through ‘sticky’ associations between signs, figures, and
objects) as well as backward (repression always leaves its trace in
the present—hence ‘what sticks’ is also bound up with the ‘absent
presence’ of historicity). (120)
This sort of affective economy is useful in better understanding the emotions and
affects that are attributed to and accepted by the collective of the girls in LeRoy.
The historical connotations (weak, vulnerable, out of control) attached to
“hysteria” would seem to discourage the girls from wanting to join the group.
However, as I’ll detail more in my final chapter, some reports of the case
suggest several of the girls’ desired to identify with the collective. Through the
development of tics and verbal outbursts (through identification with the afflicted
girls, desiring the girls themselves), the girls joined (became grouped with) the
collective of hysterical girls.
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These last two sections on Jameson and Lacan reveal alternate avenues for
identifying affect, through analysis of the art, media, and discourse of an era or
through the study of desire and affective economies. Unlike the common
conception of affect in the field—that it is the unidentifiable—these theories bring
affect into language without squelching its power. The question that has
dominated considerations of affect in our field is what is affect? In the way that
Massumi is often taken up, the answer to this question has been assumed (affects
are bodily intensities responsible for invention). Turning to other theories,
however, can help us define affect differently (e.g., as structural, in exigence,
constraint, desire, identification, economy), extending our understandings of the
many ways affect infuses rhetoric.
!

The Current State of Affect
Though “affect” is now accepted within the field’s general vocabulary, it is
frequently used only to qualify other rhetorical objects. Affect is often used to
describe an abstract, fleeting, or bodily dimension (for example, “affective
response” “affective stance,” “affective encounter,” or “affective capacity”41).
While affect in these scenarios suggests an expansion of our rhetorical scope, it
has no function beyond modifying other actions or dimensions. Invoking affect
only in this way inhibits our understandings, as it appears that affect’s only
rhetorical use is signaling an abstract dimension, and thus prevents us from
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 For example in Jeff Pruchnic and Kim Lacey (2011), Donna Strickland (2007),
Christa Albrecht-Crane (2003), or Rachel Riedner (2007).
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engaging the living whole of the rhetorical situation or a situation, lived

rhetorically. This contributes to a tenor in the field that both Edbauer (2005) and
Albrecht-Crane (2003) have written about, in which the turn to affect is
gloriously celebrated or completely dismissed as another unpractical high-theory
movement. As Edbauer illustrates through an examination of messages on the
WPA listserv: “a conversation about composition and affect turned into a critique
of what was seen as impractical theory-talk” (“(Meta)Physical” 135). The way
scholars have often seen affect as lying outside the signifying practice of writing
reflects a “fundamental misunderstanding of the affective dimension” because
writing is nothing if not the interplay of affect and signification (135-6). In the
eight years since Edbauer made that claim, “affect” has become much more
widely used in the field and scholars seem more willing to accept the affective
elements of writing. Yet rather than pursuing affect’s many rhetorical functions,
most scholars still use the term in service of other rhetorical projects.
The question remains then: what does rhetoric need from a theory of
affect? It seems we need something between an autonomous and fragmented
subject, between full and impossible communication, between conscious
intention and randomness, between pushing the limits of the linguistic and
abandoning it, between purely logical, cognitive, rational persuasion and the
dissipation of persuasion across networks and systems. A theory of affect for
rhetoric needs to oscillate between order and chaos—the very definition of
complexity. As I hope to illustrate in the following chapter, the pull between the
rhetorical tradition (a tradition that sometimes feels too fixed) and affect theory
(a theory that often seems too ambiguous) can be a productive one. To better
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understand the role of affect in rhetoric and how we might use it to revise
theories of pathos, we need to understand the role affect plays in defining
rhetorical projects, in the progression (and sustaining) of rhetorical
situations/events, and in delineating the rhetorical functions (affects) of the
many bodies that make up complex rhetorical events. The following chapter
attempts to outline these very roles of affect in rhetoric.
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Chapter Three

Persuasive Bodies, Phantom Rhetorics:
A Theoretical Framework

I certainly wasn’t fantasizing the deep ache in what
had been my right hand. Sometimes I felt as if my fist
was clamping tighter and tighter until my fingers were
ready to explode. The pain brought back memories of
that horrible night in the Humvee. In those moments,
my hand felt as if it were cupped around a hot object,
burning and throbbing as it did after the explosion. At
other times, the Phantom could create the sensation
of twisted fingers or a bent thumb. Sometimes, it was
an annoying tickle on the heel of my hand.
--Michael Weisskopf, Blood Brothers: Among the
Soldiers of Ward 57
The pain was like nothing I had ever known—it was as
strange and strong and foreign as a terrified scream in
a voice you don’t recognize. The ache was painful, yet
it was beyond pain: It was the hollow feeling of loss—
physical, yes, but a more whole body feeling, as if a
cave had been gouged deep in my leg somewhere, and
air was blowing—howling—through it. It was like the
pain of nostalgia—vague but omnipresent, attached to
everything but nothing in particular. The sensation of
complete loss.
--Emily Rapp, Poster Child: A Memoir

The phantom limb, if not existing in bone, tendons, and tissue, exists
affectively. While the limb appears absent, the pain of the phantom limb is very
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much present, as the epigraphs above suggest. The phantom, an affect, is caught
between presence and absence. It can feel, it can be touched, but it can’t be
located. It’s familiar yet foreign, of and not of one’s own body. As both Weisskopf,
a TIME correspondent who lost his hand in a bombing in Iraq, and Rapp, whose
leg was amputated because of a congenital birth defect, attest, the phantom is
fused with memories, longings, feelings of wholeness. It is a fascinating example
of bodies’ rhetoric, as the phantom seemingly persuades the amputee and others
of its presence. To carry out the claims of my introduction, I want to imagine
processes that have previously been explained (or dismissed) as biological,
neurological, or chemical as rhetorical.42 The phantom limb, like I’ll suggest
about mass hysteria, can be studied rhetorically, and uncovering these phantom
rhetorics requires a closer look at how we understand materiality. I begin this
chapter with the phantom limb because it exposes common ways of theorizing
bodies, for example, making fixed distinctions between what is and is not of a
body, clinging to an idea of a whole body, and defining bodies by what is
materially present. The phantom limb is a powerful metaphor that highlights the
affects of bodies that are not materially present—invisible bodies that continue to
persuade.
Physicians and philosophers have long theorized about phantom limbs.
One of the earliest to write about the phenomenon was 16th century surgeon
Ambrose Pare who called it a “false and deceitful sense” (457). Descartes in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Rhetoric scholars have, of course, begun to consider such approaches, most
notably in the rhetoric of science and in neurorhetorics (see the neurorhetorics
special issue of RSQ). Yet I want to distinguish my project from studying science
rhetorically; rather, I seek to study the rhetoricity of bodily phenomena.
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Meditation VI uses phantom pain as an example to illustrate how pain is felt in
the soul, present in the brain. Often attributed with coining “phantom limb,”
physician Silas Weir Mitchell (who also happened to be Charlotte Perkins

Gillman’s doctor) wrote in 1871 that “A person in this condition is haunted, as it
were, by a constant or inconstant fractional phantom of so much of himself as
had been lopped away—an unseen ghost of the lost part” (565). A common
explanation of phantom pain is that it’s the brain’s way of dealing with the loss of
a body part; as if in mourning, the brain continues attempting to reach out to the
missing limb, trying to persuade the body of its wholeness. As Elizabeth Grosz
explains, “The phantom is an expression of nostalgia for the unity and wholeness
of the body, its completion. It is a memorial to the missing limb, a psychical
delegate that stands in its place” (73). The body’s equilibrium is disturbed,
neurologist and psychoanalyst Paul Schilder asserts, because “[w]e are
accustomed to have a complete body. The phantom of the amputee person is
therefore a reactivation of a given perceptive pattern by emotional forces” (qtd. in
Grosz 73). The desire for the “complete” and “whole” body has permeated
theories about the phantom limb for centuries. In recent years, neurologists43
have theorized that phantom pain is caused by maladaptive cortical
reorganization, plasticity, or remapping, meaning that after the loss of a limb, the
brain continues to send signals to the missing body part, but another body part
picks up the signals, causing a reorganization of the body’s sensory map. The
brain, then, makes up for the loss by remapping the body into a new “whole.”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See, for example, Elena Nava and Brigitte Röder (2011) or Sylvia Gustin et al.
(2012).
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Additionally, therapy for amputees often involves the mirror; in a distorted
version of Lacan’s “mirror stage,” amputees are asked to study themselves in a
mirror, to visually reckon with the amputation.44 Both dominant theories and

therapies are based on the assumption that amputated bodies are not whole, that
the phantom limb does not exist because it’s not materially present.
These considerations of existence and reality, of course, quickly become
philosophical, as perception plays an important role in what we take to be “real.”
The phantom is stuck in Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual “paradox of immanence and
transcendence”; the phantom is immanent “because the perceived object cannot
be foreign to him who perceives” and transcendent “because it always contains
something more than what is actually given” (“Primacy” 16). The phantom is
invariably “more than,” as its pain has no clear origin. While we could easily
concede that the phantom is real insofar as it is perceived, a recent
groundbreaking study suggests it may have more material resonances than once
thought. Tamar Makin et al.’s 2013 study reveals that when amputees who have
phantom pain were told to move their phantom limbs, they had the same brain
activity as those moving intact limbs; the amputees have a persisting
representation of the missing limbs in their brains. This study suggests that the
limb, while not visibly present, is still materially present in the brain. These
results cause us to question the correlation between presence and visibility or at
least to refine/redefine what we mean by “presence.”

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Mirror box therapy is also a common treatment for phantom pain. A mirror is
used to reflect the image of an intact limb onto the space of the missing limb so
that the amputee visualizes himself or herself as whole.

93!

!

Rather than reading the brain’s desire for wholeness as a response to the
exigence of amputation, we have to acknowledge that the amputee body is still in
some sense whole, that it never registered the loss of the limb because the limb
was never (completely) lost. When we insist on theorizing bodies as complete
wholes, we risk assigning it false (rhetorical) intentions. Deleuze and Guatarri
assert:
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in
other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into
composition with other affects, with the affects of another body,
either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in
composing a more powerful body. (Thousand 257)
We cannot know the phantom until we know its affects, how it composes and
decomposes bodies and affects. As the epigraphs illustrate, the phantom destroys,
and sometimes with the right treatment, can be destroyed.
More than asking how our assumptions about wholeness and bodies affect
the way we understand the rhetoricity of bodies, I want to propose that we
expand our notion of materiality to include those things that are affectively
present. Following Rickert’s call for a more sophisticated study of affect in
Ambient Rhetoric, I suggest we resist theorizing affect and matter as somehow
antithetical (matter is seen, touched, and used; affect is not). Rickert asserts:
[O]ur concept of the material world and our relation to it must shift
as well. Affect, materiality, embodiment, world—these all go
together. Rhetorical theory’s grounding in humanism, particularly
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its lingering Cartesian assumptions of a subject/object, mind/world
dichotomy, implicitly blocks this insight and impedes revision of
many of our key concepts. (21)
The key concept of this dissertation—pathos—has long fallen victim to Cartesian
assumptions, and despite many advances in emotion and affect scholarship,
pathos is still often considered to be logos’ fickle counterpart. A central obstacle
to this revision is the inability thus far to reconcile or integrate advances in affect
theory with existing rhetorical theories of pathos. Thus, this chapter puts forth a
framework to better study affect rhetorically, which I propose hinges on
considerations of materiality.
Ways of understanding, describing, and theorizing bodies have a direct
impact on how we theorize the rhetoricity of bodies and their relations to affect—
not as just ephemeral, pervasive, invisible, but as something that assembles and
gathers matter. To see affect and bodies in this way, I suggest in this chapter that
we adopt a Spinozist view of bodies: not defined by form, function, substance, or
as subject. Rather Deleuze, in his work on Spinoza, asserts “it is the relations of
motion and rest, speeds and slowness” and “the capacity for affecting and being
affected” that define a body in its individuality (Spinoza 123). “Body” here, of
course, extends beyond the human and animal to include any gathering of parts.
So the phantom limb, because of its capacity to affect and be affected, is a body,
not only emerging from its biological origins but also entwining with other bodies
(doctors, mirror boxes, changes in the weather that bring it pain, etc.). Affect is
central to Spinoza’s theory of bodies, and his notion of affect can help us
negotiate the line between underdetermination and oversimplification of affect in
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rhetorical theory. Likewise, defining bodies by their affects—by their rhetorical
affects and functions—opens opportunities for applying rhetorical theories to
complex rhetorical events.

Toward a rhetorical theory of affect, I’ll argue in this chapter that looking
at ontological approaches to rhetorical study reveals the enmeshment of affect
and matter. After a consideration of what it means to study rhetoric ontologically,
I turn to an example of how a theory of “fire objects” is useful for investigating
complex rhetorical events with many emotional and affective influences. Then, I
suggest we return to a notion of affect as assembling, specifically with a better
understanding of Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory. Rather than
studying affect primarily as a bodily or abstract dimension of something else,
returning to an understanding of affect as assembling highlights the rhetorical
work of affect. Finally, I suggest that Spinoza’s theory of bodies places affect at
the center of the emergence of material and rhetorical bodies—specifically the
rhetorical relations of human and nonhuman bodies in complex rhetorical
events.

Rhetoric and Ontology
Studying an event like the one in LeRoy is not an easy rhetorical task.
More than just trying to untangle the many variables, forces, and motivations
that drive the outcomes of the event, one must first back up and try to determine
what exactly to study. As an object of study, mass hysteria could be understood
as a clinical diagnosis, as a confluence of symptoms, as inspired by historical and
cultural understandings, etc. What is more, when attempting to mark out the
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boundaries of mass hysteria, it may suddenly seem to cease to be an object at all.
Mass hysteria has no clear beginning or end; it extends and mutates seemingly
infinitely. In rhetoric, we often don’t talk about our projects as objects. Compared
to discourse, language, media, and texts, objects seem static, discrete. Studying
objects has often been the domain of science and philosophy, but a growing body
of scholarship suggests that ontology offers a unique perspective for rhetorical
study.
Ontological approaches in rhetoric have garnered renewed interest in the
last several years, as packed audiences at the 2010 and 2012 RSAs and the 2012
CCCC panels on object-oriented, complexity, and Latourian theories illustrate. As
a discipline historically concerned with the human rhetor and student writer, a
heightened interest in objects, materiality, and networks may seem surprising.
But it is the very turn away from theorizing the human as the fulcrum of a
rhetorical act that seems to invigorate this scholarship for rhetorical study.
Rhetoricians who’ve been presenting and beginning to publish in this vein
(Cooper, Hawk, Rickert, Barnett, Rivers) aim to decenter the human rhetor
within rhetorical acts; understand the rhetorical act more as an occasion
materializing within, among, and aligned with other always, on-going occasions;
expand our understanding of persuasion, such that nonhuman things, too, can
persuade; and question assumptions about rhetoric by asking what it would
mean to have a rhetoric of objects. These scholars have elucidated how studying
rhetoric ontologically changes our understanding of how rhetoric comes into
being and humans’ role(s) in that becoming. However, despite a number of
rhetorical inquiries into objects, networks, and nonhumans in the last decade, it’s
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not yet clear how capacities that have often been thought to be uniquely
human/animal—sensing, feeling, emoting—fit into object-oriented, materialist,
or complex rhetorical theories.
Affect, because it is not unique to humans, is in a prime position to
transcend boundaries between humans and nonhumans, subjects and objects.
Jane Bennett writes in Vibrant Matter:
Over the past decade or so, many political theorists, geographers,

art historians, philosophers, sociologists, dancers, literary theorists,
and others have explored the contributions made by affect to public
culture, whereby affect refers to how moods and aesthetic
sensibilities influence ethics and politics as much as do words,
arguments, and reasons. While I agree that human affect is a key
player, in this book the focus is on an affect that is not only not fully
susceptible to rational analysis or linguistic representation but that
is also not specific to humans, organisms or even to bodies: the
affect of technologies, winds, vegetables, minerals. (61)
For rhetoric, what this means is expanding not only our understanding of how
affect gathers matter, things, humans, and objects, but also extending theories of
pathos to include considerations of objects and matter. Before imagining what it
might mean for an object to use or intersect with pathos, I’ll consider more
closely what ontological studies in rhetoric might look like.
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One of the most recent and popular strands of this scholarship is objectoriented ontology (OOO),45 coined in philosopher Graham Harman’s 1999
dissertation. “OOO,” as its commonly referred to, responds to poststructuralist

and linguistic philosophies that ignore objects or describe them as secondary to
humans or human experience; in OOO, by contrast, humans and nonhumans are
ontologically equal. Since OOO has taken off, several conference panels and blog
posts have been dedicated to musings on object-oriented rhetoric (OOR).46 Jim
Brown’s review of the 2010 RSA panel “Toward an Object-Oriented Rhetoric, or
What Happens When the Human is No Longer the Center of Rhetoric?” incited a
number of blog responses from central OOO theorists. In a response to Brown’s
review, philosopher Levi Bryant asserts the main claim of OOR would be that not
just humans—but also nonhuman objects—persuade. Similarly intrigued by the
possibilities of OOR, another prominent OOO scholar and computer programmer
Ian Bogost suggests, “We might also ask a different question under the name of
object-oriented rhetoric: what is the rhetoric of objects? Do things like traffic
lights and kohlrabis persuade one another in their interactions? What would it
mean to understand extra-human object relations as rhetorical?” These are
provocative questions to say the least and in some ways they mirror some of my
own, yet OOO/R because of its ties to Latour, actor-network theory, and
complexity theory, is much more interested in the functioning of technological
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Though OOO scholars mark several distinctions between it and previous
ontologies or ontological projects, OOO is often included under the umbrella of
speculative realism or lumped in with new materialism and new vitalism.
46 The most substantial consideration of this is Scott Barnett’s “Toward an
Object-Oriented Rhetoric,” a review of Harman’s book and then subsequent
responses to that review.
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and natural-cultural systems than in consciousness, sensations, or feelings. OOR
scholarship doesn’t yet explain if or how central rhetorical concepts might be
mapped onto an object’s rhetoric. It’s unclear for instance how pathos would
exist in OOR. But a closely related vein of scholarship that emerges more from a
Spinozist-Deleuzian tradition—new materialist theory—better accounts for the
roles that affects and emotions play or can play in rhetoric.
In new materialist theory, affect is part of the becoming of matter and
what matters; it can help us better imagine how pathos fits into materialist,
object-oriented, complex rhetorics. A true revision of pathos, using affect theory,
must extend beyond the human, linguistic, and discursive. Though rhetoricians
have only just begun to publish in this vein,47 it’s a growing area of
interdisciplinary scholarship. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost explain the main
tenets of new materialism in their introduction to the 2010 anthology New
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics:
In sum, new materialists are rediscovering a materiality that
materializes, evincing immanent modes of self-transformation that
compel us to think of causation in far more complex terms; to
recognize that phenomena are caught in a multitude of interlocking
systems and forces and to consider anew the location and nature of
capacitates for agency. (9)
Mirroring Massumi’s argument for augmenting rather than critiquing, a new
materialist approach is interested in production, in thinking our way around
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Scholars in rhetoric have begun to identify with this scholarship only in the last
few years. Many of them also study OOO/R. Rickert’s (2013) and Hawk’s (2007)
works are preeminent examples of a new materialist rhetoric.
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humanist assumptions about the world: “It avoids dualism or dialectical
reconciliation by espousing a monological account of emergent, generative
material being” (8). Coole and Frost assert that a new materialist ethos is

“positive and constructive”; rather than concerning themselves with a critique or
a dismissal of Cartesianism, new materialists attempt to think beyond it. In the
“material turn,” matter becomes vibrant, active, resistant, productive. Coole and
Frost mark Einstein’s theory of relativity as a transition from theorizing matter as
inert and immobile unless acted upon (inspired by Euclidean geometry and
Newtonian physics) to theorizing matter and force as inseparable. In this
transition, rather than explaining cause and effect by the classic billiard ball
example, in which both cause and effect are easily identifiable, causes and effects
become more difficult or impossible to pull apart.
Despite much enthusiasm for the potentials of OOO and new materialist
scholarship, there is no shortage of concern about invoking these theories in
rhetoric. Two central concerns emerge for scholars who see rhetoric as a human
enterprise: 1) extending rhetorical study infinitely outward to encompass the
study of any thing makes rhetoric lose its distinctiveness and power, and 2) if we
give objects agency, we take agency and control away from humans. These
concerns reflect two already, ongoing debates in rhetoric about Big Rhetoric and
agency. Here, I’ll briefly respond to each of these concerns in hopes of
complicating existing conceptions of what it means to pursue new materialist
theory in rhetoric.
Some argue if rhetoric is no longer a human enterprise interested in public
discourse and persuasion, it’s no longer rhetoric. This claim echoes the Big
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Rhetoric debate of the ‘90s, when scholars like Thomas Farrell, Dalip
Parameshwar Goankar, and Lloyd Bitzer responded to the popularization and
expansion of rhetorical studies. The oft-cited quote from Rhetorical
Hermeneutics by William Keith, Steve Fuller, Alan Gross, and Michael Leff

captures the critique of Big Rhetoric: “If everything is rhetoric/rhetorical, then it
is neither informative nor interesting [to] be told that a
practice/discourse/institution is rhetorical. si omnia, nulla” (1999, 331). “If
[rhetoric is] everything, [rhetoric is] nothing”. Underlying much of this critique is
the idea that rhetoric, born from the desires of the human rhetor, simply isn’t
equipped to and shouldn’t be concerned with studying phenomena that is extradiscursive or extra-linguistic. This reflects the idea that persuasion are a uniquely
human capacity. But this critique also reflects a disciplinary insecurity, as
Edward Schiappa suggests in “Second Thoughts on the Critiques of Big Rhetoric.”
There, he outlines the critique of Big Rhetoric in this way: “1. Definitional—If
rhetoric is everywhere, it is nowhere. 2. Evaluative—Big Rhetoric contributes to
weak scholarship. 3. Political—Without a clear disciplinary history and discrete
identity, the discipline of rhetoric is threatened” (267). Rather than seeing the
popularization of rhetoric as a threat, Schiappa suggests we see it as an
opportunity: “What is significant about the rhetorical turn is not that ‘everything
is rhetoric,’ but that a rhetorical perspective and vocabulary potentially can be
used to understand and describe a wide range of phenomena” (268). A new
materialist rhetoric is an opportunity to shed light on a variety of phenomena but
perhaps more importantly to question and extend existing rhetorical theories and
applications.
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Rather than assuming that humans are the producers of rhetoric, we might
see humans as being folded into rhetoric. As both Davis and Rickert have
suggested, rhetoricity precedes us. Our task, then, is not to ask what is rhetoric;
it is not, we know, one thing. Rather we are left to carve out rhetorical projects, to
figure out what we can interpret as rhetorical in any phenomenon and what that
process might teach us about what rhetoric can be. Hawk’s Counter-History of
Composition takes up this sort of investigation, both extending traditional
boundaries of rhetoric and illustrating how a counter-history inspires us to ask
questions about long-standing rhetorical theories. He argues, “The seemingly
simple, static logic of the enthymeme and the abstract power of language over us
need to give way to a more complex middle ground” (187). A complex vitalist
perspective, he suggests, reveals rhetoric as a self-organizing complex adaptive
system, wherein the human subject is a node in a network, not rhetoric’s
orchestrator. Hawk asserts that a closer look at our history shows a tradition of
valuing complex relationships among minds bodies, and environments, relating,
for example, Aristotle’s entelechy to an ecological, layered process of
development. If we accept that humans are no longer the orchestrators of
rhetoric, this means paying attention to how affects and emotions are produced
and transmitted by nonhumans, as Hawk asserts, “any understanding of rhetoric
in the contemporary world needs to understand rhetoric at the level of affect.
Like language, new media make new affections and new relations possible” (190).
Affect theory is an avenue for humanistic rhetorical traditions to be merged with
recent studies of objects, matter, or the nonhuman.
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Another popular critique of ontologically focused theories in rhetoric is

that they take away agency from humans. However, a number of theorists have
made compelling arguments that our understanding of human agency has been
flawed all along. Bennett addresses just this “The Agency of Assemblages.” She
argues that human-centered notions of agency are inadequate. In her scheme,
assemblages are made up of groupings of actants, some of which, she suggests,
have sufficient coherence to appear as entities; others, because of
their great volatility, fast pace or evolution, or minuteness of scale,
are best conceived as forces […] Within this materialism, the world
is figured as neither mechanistic nor teleological but rather as alive
with movement and with a certain power of expression. (447)
The problem, she says, with popular conceptions of agency is that they celebrate
human intentionality and a presumed superiority; it is centered around “the
rational, intentional human subject” (453). A phenomenological approach, by
contrast, as inspired by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, recognizes the
embodiment and intersubjectivity of all human actants. Bennett offers what she
calls “a distributive theory of agency,” which does not ignore the human ability to
reflect and make judgments but she asserts:
[I]t attempts a more radical displacement of the human subject
from the center of thinking about agency. It goes so far as to say
that effective agency is always an assemblage: even what has been
considered the purest locus of agency—reflective, intentional
human consciousness—is from the first moment of its emergence
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constituted by the interplay of human and nonhuman materialities.
(453)
This doesn’t mean that humans no longer have agency (as some critics have
suggested) but rather that we must acknowledge the nonhuman aspects of human
agency; a human agent never makes a choice without other materialities.
Within our own field, Marilyn Cooper takes up Bennett’s theory of agency,
in her article “Rhetorical Agency As Emergent and Enacted.” Cooper, too,
criticizes a popular understanding of agency as conscious intention and free will.
Instead, she suggests, “though the world changes in response to individual action,
agents are very often not aware of their intentions, they do not directly cause
changes, and the choices they make are not free from influence from their
inheritance, past experiences or their surround” (421). Cooper urges that we see
agency as “an emergent property of embodied individuals” (421). Even though
agents plan and reflect on their actions consciously and while this consciousness
plays a role, Cooper claims this agency is based in “individuals’ lived knowledge
that their actions are their own” (421). We often attribute our actions and words
simply to conscious choices that we made rather than considering the agency also
of our surroundings and other nonhuman agents. Complex systems, Cooper says,
shift our focus from cause-effect to “the dance of perturbation and response as
agents interact” (421). For example, calling one of the LeRoy girls an agent
recognizes her as an independent entity functioning in a larger system. It doesn’t
mean that she necessarily is conscious of her agency or that she has the ability to
will her symptoms to stop or control the way she is represented. Her agency
emerges based on her interactions with other agents (girls, media, doctors,
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medication). Traditionally we might have privileged the girl herself (as a coherent
body, a subject, a participant in society) as an independent agent, but an agency
that emerges and is enacted acknowledges that the girl is made up of agents,
some that are contained and some that spill out of her, that interact with other
agents. Agency is the actions that are possible, in breathing or not, in ticking or
not, in accepting a diagnosis or not.
I turn to these two critiques of studying rhetoric ontologically not only to
dispute popular misconceptions of this vein of scholarship but also to highlight
the ways in which affect and emotion have not yet fully entered the conversation.
Affect and emotion tie new materialist theories more closely to rhetorical theory
but also incite rhetorical theory to do some revising of its own. Only a few
rhetorical scholars thus far (e.g., Hawk, Rickert, Edbauer) have begun to make
connections between these “new” ways of seeing the world, in terms of complex
systems, networks, ecologies, and affect/emotion. One way to bridge
considerations of affect and matter is through assemblage theory which I’ll will
pursue later in this chapter, but first I return to the question posed at the
beginning of this section: what is the object “mass hysteria”?

Fire Objects
If this question seems impossible to answer, it’s likely because we think of
objects as lifeless, static, and discrete, the opposite of something as complicated
as the outbreak in LeRoy. For this reason, some scholars prefer terminology other
than “object,” choosing “thing,” a la Heiddegger, or phenomena, like Barad.
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Though I’m not particularly invested in the terminology debate,48 I’m taking time
to consider the outbreak in LeRoy as an object because of some provocative
scholarship in science, technology, and society studies. Two theories—the fluid
object and fire object—help us pin down the objects of mass hysteria.
The theory of fluid objects, put forth by Marianne de Laet and Annemarie
Mol in “The Zimbabwe Bush Pump: Mechanics of a Fluid Technology,”
emphasizes objects’ flexible, adaptable nature. The pump, which De Laet and Mol
describe as a brilliant and valuable technology, is so successful because of its
fluidity; its relatively simple and intuitive design allows people to easily replace
missing or broken parts with a variety of materials, including sticks. Because its
boundaries are neither solid nor sharp, the pump is a fluid object which
continues to work with a changing makeup. As the boundaries change, different
identities emerge for the pump. We can see how mass hysteria might benefit from
being studied as a fluid object, as its makeup is continually adapting. However,
John Law and Vicky Singleton’s concept “fire object,” captures even more of the
complexities and conflicting identities of an object like mass hysteria.
In their article “Object Lessons,” Law and Singleton explain the difficulties
they faced studying the management of alcoholic liver disease in a particular
healthcare system. These difficulties arose not because of the many perspectives
(doctors, patients, social workers, etc.) from which the phenomenon could be
studied but because the object itself was in constant flux; alcoholic liver disease is
an example of what they call a “messy object.” A typical approach to studying the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 I use mostly the terminology “body” and “assemblage” because they most easily
traverse and encompass the varying traditions in this scholarship.
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disease and its context would be epistemological, wherein researchers would

consider how an object means different things to different people, how it comes
to be known. However, Law and Singleton decide to study the disease
ontologically, actually thinking about “the nature of objects in the world—about
what counts as an object” (334). To do this, they suggest, we need to acknowledge
that “realities, messy or otherwise, are enacted into being” and “in part at least,
such enactments take place in the practices of getting to know those realities”
(334). So while something like alcoholic liver disease may seem to cease to be an
object at all, it only seems that way because our methods for studying it don’t
allow us to recognize it as such.
Law and Singleton suggest that alcoholic liver disease could be studied as
de Laet and Mol’s fluid object or as a networked object (as constituted by its
relations which allows it to hold its shape for a period of time), but they also offer
a new theory of a fire object to better capture the disease.49 They assert the “fire
object” is a way to better account for the presences and absences of an object:
“The present object implies realities that are necessarily absent, that cannot be
brought to presence; that are othered. So, to put it slightly differently, an object is
a pattern of presences and absences” (342-3). There are aspects of the object that
are absent but still generative. For example, when studying the disease on the
level of a body, the other realities of the disease (its object on the hospital or
societal level) are necessarily absent. They write, “The argument in part is that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 It’s worth noting that the fire object doesn’t exclude an object from being fluid
or networked. Law and Singleton are not proposing “fire object” as the best
theory of objects, but as one possible way to rethink the multiplicity of objects.
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fires are energetic and transformative, and depend on difference—for instance
between (absent) fuel or cinders and (present) flame. Fire objects, then, depend
upon otherness, and that otherness is generative” (344). The object of the disease
on the level of a body (its cause and its prognosis) inform the object of the disease
on the level of society (its social beginnings and treatments) and vice versa. They
go on: “We are arguing, then, that alcoholic liver disease and its treatment in the
hospital are fire-like objects. They are generated in juxtaposition with realities
that are necessarily absent, even though they bring versions of those realities to
presence” (345). As I will show more extensively in the following chapter, mass
hysteria, too, can be studied as a fire object.
Like alcoholic liver disease, mass hysteria becomes multiple objects with
generative presences and absences. If we were to take an epistemological
approach, as Law and Singleton explain, to studying mass hysteria, we might
focus on how we come to know illness (as doctors, through media outlets, firsthand accounts, etc.). But an ontological approach would consider how the
hysteria changes itself based on the presence, absence, and otherness of its
identities. For example, in a psychologist’s office, mass hysteria is evidence of
trauma, a disorder of the mind, something to be overcome (perhaps with a
change in life circumstance and therapy); on various TV programs, it becomes a
mystery illness, an environmental contagion, a plight of girlhood, or a curse; and
among the girls themselves, it is something that binds them, a manifestation of
their bond (of their struggles, material circumstance, etc). Mass hysteria’s
objectness emerges through these series of presences and absences. Even when
two afflicted girls are alone, when the object of mass hysteria is an identification
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or a mark of a confluence of painful life circumstances (despite differences in
their pasts, lifestyles, and bodies), the historical and cultural object of mass

hysteria is necessarily absent but never gone. Even if the object of mass hysteria
is in one moment an identification, an acknowledgement of suffering, its
objectness as dysfunction, abnormality, or girlhood irrationality is absent but still
generative.
I draw attention to the fire object because it is one specific example of how
ontological approaches to defining objects could change how we approach
rhetorical projects. The theory of fire objects acknowledges the impossibility of
defining a discrete object of study but it also points our attention to how we can
identify multiple predominant objects in what we study. Of course we can never
grasp all of the objects of mass hysteria or any other phenomenon, but identifying
the predominant objects and how they come into presence and go into absence
(and how each of those objects is part of a different rhetorical situation) gives us a
fuller picture of what we study. It might seem that an object like mass hysteria
exceeds the purview of rhetoric, that there are too many variables (biological,
psychological, environmental, etc.) whose purposes or agency we can’t account
for, echoing in many ways the concerns of the Big Rhetoric and agency debates.
However, the theory of fire objects isolates different manifestations of
phenomena so that we can consider various rhetorical purposes and affects in a
given situation, isolating, for example, mass hysteria as a psychological
syndrome, a mystery illness, or an identification.
Popular understandings of affect often suggest that we can’t bring affect
fully into presence, that if affect is a preconscious bodily intensity (a la Massumi),
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bringing it into presence—recognizing it, naming it—pulls affect into the realm of
emotion. But just as presence is fueled by absence, so too is emotion fueled by
affect, the visible fueled by the invisible, and the phantom fueled by the limb. The
fire object calls attention to the generative relationship between presence and
absence and the rhetorical aims and affects of those presences and absences.
Before we can study affect rhetorically, before we can study the affects of mass
hysteria, we have to do a better job of pinning down its multiple objects. Each
object has its own affects, and in this way, affect is central in defining and
assembling objects—“messy” or otherwise.

Assembling Affect
Early theories of affect often emphasized its power as a verb; affect wasn’t
invoked so much as a companion to emotion, sensation, or feeling as much as it
was considered an action, movement, and force. A lot of recent scholarship uses
“affect” to qualify other things,50 for example “affective lives,” “the affective
component of writing and reading,” “affective potential,” “affective dimension,”
or “affective capacity.”51 In these examples, affect qualifies other phenomena or
denotes a realm we can’t readily access or understand. Though there’s nothing
inherently wrong with this, as a stand-in for anything extralinguistic, affect’s
rhetorical work is less clear; “affective” often refers to a more abstract, new, or
sophisticated level of whatever is being studied. The question that many scholars
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Two excellent exceptions are Daniel Smith (2003) and Jenny Edbauer Rice
(2004).
51 These phrases can be found among Worsham (1999), Pruchnic and Lacey
(2011), Strickland (2007), Crane (2003), Rachel Riedner (2007)
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have pursued in the field is what can we do with affect? But a question like this
mischaracterizes affect itself. Instead, we ought to be asking what does affect do
to us? One answer to this question is it assembles. Whereas assemblage theory
was central for theorizing affect for Deleuze (whose theory is rooted in Spinoza),
it was less so for Massumi. Scholars who turn only to Massumi for a theory of
affect might miss the rhetorical potential that exists in considering the
assembling power of affect.
Although Deleuze and Guattarri spend little over 20 pages discussing
assemblages in their otherwise exhaustive work, A Thousand Plateaus,
proponents of the theory claim Deleuze develops his assemblage theory through
his entire oeuvre. Scholars across disciplines use the assemblage generally to
describe dynamic, heterogeneous collectives of humans and nonhumans. As
opposed to some conceptions of the network, the assemblage never has a fixed
identity but is always collecting, becoming, composing, and decomposing. One of
the most prominent assemblage theory scholars is social scientist Manuel De
Landa who puts forth an assemblage-based ontology in A New Philosophy of
Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity. Uprooting persisting
understandings of individuals and societies in social theory, assemblage theory,
De Landa argues, offers a new paradigm. An assemblage, while it is a whole, is
not a totality; it’s not seamless and has no essence. Rather the assemblage has
synthetic and emergent properties, resulting from the interaction of its parts. A
part can be a member of multiple assemblages; De Landa calls this “Relations of
exteriority” which “guarantee that assemblages may be taken apart while at the
same time allowing that the interactions between parts may result in a true

112!

!

synthesis” (11). He discourages thinking of any assemblage in terms of interiority
because it perpetuates the idea of essence. Of the many concepts that are caught
up in assemblages for Deleuze and Guatarri, I will focus on just two here that I
think are especially relevant to affect and rhetoric: double articulation and
territorialization. The following is a brief, and therefore necessarily reductive,
explanation of both.
To understand the assemblage rhetorically, we must first figure out how it
comes into being. Double articulation is a dual process of creation that “is so
extremely variable,” Deleuze and Guattari claim, they “cannot begin with a
general model, only a relatively simple case” (40). They go on to explain:
The first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable
particleflows, metastable molecular or quasi-molecular units
(substances) upon which it imposes statistical order of connections
and successions (forms). The second articulation establishes
functional, compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the
molar compounds in which these structures are simultaneously
actualized (substances). (41)
Their initial example is a geological stratum, in which the first articulation is
sedimentation; the sediment is deposited in a statistical order. Then, in the
second articulation, the sediment stabilizes into rock. While the first articulation
selects, sorts, and orders substances (formed matter), the second articulation
produces a more stabilized form; the assemblage is actualized, and this is where
integration, unification, and hierarchization happens and where qualities and
capacities emerge. The first is concerned with “content” and the second
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“expression,” though neither content nor expression is preexisting; they emerge
together (inseparably) in each becoming. De Landa delineates the two
articulations by suggesting the first is nondiscursive and the second discursive or
is a process of coding. Because assembling is a recurring process that is never
complete, there is always slippage in the process of sorting and stabilizing, and
assemblages can always fall apart. Territorialization (and relatedly,
deterritorialization and reterritorialization) is part of the process of the first
articulation in which matter (human and nonhuman) is sorted. De Landa
explains that territorialization defines and sharpens (spatial or nonspatial)
boundaries or territories; he gives the example of people being sorted and
included/excluded in groups and organizations.
In another example, Deleuze and Guattari put forth some “general
conclusions on the nature of assemblages” and they map double articulation onto
axes:
On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments,
one of content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a
machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an
intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other hand
it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements,
of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on the
vertical axis, the assemblage has both territorial sides, or
reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of
deterritorialization, which carry it away. (88)
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On the horizontal axis, the assemblage is formed through the arrangement and
collecting of bodies, actions, and passions; on the vertical axis, the assemblage is
further recognized as an independent entity which has particular boundaries. In
social organizations and assemblages, shared identities, values, and motivations
bind people for a period of time.
While undoubtedly a complicated process that can never be fully pulled
apart for examination, the formation of assemblages is useful for studying events
that have many parts or variables; we can begin to understand rhetorical
situations as assemblages, whose parts are pulled in and articulated differently
depending on the situation, or how parts fulfill varying rhetorical functions in
assemblages or are called to function rhetorically differently. For example, the tic
of a hysterical girl in an assemblage of other girls identifies her with them; in the
assemblage of a body, the tic is an exigence to address an underlying problem; or
in the assemblage of the Dr. Drew show, the tic is a representation of mystery,
dysfunction, or performance. In a hysterical body, through the process of double
articulation, bodily matter, material circumstance, psychological state, and
exposure (along with innumerable other parts) gather to manifest in a tic;
intensities from inside and outside the individual collide to create the becoming
of hysteria. Then, of course, as more girls exhibit symptoms, they too are being
assembled and sorted by healthcare professionals, peers, and the news media, to
become the group of hysterical girls. We can see how the assemblages grow and
change and die, encompassing many parts.
The relationship between cause and effect in assemblage theory is an
emergent, productive relationship. Rather than thinking of one entity or body
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being the cause of a given effect, De Landa asserts, in assemblage theory the

cause is a change, action, or movement. The possible affects of a body become the
causes (the changes) that form new relations. To think of affect in terms of the
assemblage is to think of it as becoming. As Deleuze and Guattari explain:
To every relation of movement and rest, speed and slowness
grouping together an infinity of parts, there corresponds a degree of
power. To the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an
individual there correspond intensities that affect it, augmenting or
diminishing its power to act; these intensities come from external
parts or from the individual’s own parts. Affects are becomings.
(256)
This explanation highlights the relational and ecological aspects of affect,
specifically how in relations and movement, parts of an assemblage come
together and diverge, altering each part’s power to act. Relations are constantly
composing and decomposing, allowing or restricting an individual’s capacity to
influence. For rhetoric, then, affect is part of what is becoming the available
means (of persuasion) in a given situation. It is what propels parts into grouping
but also what gives and removes power. Affects are not random forces that
pervade everything, but are instrumental in the becoming of humans, objects,
rhetoric—assemblages of all kinds. Merleau-Ponty offers a prime example of the
assembling power of a nonhuman affect in his writing about honey. He explains,
“Honey is a particular way the world has of acting on me and my body” (World
47). Honey, an assemblage of pollen, nectar, bees, bee-keepers, shop owners, and
taste buds, is not inert; rather “we are moved or compelled to treat it in certain
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way . . . it has a particular way of seducing, attracting or fascinating the free

subject who stands before us” (47). More than just explaining how matter comes
together, assemblage theory is important to understanding what affect does.

Defining Bodies by their Affects
One of the primary reasons scholars across disciplines have turned to
affect theory is because it demands that we begin accounting for the role of
bodies, not just how existing within a body shapes the way we perceive the world
but also how processes like learning, rationalizing, and persuading are embodied.
A heightened focus on bodies for rhetoric means considering how our bodies
persuade and are persuaded, yet to entertain these considerations, we must
determine what makes up a body, where a body begins and ends. Might our
bodies extend to the media we use and consume, as Marshall McLuhan has
suggested or might bodies be made up of machinic, nonhuman parts as Donna
Harraway’s cyborg suggests? Rhetoric might seem to be an odd discipline for
debates about bodies and materiality, as Celeste Condit asks in “The Materiality
of Coding,”
Surely, speaking and writing are not material in the same sense
genetic coding is? Except in war and lovemaking, human beings do
not use the physical conformations of their bodies and direct
contact with other physical substances to communicate in the direct
fashion used by amino acids and other molecules. Yet further
reflection suggests that communication is every bit as material.
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Speaking is an act of breathing, of the physical vibration of air

molecules, of hearts supplying blood for hand motions and bodylean. (327)
But as Condit and scholars like Hawhee have asserted, just acknowledging that
these physical and material elements exist doesn’t do enough to advance our
rhetorical theories. The more difficult task is figuring out what it means to
account for bodies in rhetorical theory—a consideration that might be best
theorized in relation to affect.
Following Deleuze and Guattari, bodies compose and decompose based on
how they affect and are affected by other bodies. Affects are central to the
formulation, arrangement, exigence, and dissolution of bodies—human, textual,
rhetorical, mediated, etc. Bodies, in this configuration, are human and
nonhuman and are made up of an infinite number of parts. Edbauer (2004)
explains this as a sort of expanding: “It is the experience that we are not
a/lone(ly), but that we exist in relations beyond what we may recognize or even
wish.” These relations with other human and nonhuman bodies constitute the
coming together and falling apart of any event: “Affect marks the lived duration
between two states experienced by one body that is affected by another body”
(Edbauer). This view of affect is very much grounded in Spinoza, wherein a
body’s individuality is defined by, as Deleuze explains in Spinoza: Practical
Philosophy, “relations of motion and rest, speeds and slowness” and its “the
capacity for affecting and being affected” (123).
Subverting the definition of bodies by a physical or visible border or limit,
Spinoza defines bodies by their affective potential. Because bodies, for Spinoza,
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are made up of an infinite number of particles, “whole” would never be an

accurate description of a body because wholeness implies stability. Deleuze gives
the example of how a plow horse is more similar to an ox than a racehorse
because their affects are similar. This introduces a new way of categorizing
bodies, in which affects are the central mode of definition; we are defined by what
we can do, say, and incite. For Spinoza, affect is a capacity; as any event or
assemblage changes, so does our power to affect, to persuade. As Spinoza writes
in his Ethics, “By affect I understand the affections of the body, by which the
power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered,
together with the ideas of these affections” (106). We transition from one state to
another toward more or less perfection, an increase or decrease in the power to
act. As bodies move from one state to another, their rhetorical abilities to act are
created and diminished.
To accept these propositions means that we resist defining bodies by their
forms; rather, bodies are in a constant state of composing and decomposing: “The
important thing is to understand life, each living individuality, not as a form, or a
development of form, but as a complex relation between differential velocities,
between deceleration and acceleration of particles. A composition of speeds and
slownesses on a plane of immanence” (Spinoza 123). Even if we were to
acknowledge a human body as discrete, its makeup constantly changes—through
the consumption of nutrients, illnesses that subsume it or are overcome, levels of
exertion, absorption of chemicals and topical treatments, changes in climate, etc.
A body’s border similarly changes to include things like hearing aids, tumors,
body hair, etc. And because, as Deleuze writes, “all bodies are in extension,” parts
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of a human body extend out to other bodies and may leave ours for another (114).
The tic of a hysteric girl extends into the space around her but also extends to
other girls who consume and develop the tic; similarly, the tic extends into the
news media that seek to capture it. The tic is an affect that both defines the
hysteric girl but also extends beyond her to have other rhetorical affects, as it
becomes for example, the focal point52 of the news media interviews.
Studying the possible affects of bodies in a situation is a chiefly rhetorical
task. This approach is important for thinking about intersecting rhetorical
situations, in which bodies can have multiple roles (as exigences and constraints
for example) depending on their affects. Similarly, affects are central in emerging,
categorizing, and identifying bodies. When a LeRoy girl develops a tic—when tics
are one of her affects—she becomes a hysteric. But when she appears on the Dr.
Drew show and her tics cease, people question whether she really is a hysteric.
No identity is static. Through individual (and cultural) narratives and memories,
some affects (especially those that don’t make sense given our experience) spur
strong emotional reactions. The fear, for example, surrounding hysteria is in part
a fear of its affects. This fear grows only because we can never fully know our
affective capacities:
That is why Spinoza calls out to us in the way he does: you do not
know beforehand what good or bad you are capable of; you do

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 In fact, when one of the interviews failed to capture the tic—when one of the
girls being interviewed failed to exhibit symptoms—the viewing audience used it
as evidence that the girls were faking the syndrome.
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not know beforehand what a body or a mind can do, in a given
encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination. (Spinoza
125)
While this may seem to suggest that we have no control over our bodies and

affects, we have to remember that patterns emerge; all bodies are in relation. We
might not be able to predict with much accuracy what affects we and others will
have in the future, but we can better understand the available affects of bodies in
a rhetorical situation in the moment.

Affective Agency
An understanding of affect through Spinoza, Deleuze, and Guattari
suggests that affects are the very basis for what is rhetorically possible. Within
this framework, rhetorical concepts and theories have no essence—only affects. A
rhetor, audience, or text is defined by its affects and its capacities in any given
situation, so a rhetor is a rhetor only because she has an audience, the ability to
persuade, to recognize and respond to an exigence, etc. This means, of course,
that a rhetor doesn’t have to be human. As long as a body has the affects of a
rhetor, given its relation to other bodies, it is a rhetor. Thus, this framework could
be used to describe almost anything as rhetorical but also to consider central
rhetorical theories and concepts in different light, to ask for example, What are
the affects we assume a rhetor, text, or audience has? What possibilities do we
allow and deny through our assigning of affects?
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If we understand affects to be what is possible for any body in any

situation, we can harness these possibilities, rhetorically, in different ways. While
we have little control over some affects, others affects we can change and control.
Think for example about our relation to the earth. One affect we can hardly avoid
is stepping, trampling, or driving on the earth, yet there are other affects we have
on the earth we can control, e.g. mowing, composting, or reducing our carbon
imprint. We know that the affects we have on the earth change our relation to it,
change the body of the earth and our bodies. One could even consider global
warming as the world’s affect on us—an emergence of many chemical, ecological,
human bodies. Affects are closely tied to theories of agency, as a body’s affects
(both the affects that are available and not to a body) enable its agency. This sort
of emergent, agential affect aligns closely with physicist Karen Barad’s theory of
agential realism, which she writes about in Meeting the Universe Halfway:
Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. She argues
representationalism is problematic because it “separates the world into
ontologically disjoint domains of words and things, leaving the dilemma of their
linkage” (137). However, similar to assemblage theory, she introduces a theory of
“intra-action” which describes the process by which phenomena53 emerge; agency
in this configuration is also emergent:
Agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather,
agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Barad uses “phenomena” as the primary ontological unit rather than “thing” or
“object” because those concepts suggest separation and individuality; phenomena
on the other hand are “dynamic topological
reconfigurings/entaglements/relationalities/(re)articulations of the world” (142).
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entanglements. So agency is not about choice in any liberal
humanist sense; rather, it is about the possibilities and
accountability entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive
apparatuses of bodily production, including the boundary
articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices.
(“Interview” 58)
Thus, similar to Cooper, Barad asserts agency is enacted. Rhetorically, it’s a
matter of figuring out how our and others’ affects can “reconfigure

entanglements.” Defining affect in this way resists an understanding of affects as
free-floating or representational; they assemble and dissemble us and rhetoric
into bodies. In this way, affect and matter are closely entwined; as Bennett has
suggested, “I equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate force that
can enter and animate a physical body.” (xiii). This helps us understand how
phenomenon like the phantom limb, regardless of its material presence (as an
appendage or in the brain), is affectively present and persuasive, through the
affect of pain. This kind of rhetorical affect is what I hope to highlight in the
application of my theoretical framework in the following chapter, to reveal some
of the multifaceted ways that affects and emotions work in a complex rhetorical
events.
Perhaps these theories of affect sounds like the “impractical theory-talk”54
that so many scholars bemoan. Yet they capture both affect’s complexity (that we
can never really grasp all of the affects that surround us) but also its work in a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 As referenced in Edbauer Rices’s examples from the WPA Listserv thread in
“(Meta)Physical Graffiti: ‘Getting Up” as Affective Writing Model.”
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rhetorical situation, as its various parts (bodies) come into being only in their

relations with one another, in their capacities to affect and be affected. If we take
this version of affect to consider the work of pathos in a rhetorical situation, we
can see how it becomes more than just a tool to be invoked, a twist in style, a flair
in delivery. Rather than being primarily the impetus for a situation or the desired
result of rhetoric, affects and emotions become the very circumstance in which all
things (rhetorical and not) come together, the very basis of change. This view is
actually not so far off from Aristotle’s two millennia ago: pathe, the emotions “are
all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and that are
also attended by pain or pleasure.” The emotions neither begin nor end in a
human body; they emerge among the relations of rhetor, audience, exigence, and
constraint, and each of these entities is limited by the possible feelings, the
affects, it can elicit. This theory of affect, while not transparent, allows us to
imagine what it might entail to see pathos as the very foundation for rhetoric.
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!

!
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CHAPTER FOUR

A Rhetorical Analysis of Mass Hysteria

!
The debate surrounding the outbreak of mass hysteria in LeRoy could
have ended January 11, 2012. On that day, Dr. Gregory Young presented the
results of the New York State Department of Health’s investigation to over 150
concerned community members in the LeRoy High School auditorium. Dr. Young
reported that no infectious or environmental causes could be found, but citing
HIPPA regulations, claimed he wouldn’t release the real diagnosis—conversion
disorder turned mass psychogenic illness. When Dr. Young repeatedly refused to
reveal the diagnosis for the girls (what he said would be a breach of privacy), an
unafflicted student named Jessica confronted Dr. Young in the front of the group:
“You think it’s unethical for you not to give us the cause. I think it's wrong for you
not to tell us . . . You're not telling us the truth because you don't really know
what's going on” (Owens). The Department of Health, school administration, and
doctors treating the girls all hoped this meeting would mitigate the community’s
concerns, but the overwhelming sentiment toward the report might be best
summed up by Jim Dupont, one of the parents who was interviewed by local
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news media after the meeting: “Well in my opinion we've only just begun. If you
haven't found anything then we have to turn some more stones and we need to
have another investigation that is not government related” (Brean).
If parents, girls, and local residents had accepted the diagnosis (despite
Dr. Young’s refusal to publicly name it, most in the community knew several of
the girls had begun successful treatment for conversion disorder), this case could
have slowly come to an end—the girls could have continued treatment at Dent
Neurological Institute, and their symptoms could have ceased. But when parents
decided to create a support group and turn to the national news media, this
became a whole other event; news reporters swarmed the town, conspiracy
theorists plead their cases, fear in the community escalated, symptoms worsened,
and the number of afflicted more than doubled to twenty-four.
Similarly, a rhetorical study of this case might have ended with the report
from the New York State Department of Health. A traditional rhetorical study of
this case might begin with choosing the central texts in this event. I might have
begun by close reading the report and a few other articles and interviews, looking
for rhetorical appeals and strategies. I would have considered the persuasive
effects of these texts, the strength of their evidence, and to whom they were
written. If that report, whose dual purpose was presenting scientific findings to a
lay-audience and mitigating fear in the community, had been the end of this
story, it could have been the end of my analysis. But instead, the report was the
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impetus for parents—who have been described by anthropologist Ryan Cook55 as
“concerned but poorly informed” (3)—to ask the national news media for help.
This decision produced a case of mass hysteria that has never been seen before—
wherein news and social media became the main site for transmission of the
symptoms.
Between January and February 2012, hundreds of international articles
and news segments covered the “mystery illness” in LeRoy. The most sustained
coverage (and arguably most sensational) came from Dr. Drew Pinksy, who Cook
describes, “enthusiastically positioned himself as [the girls’] advocate” (3). On his
talk show, he had an almost daily report on the girls for several weeks. It seemed
that for every news report that asserted the girls were suffering from mass
psychogenic illness, there were twice as many that introduced conspiracy theories
about the cause of the symptoms. As Cook describes: “For their part, news
organizations continued to emphasize the mysteriousness of the illness even after
it was officially labeled MPI, and they circulated dramatic videos on TV and the
internet of the afflicted exhibiting tics.” (4). Meanwhile, the public, through blogs
and internet comments, weighed in on the cause of the symptoms, offering any
number of modern-day ills—environmental pollution, vaccines, social media,
atheism, premarital sex, etc. By the middle of March, the news media went

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 One of only a few scholars who have published about the case, Cook does an
ethnographic study called “”I Didn’t Want to Be One of the Contaminated
People”: Confronting a Mystery Illness in a Rural American Landscape.”
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silent.56 Only a few local news stories have covered the girls since—all suggesting
there’s not much to report. The girls have been treated and are better.
The study of this case, as I’ve suggested, requires a new kind of approach
and methodology. My analysis is informed by the study of approximately fifty
newspaper articles and blog posts on the case (including thousands of
comments), twelve television news reports on the girls (including several
interviews), and the report issued by the New York State Department of Health.
But I won’t be turning to those articles, interviews, and stories as central texts of
my analysis. In keeping with my desire to pursue a study of more than the
discourse surrounding the event, I’ll turn to these texts in support of finding the
emotions and affects that propelled this case, to identify new kinds of persuasion
and rhetorical relations. I won’t be studying this event as a traditional rhetorical
object per se; rather my approach begins in the middle to discern what objects,
bodies, assemblages, and affects are holding the event together. While
unorthodox, this isn’t such a new approach; scholars in critical and cultural
rhetoric have been arguing for similar methodologies for decades. In his seminal
argument for critical rhetoric Raymie McKerrow (1989), for example, argues
against “universalist” approaches to rhetorical criticism that “privilege reason
above all else” (124); he, instead, asserts,
To approach mediated communication as rhetorical is to see it in its
fragmented, unconnected, even contradictory or momentarily
oppositional mode of presentation . . . The process one employs is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 This was most likely because the girls’ physicians were finally able to convince
them that interacting with the news media was making their symptoms worse.
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thus geared to uncovering the ‘dense web’ (Moscow), not by means
of a simple speaker-audience interaction but also by the means of a
‘pulling together’ of disparate scraps of discourse which, when
constructed as an argument, serve to illuminate otherwise hidden
or taken for granted social practices. (134)
The analysis that follows aims to study more than the many speaker-audience
interactions in this event; instead, it hopes to “pull together disparate scraps of
discourse”—cultural, mediated, bodily, emotional discourses—to reveal some of
the emotional and affective arguments and influences in this case. Though not all
events need be studied on the level of affect and emotion, I’m interested in
considering what this would look like. What could we uncover, if we began our
studies not by imposing theories of persuasion, the rhetorical situation, or
rhetorical appeals onto our objects of study, but by looking for the objects,
bodies, assemblages, and affects at the core of our studies?
Thus, this chapter applies the framework put forth in the previous chapter
alongside analysis of reports of the case and situated among some of vast
scholarship on hysteria, which has influenced popular and medical
understandings of the syndrome.57 By situating analysis of the case within some
of this literature, I hope to point out the recursivity of historical and cultural
connotations of hysteria as they inspired some of the mediation and reception of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 We mustn’t forget, for example, in the 19th century, hysteria was touted as the
most common illness treated by physicians in Western Europe and the U.S.
Hysteria was called both the “The English Malady” by physician George Cheyene
and “American Nervousness” by physician George Beard. At that time, hysteria
was still believed to be a somatic disorder, often attributed to the nerves.
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this case. As a syndrome, hysteria has a long history of being described in

emotional terms. Understanding how hysteria has been suffered, diagnosed, and
treated historically is important for making sense of the cultural mythology
surrounding this baffling syndrome.

Defining Rhetorical Objects
Just as a traditional case study would begin by defining its object of study,
I, too, will begin considering mass hysteria as an object. After consideration of
how it’s been historically conceived as an object, I’ll use Law and Singleton’s
theory of fire objects to reveal how mass hysteria becomes different objects in
different venues and with different relations. Historically, hysteria has often been
described as an excess of emotion, a disease that inflicts those who cannot
appropriately handle or control their feelings and desires (Shorter 1993, Scull
2009). Seventeenth century physician Thomas Sydenham, for example, blamed
hysteria on “the passions”; he said of his hysterical patients, “All is caprice. They
love without measure those whom they will soon hate without reason” (quoted in
Scull 33). He understood hysterics to be impulsive, weak, and easily affected.
Today, despite a better medical understanding of hysteria,58 we still think of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Since the APA dropped “hysteria” as a diagnosis in 1952, it has introduced a
number of new disorders that explain what were previously considered hysterical
symptoms (psychogenic and psychosomatic illnesses, like conversion disorder
and somatization disorder). While some physicians believe hysteria has simply
waned in the 20th century (like small pox, polio, or gout), others argue that
hysteria is as widespread as ever; it has just slipped into disguise. Recently,
scholars suggest that PTSD, chronic fatigue syndrome, and borderline personality
disorder may be new manifestations of the syndrome.
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emotionally (and often sexually) maladapted people, as psychoanalyst
Chirstopher Bollas points out:

When we think of hysteria we think of people who are troubled by
their body’s sexual demands and repress sexual ideas; who are
indifferent to conversion; who are overidentified with the other;
who express themselves in a theatrical manner; who daydream
existence rather than engage it; and who prefer the illusion of
childlike innocence to the worldliness of adulthood. (1)
Bollas captures a common way of thinking about hysterics, as both excitable and
weak, which prevails in descriptions of the LeRoy girls. Susan Dominus’ exposé
in The New York Times Magazine describes the scene in LeRoy: “Parents wept
as their daughters stuttered at the dinner table. Teachers shut their classroom
doors when they heard a din of outbursts, one cry triggering another, sending the
increasingly familiar sounds ricocheting through the halls.” There is a
hopelessness that pervades these kinds of descriptions, but also a hint of
annoyance—doors have to be closed in order for everyday life to continue. This
annoyance can quickly become resentment, as we can see in a comment from
Lorie Longhany, the chairwoman of the Genesee County Democratic Committee:
“Without laying any blame on any of these families — they’re going through their
private hell with this. But it’s not private hell, it’s public hell. It’s almost like a
depression has just settled over Le Roy” (quoted in Dominus). The fact that this
case of mass hysteria was so public contributes to the emotional climate of the
whole town. Underlying this annoyance or resentment seems to be a critique of
the girls themselves; because the illness is psychological (the outbursts
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illustrating, to some, a lack of restraint), the girls’ inability to stop the symptoms
seems to indicate a lack of psychological fortitude.
As many looked on at the seemingly out-of-control girls, one central
emotion emerged—pity. And it is the spurning of onlookers’ pity that seems to
keep girls and their families from accepting the illness, that fuels comments from
parents like Heather Parker who said, “That mass psychogenic illness—that’s just
a bunch of hoggy” (quoted in Dominus). An environmental or infectious cause for
the symptoms is much easier to digest because it places the cause of the illness in
the environment, not originating within the girls’ themselves, in bodies that can’t
control themselves. This is an understanding of hysteria (a historical object of
hysteria) that has existed for centuries; Ruth Graham of Slate notes how closely
the outbreak mirrors historical connotations of hysteria: “As archetypes go, the
Salem events hold up quite well, even from a distance of 320 years. Victims of
mass hysteria are so often female that gender imbalance is one clue doctors use to
differentiate hysteria from poisoning.” But holding onto these archetypes,
accepting this object of mass hysteria, comes at a cost; it fails to capture the
complexity of the realities of mass hysteria that are brought to the fore in this
event. Different versions of this object emerge depending on whether mass
hysteria is portrayed on the national stage as a site of mystery, in the doctor’s
office, or between two girls. A theory of fire objects, however, shows how mass
hysteria as an object changes over time but also how it can be multiple objects
simultaneously.
Recognizing a thing or a phenomenon as a fire object means paying
attention to the invisible work and realities of an object. When one of the versions
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or objects of mass hysteria comes into presence, the others become necessarily
absent; they are “discontinuous realties that cannot be held together or brought
to presence” (Law and Singleton 344). These sets of absences are “othered,”
suggest Law and Singleton, and it is the otherness and difference that is so
generative in creating and sustaining a complex syndrome like mass hysteria.
Like Law and Singleton assert about alcoholic liver disease, this case
encompasses versions of mass hysteria that are made up of presences and
absences—each of which have varied emotional and affective influences. Mass
hysteria is an object that spreads across mind, body, and society. Looking at the
different objects of mass hysteria at work in this event explains why there is so
much disagreement among parties who grappled with the definition, cause,
treatment, and significance of this syndrome. Though there are many objects of
mass hysteria that are prominent in this event, I’ll look specifically at objects the
news media produces and also the objects that come into being when the girls
interact with each other.
On the level of the news media, many of the reports and interviews made
the object of mass hysteria a mystery, as we can see in headlines like “Corinth
Girl’s Tics Are a Medical Mystery”; “Mysterious Illness At Leroy High School”;
“Le Roy Student Speaks out about Illness, Lack of Answers”; “Facial Tics, Verbal
Outburts Perplex Community”; “The Mystery of 18 Twitching Teenagers in Le
Roy New York”; “Mystery Malady; No known Cause.”59 When we accept this
version of mass hysteria as a mystery illness what is absent is a diagnosis, which
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 These headlines come, in order, from the following news organizations: WNYT
13, WKBW, WGRZ, USA Today, The New York Times Magazine, Nightline ABC.
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inspires fear, intrigue, or suspicion, depending on who you are. (For the

individual this might fuel the denial of an underlying issue.) This version of the
illness is dependent upon the presence of symptoms, which opens opportunities
to diagnose and/or analyze their meaning. With the emergence of conspiracy
theories, the news media has an opportunity to (in denying the real diagnosis and
making it absent) continue reporting on a story that remains intriguing only
because a diagnosis is absent. But the “mystery illness” can only be sustained for
so long; once the diagnosis is widely accepted among the news media, the
absence of mystery closes off particular opportunities and understandings of the
syndrome. When the mystery is absent, the story is no longer interesting to the
general public. The news media, in choosing to highlight the “mystery illness,”
produced an object that inspired fear, intrigue, and curiosity in the general
viewing audience; this object, because of its mystery, incited a unique kind of
emotional investment in the viewing audience.
Not all new organizations insisted this case was a mystery; some reporters
accepted and reported the diagnosis. Though this object of mass hysteria would
seem to simply be the medical diagnosis, these portrayals often suggested mass
hysteria is rooted in the difficult (emotional) experience of being a teenage girl on
the brink of adulthood. Dominus’ article presents this object of mass hysteria, as
does the accompanying cover photo on The New York Times Magazine. Two of
the girls (Thera and Katie) sit on a bed in a room that by all indications is a girl’s:
the wall is painted a loud yellow; the comforter is colorfully striped and the bed is
accented with bright pink pillows and blankets (one says “LOVE” on it in the
fashion of the Victoria’s Secret PINK line). Above their heads hang large collages
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of pictures; groups of girls are pasted together with other memorabilia, including
a peace sign sticker. The setting of the photo suggests these are just girls—the
kind who paste their memories and dreams above their beds. Yet what the girls
wear and how they are posed suggests they are on the precipice of womanhood.
Both girls appear to have dressed up for the event: their hair is styled, they’re
wearing make up, Thera wears a silk shirt, and Katie wears a fashion scarf. They
sit, shoulders touching, legs intertwined, closing in toward each other, in way that
appears both comforting but also slightly erotic (it’s a pose we rarely see adult
women or men in). However, at the same time, we are reminded of their youth by
their distressed blue jeans and brightly patterned fashion socks sticking out
toward the camera.
The photo captures the girls in their everyday environment—surrounded
by symbols of girlhood—yet the environment is juxtaposed with the seriousness
of their faces, a reminder of their current trials and the severity of their illness.
This version of mass hysteria brings innocence, beauty, and potential into
presence, but wild, inappropriate outbursts and movements threaten to spoil this
potential. There’s a sense, in this version of mass hysteria, that so much could be
lost. Viewers seemed to be transfixed with the idea that as parent Jim DuPont put
it, “These kids are totally normal, and the next thing you know their arms are
swinging and they can't control themselves.” We’re reminded of the fragility of
health, of how quickly youth and beauty can be spoiled. This take on hysteria can
be seen in as early as Freud’s famous study of Dora.60 Dora was, Freud explains,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 In his 1905 An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (often just referred to as Dora),
Freud set out to analyze a typical case of hysteria. He writes a detailed account of
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“in the first bloom of youth—a girl of intelligent and engaging looks” (38) yet

“unmistakably neurotic” (34). Freud’s first bloom metaphor suggests more than
Dora’s youth, promise, and innocence; every bloom closes and wilts. In this same
way, hysteria risks spoiling the first bloom of womanhood. This alternate version
of mass hysteria, while it may seem to more accurately portray the illness, is used
by the news media to incite a different kind of emotion—not the fear of contagion
of a mystery illness but a sadness for the girls, a sadness for what they lost and
might still lose.
While the way mass hysteria was portrayed in the news media (and to
what ends) is important for understanding this event, we can’t ignore the object
of mass hysteria on the level of the girls, whose identities change throughout the
case. As the event progresses and as more parties (doctors, TV personalities,
community members, conspiracy theorists, etc.) join the public discourse
surrounding the illness, various identities of the girl emerges; the girl herself,
doctors, and the news media all play a role in calling particular identities into
presence and pushing others into absence. Before the girl develops symptoms,
her identity is as a healthy girl and the absent realities of her identity are
minimal. While she understands that she (like anyone) could become ill, she has
likely never experienced the debilitating involuntary symptoms that she soon
will. When the girl develops symptoms, a number of identities emerge: the
hysteric, the girl suffering from mystery symptoms, the faker of symptoms, etc.
Depending on what situation she’s in—in a doctor’s office, on the Dr. Drew Show,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
his perceptions and diagnosis of Dora who suffered from difficulty breathing, loss
of voice, heavy coughing, and headaches, paired with social avoidance and
depression.
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on facebook—different identities for the girl become prominent. These changing
and multiple identities would be understandably confusing and frustrating for
anyone. Even when the girl is cured, the realities of her illness—the version of her
that was broadcast on national television, the way she was treated as an example
of a mystery illness, the way her parents, community members, physicians, and
strangers alike fought over what she was (a hysteric, a faker, a site of pity)—may
be absent but are still generative. When contemplating the emotional experience
of the girl, we can see how her various identities (both assigned to her and
personally accepted) allow her to be represented in different ways. Fear—the
predominant emotion in much of this case—was propagated by the uncertainty of
the girl’s identity.
When different versions of the girls were portrayed in the media, the
stakes of taking on one identity over another became high for the girls, especially
as they chose which treatment to receive. Dominus explains the tension that
arose when some of the girls, instead of continuing treatment at the Dent
Neurological Institute for conversion disorder, decided to see Dr. Rosario
Trifiletti who asserted the syndrome was PANDAS, an autoimmune disorder:
After that, more lines were drawn in Le Roy. Some girls, including a
few who had been receiving treatment at Dent, started seeing
Trifiletti and taking the medications he prescribed. Others
remained with their original neurologists, and were bullied on
Facebook by those who were now taking the antibiotics: if you got
better without the pills, you had surely been faking all along. The
accusations invariably exacerbated the symptoms.
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These clashes reflect what was really at stake for the girls in accepting a

diagnosis. The news media’s involvement didn’t end with spinning the case in a
number of ways (invoking a number of emotions) to maintain a viewing
audience; the ways in which the news media pitted the diagnoses against each
other had real implications on how the girls—and if the girls—would seek proper
treatment for their illness.
When we study complex events like this rhetorically, we make choices to
draw out particular objects and realities. Of course, it’s not always as simple as
making a conscious choice to privilege one object over another. The hysteric girl,
for example, waiting for a diagnosis doesn’t have the control to become the
healthy girl (though arguably once the diagnosis is given, she has the choice to
accept it and start the becoming of the cured girl or not), but the news media has
a choice to highlight particular realities—to bring into presence the focus of their
story and to push into absence what will be generative. For example, if the
hysteric girl is brought into presence, the generative absences of the healthy girl
can be used—loss of innocence, control—to construct an emotionally moving
narrative. And this work has clear emotional and affective resonance as we can
see different emotions attached to each version of the illness (pity, fear, sadness).
Typically, we might look for the role of pathos in an event like this to see
which emotions are being represented or incited by particular parties in the
event; however, studying mass hysteria as a fire object, we can also see how the
defining of an object itself, in drawing out what we consider to be a rhetorical
object is a task that privileges some emotional realities of the object and ignores
others. For example, if we choose to focus solely on the fear and pity that is
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associated with one version of mass hysteria, we overlook how among the girls
(as we can see in their social media reprimands) this illness is also embroiled
with social belonging and social standing. Studying a complex object like this
means not just taking the first object of mass hysteria that comes into view—the
historical or popular objects that inspire fear or pity—but also looking for other
objects which might drive a different array of emotions.

Complicated Situations: Rhetorical Assemblages
As I’ve suggested in previous chapters, traditional notions of the rhetorical
situation don’t fully capture an event like this. Fortunately, several scholars in our
field have already theorized better ways of mapping complex rhetorical
situations, in terms of networks, systems, and ecologies that emerge and overlap
with other situations. Complexity theory has been a primary avenue for these
pursuits, which is detailed in the 2004 special issue of JAC, in which guest
editors Thomas Rickert and David Blakesley claim complexity theory “promises
to challenge and transform great swaths of our received knowledge concerning
rhetoric, culture, social organization, and composition” (822). Within complexity
theory, controlled rhetorical situations, in which rhetor, audience, and message
are discrete entities, become complex adapting systems, co-evolving with,
against, among any number of nodes and networks. Relying namely on Mark C.
Taylor’s The Moment of Complexity and his interdisciplinary look at emerging
network culture, the authors in the JAC special issue suggest the rhetorical
situation is no longer a “situation” at all, as it extends innumerably outward. No
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doubt, theorizing a complex, emergent, ecological rhetorical situation is not

simple. It subverts what Hawk (2004) has called “the desire for simplicity” that
has “haunted rhetoric and composition for most of its history” (“Toward” 831).
Accepting complexity means, as Elizabeth Birmingham (2004) suggests, “we
must be willing to develop a rhetoric that values untidy and misshapen
arguments” (1002). Complexity theory troubles our understandings of the role of
the rhetor in, and the boundaries of, the rhetorical situation.
The rhetor is no longer the orchestrator of a situation but another system
that emerges with and against the situation; some scholars have described this in
terms of the writing process. As Hawk (2011) suggests, “the subject of writing is
the network that inscribes the subject as the subject scribes the network”
(“Reassembling” 75). The writer, then, is constructed through a circular process,
along with the other components in the network. The writer and the product
emerge together. Noah Roderick (2010) calls this new subject an “eco-subject”:
“Under this new metaphysical goalpost, then, the writing act can be described as
being a function of network behavior rather than an effect of generalizable mental
processes.” The writer does not simply turn inward to identify motivations and
ideas for writing; rather the writing and the writer emerge from the many
interlocking social, political, historical, and emotional networks in which she is a
part. This same approach can be applied to the rhetor’s role in the rhetorical
situation, which, as Edbauer Rice (2005) has suggested, might be better studied
as an “ecology.”61 She asserts, “An ecological, or affective, rhetorical model is one
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 See Margaret Syverson’s (1999) The Wealth of Reality: An Ecology of
Composition for more on ecologies of writing.
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that reads rhetoric both as a process of distributed emergence and as an ongoing
circulation process” (“Unframing” 13). More traditional formulations of the
rhetorical situation overlook the fluidity and emergence of rhetoric; they don’t
explain how rhetoric spreads, moves, or how it’s generative. In these scholars’
recharacterizations of the rhetor’s role and situation, it seems emotions and
affects are dispersed across people, things, and environments. Assemblage
theory, as I suggested in the previous chapter, might best capture the
interrelated, emergent nature of situations, along with the role of affect.
Theorizing a rhetorical situation as an assemblage highlights how nonhuman
variables in the situation also hold an event together.
With Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory, through the process of
double articulation, we can see the becoming of mass hysteria. In the first
articulation, variables—life experience, exposure, chemicals, bones, tendons,
vocal chords, etc.—become organized in such a way to give rise to the symptom,
and the actual symptom, the expression, is the second articulation. Through
double articulation, bodily symptoms emerge, and through territorialization, the
symptoms are recognized as an expression of hysteria; 62 then, as more girls
exhibit symptoms, they are grouped into a collective of hysterical girls, which in
turn attracts the attention of other assemblages (health departments, school
boards, conspirators, etc.). The assemblage of girls grew as more began taking on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 “Hysterical symptoms” are, of course, not fixed. Historian Edward Shorter
(1993) suggests that symptoms of hysterical disorders adapt based on cultural
acceptance; for example, swooning was prominent in the 18th century, fits and
paralysis in the 19th century, and eating disorders and chronic fatigue in the 20th
century. Similarly, feminist scholar Rachel Maines (1999) suggests that eating
disorders, for example were once considered hysterical but have since been
deemed an independent disease (8).
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the symptoms (affects) of other girls. Even Dominus, in her exposé, describes the
spread of the illness in terms of joining a social group (or assemblage). The first
girls to fall ill, she describes, were those of higher social status (cheerleaders and
honor roll students) and those who developed the symptoms later (who joined
the assemblage later) tended to be of lower social status in the high school. She
writes, “Mass psychogenic illness, whatever its mysterious mechanism, seems
deeply connected to empathy and to a longing for what social psychologists call
affiliation: belonging.” Taking on the symptoms of someone else (joining the
assemblage) is a way of empathizing and belonging.63
A theory of rhetorical assemblages allows us to see how parts of this event
that we might previously have studied as external to the event—namely news and
social media—became part of the event itself. At first glance, we can see the role
of the news media was to report the event, providing the girls, families, and
community alternate explanations of the syndrome. But this reporting also
influenced the possible outcomes of this case (will the girls accept particular
diagnoses or not), and in the case of social media, allowed the girls to document
symptoms, debate diagnoses, and also open themselves up as a site for public
commentary. News and social media played a much larger role in this event than
has been documented in other cases of mass hysteria. In a historical and
psychological analysis, Robert Bartholomew, Simon Wessely, G James Rubin

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Neurologists might explain this using a theory of mirror neurons, which
suggests that we unconsciously mimic those around us, but perhaps most those
with whom was want to identify. For an analysis of mirror neurons’ role in mass
hysteria, see Yao-Tung Lee and Shih-Jen Tsai (2010).
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suggest the case illustrates what might be a new way of transmitting mass
psychogenic illness:

We may be witnessing a milestone in the history of MPI where the
primary agent of spread will be the Internet and social media
networks. Communication with the neurologists treating 12 of the
victims supports this view. ‘As soon as the media coverage stopped,
they all began to rapidly improve and are doing very well,’ they
report. At the time of writing, all but one of their patients ‘are free
of tics and vocalizations.’ (511)
In a traditional rhetorical analysis of this case, we might have studied the news
media as having an independent, external role in reporting and sensationalizing
this case. However, as many of the physicians involved in the case suggested, the
news media became part of the syndrome itself. Dominus also highlights the
intersecting parties (assemblages) that came together in the creation of the story:
“Now, though, the girls’ writhing and stuttering suggested something troubling,
either arising from within the community or being perpetrated on it, a mystery
that proved irresistible for onlookers, whose attention would soon become part of
the story itself.” Dominus describes how the attention the girls gained from the
general public contributed to the worsening and progression of the syndrome. In
this way, the various commentaries from “onlookers” were taken on (actually
subsumed in the assemblage of the girls’ bodies) and then responded to, in many
cases, with worsening symptoms (changing affects).
Interestingly, though, the girls also used social media in a way that some
described as an effort to control the portrayal of their syndrome. This also
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contributed to the way the symptoms spread, as David Lichter, professor of

neurology at the University of Buffalo, who treated some of the girls, told MSNBC
in an interview:
It's remarkable to see how one individual posts something, and
then the next person who posts something not only are the
movements bizarre and not consistent with known movement
disorders, but it's the same kind of movements. This mimicry goes
on with Facebook or YouTube exposure. This is the modern way
that symptomology could be spread. (Velasquez)
If we look at the actual illness and symptoms as rhetorical, as I’ve suggested, an
understanding of the rhetorical situation must extend to consider social media
not external to the bodily manifestation of the illness, but to see how it joined the
assemblage of the illness. Through the connections that social media allows, the
physical, biologic symptoms were spread remotely—through what we might call
an assemblage of the bodily, material, networked, affective.
Studying rhetoric in terms of assemblages allows us to see how events can
be held together by things or actions that might not traditionally be considered
rhetorical, for example, the tic. In the assemblage of the girl’s body, the tic
prompts family and friends to be concerned; it is the reason doctors and experts
enter the story, bringing in an entire medical assemblage with various histories of
treatment. When the news media assemblage joins, each station/show (with its
own approaches, tactics in dealing with the portrayal of the tic), render the tic for
its viewing audience. While the growing attention to the tics made the symptoms
worse and more pronounced as the assemblages were growing together, when the
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tics stopped, the event itself broke down; the news media dropped away, girls no
longer became afflicted, the parental assemblage no longer reached out for
answers, the high school administration no longer investigated, and the girls
were no longer bound in the same way. Studying this case rhetorically means
looking beyond voluntary, conscious forms of persuasion, to also think about how
objects, affects, and bodies are persuading us.
What’s particularly interesting about the assemblage for studies of
emotion is how emotion propels not just the discourse of the event but is also
part of the development of the syndrome itself. Studying hysteria as an
assemblage, we can see how the emotional looping of doubt and mistrust often
fuels symptoms; emotions almost seem like a separate agent in the assemblage,
as they work to both intensify, and fuel skepticism toward, symptoms.64 Dominus
describes the doubt surrounding the diagnosis in the community: “To many
parents, the diagnosis was woefully inadequate, even insulting. ‘It’s a very hard
pill for me to swallow—what are we, living in the 1600s?’ the guardian of one of
the girls said.” Similarly, Nicholas Jackson in The Atlantic, described the LeRoy
community’s response to the diagnosis: “And yet many continue to question the
diagnosis; they can't seem to take conversion disorder seriously.” This doubt is
what several doctors suggested was fueling the development and worsening of the
symptoms. Freud even describes this phenomenon in his treatment of Dora,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Chelsey Dumars, one of the suffering girls describes her debilitating symptoms
paired with her perceptions that the community is doubting her: “I couldn’t stop
stuttering. And then throughout the day, I got worse, and I started twitching and
everything. I hate when it happens because my body is sore. Sometimes it gets me
to the point where I want to cry from twitching so much . . . Like I said, I don't
like even going into stores, because I feel like people are staring at me and
making fun of me.”
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suggesting that when the hysteric is surrounded by people who doubt and
mistrust her, she consumes those emotions and her physical symptoms are,
arguably, a response. Dora’s father told Freud her symptoms resulted from “a

phantasy that has forded its way into her mind” rather than a legitimate trauma
(41). This doubt, Freud asserts, magnified Dora’s symptoms.65 The syndrome
itself often arises and subsists because of an inability to make narrative sense of
trauma, as psychiatrists Howard Waitzkin and Holly Magana observed in “The
Black Box in Somatization; Unexplained Physical Symptoms, Culture and
Narratives of Trauma.” When Waitzkin and Magana received an influx of patients
who had migrated to the U.S. from war-torn countries in Central America
suffering from somatic symptoms without physical disease, they set out to better
understand the root of these symptoms. The inability to construct a coherent
narrative, they suggest, often heightens symptoms: “the mechanism by which
trauma is transformed into somatic symptoms often involves an incoherence in
narrative structure, because of which the traumatic experience cannot be told as a
coherent whole” (818). Several of the news stories about the girls hint at their
underlying personal trauma: absent fathers, debilitating parental illness, poverty,
teen pregnancy, etc. When so many in the community were unable to make sense
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Here, Freud suggests hysteria is a phenomenon neither contained in the mind
nor body but that it is held together by a number of influences: Dora’s
interactions with the source of her anxiety (a family friend who made an
unwanted sexual advance), her interaction (or lack thereof) with peers, and even
her therapy with Freud. He explains hysterical symptoms require psychical
significance or meaning and somatic compliance: “hysterical symptoms are the
expression of their most secret and repressed wishes” (22). Thus, Freud’s
treatment of hysteria involved an investigation into the psyche—both uncovering
the root of the symptoms and convincing the patient that the symptoms have
purpose.
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of the symptoms (especially in the case of denying the diagnosis), the girls were
prevented from believing that whatever underlying psychological issues they
might be dealing with were legitimate and worthy of serious attention.66 Viewing
this case of mass hysteria in terms of assemblages allows us to see these emotions
and the role of social and news media as central (rhetorical) parts of the event
itself—rather than external forces.

Rhetorical Bodies
Following a Spinozist theory of defining bodies by their affects allows us to
see how (human and nonhuman) bodies are persuasive. As I’ve already noted,
there’s a way in which the physical bodies of the girls in LeRoy persuaded
themselves, those around them, and viewers. Dominus describes this kind of
persuasion by highlighting the “language”—the symptoms—the girls use:
As their parents and the media and town officials conducted a
conversation all around them, the girls in Le Roy seemed to be
sharing a language that maybe even they did not fully understand.
That so many people in town were more preoccupied with
environmental waste than the homes of the affected young people
suggests that their message may have been hard for some of the
adults to hear, too.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 We can see this sentiment in comments from some of the girls. For example,
Traci Leunbar, reported, “A lot of people say we are faking it”; Thera Sanchez
illustrates her own doubt with the diagnosis: “I don’t think this is in my head. I
don’t think I can wake up from a nap and this can happen.”
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Dominus points to the rhetorical purpose of the symptoms, that there was
something the girls were trying to express—something they couldn’t express
verbally—that reflected the economic and cultural state of the town itself.67

Viewing these symptoms as rhetorical recognizes the syndrome as purposeful and
the girls as agents, not just as passive vessels—how hysterics have been studied
historically. Even the way the girls turned to the news media (acknowledging the
possible rhetorical affects of that body) illustrates an awareness of their rhetorical
possibilities in this event. As Bartholomew, Wessely, and Rubin put it: “This is
the first case in which, to our knowledge, those affected have been able to ‘put
their case’ directly to the wider public” (511). To return to the notion of “affective
agency” discussed in the last chapter, there’s a way in which the girls try to
“reconfigure the entanglements” (to use Barad’s terms) of their story. This move
to take control of their own narrative, may have backfired to some extent given
the way the syndrome spread via social media, yet this is an example of using
one’s affects to change one’s own body and the public discourse surrounding the
case. We can read the girls’ affects—bodily, mediated, and otherwise—as
rhetorical.
While it might seem unethical to read or assign purposes to another
person’s body, ignoring what bodies might be saying, in some cases, seems
equally risky. Recently, scholars have argued that we expand our rhetorical scope
to study unintentional texts and discourses, like objects, animals, and things, yet
bodily processes are rarely considered rhetorical. Perhaps this is because of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 As Dominus and others described in their reports of this story, the town of
LeRoy, once a booming manufacturing town, is now struggling with higher rates
of poverty, unemployment, and single-parent households.
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politics surrounding the study of human bodies. We know that this can quickly
become dangerous, as we can see, for example, in ancient theories of hysteria,
which were based on the belief that wombs were wandering around women’s
bodies.68 Plato69 and several Hippocratic authors thought the womb was capable
of strangling or suffocating a woman as it moved around her body. To avoid this,
Christopher Faraone writes in “Magical and Medical Approaches to the
Wandering Womb in the Ancient Greek World,” women were encouraged to
marry young and have many children to always keep the womb in place. The
womb was described variously as a sentient being, a wild animal, or a defective
organ; in a Greek Magical Handbook from 4 CE, the womb is even described as
biting and chewing the insides. In the case of a wandering womb, physicians
often tried to persuade it back into place with fumigations (foul ones at the nose
and sweet smelling at the vagina) or loud noises. Despite how bizarre these ideas
now seem, we still talk about “hostile” wombs or cervixes whose intentions are to
prevent fertilization and incubation, similarly implying that the cervix has its own
motives and functions separate from the rest of the body. We often talk about our
human bodies in rhetorical terms, saying things like “my body is trying to tell me
something.”
To really take up the calls of complexity, assemblage, and affect theories
means paying attention to what might seem to be involuntary or coincidental. As
is made so clear in the way the LeRoy girls’ symptoms are variously analyzed and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 The “wandering womb” was frequently blamed for hysterical symptoms in
ancient times. Before human dissections, physicians had no way of knowing
where wombs were located.
69 Some scholars have debated this. See, for example, Mark Adair’s “Plato’s View
of the ‘Wandering Uterus.’”
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portrayed, these symptoms mean something. In keeping with my analysis of a tic,
we can see how it might be a call for psychological help and perhaps a call for
social acceptance among a group of girls. The tic is an exigence (in Bitzer’s terms
“an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle”), but it’s also a
constraint for the girl’s body. The tic is an argument that many other bodies
responded to in different ways given their purposes: to highlight environmental
concerns, the personal struggles of the girls, the (il)legitimacy of doctors and
other experts, etc. Accepting something like a tic as rhetorical suggests that any
body (human or not) can persuade; we no longer need the conscious and
intentional rhetor.
If we accepted that any body or thing can persuade, there’s a way in which
everything is rhetorical, every becoming, every combining of parts would be
rhetorical. This aligns with those who’ve argued rhetoricity and affects precede
us. For example, Diane Davis suggests in Inessential Solidarity, there is an
affectability that precedes symbolicity and is necessary for persuasion to take
place. Similarly Rickert (2013) echoes Davis when he asserts affect and
persuadability is “the condition of the possibility for rhetoric’s emergence” (159).
These claims become especially apparent then we decide to study an event like
the one in LeRoy rhetorically. The rhetoric in this event doesn’t appear just in the
discourses that emerged when various parties debated about this “mystery
illness.” Even the news media picked up on the “language” of the girls’ symptoms,
suggesting that the illness itself was persuasive, rhetorical.
A close study of this case encourages us to question not just what we
define as rhetorical, but also the role of affects and emotions. We can see, for
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example, with the theory of fire objects how defining a rhetorical object calls forth
particular emotional realities. Paying attention to the various versions of mass
hysteria at work in this case reveals not just the obvious emotions at work—fear,
pity, sadness—but also emotions attached to the girls’ sense of belonging and the
questioning of their symptoms’ legitimacy. Similarly, the way that news and
social media become part of this syndrome (this assemblage) reflects the power
of media to produce and transmit affects and emotions in a way that hasn’t really
been seen before. The doubt and mistrust that spread through those networks
was consumed by and reflected in the syndrome itself, ultimately helping to
determine which diagnosis the girls accepted and which treatment they sought.
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Postscript

Toward a Revised Theory of Pathos
As emotions were the first motives which
induced man to speak, his first utterances were
tropes (metaphors). Figurative language was
the first to be born, proper meanings were the
last to be found.
–Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essay on the
Origins of Languages

Rousseau captures the tension at the heart of this dissertation: emotions
are the impetus for language, communication, and expression of human
experience, yet language is never enough to capture the all of human experience.
Many scholars of emotion studies have cited this tension, claiming our lack of
vocabulary or “proper meanings” prevents us from adequately theorizing the
emotions. While the advent of affect theory seems to be a response to that dearth
of vocabulary, as it claims to better capture the visceral, embodied, and sensual
aspects of human experience, the pursuit of “proper meanings” often seems to be
a distraction in itself. This distraction—specifically debates over terminology and
theoretical tradition—prevents us from the kinds of insights that might emerge if,
rather than beginning with static definitions and seeking out evidence of their
existence, we begin our rhetorical studies, as Massumi suggests, in the middle.
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My main objective in this dissertation was to take seriously the call from
scholars who have studied both affect and emotion in our field: to carefully
(re)consider how we discuss and use both terms. Perhaps more importantly, I
wanted this work to culminate in a revised theory of pathos, into a theory that
would be useful—and not seemingly external—to rhetorical theory. The difficulty
I faced (as have others who’ve taken up this sort of study) is figuring out how to
reconcile theories of affect with rhetorical studies. I, too, was swept up in the
pleasure—the exciting emotional experience—of re-thinking many of the ideas
and theories that were the basis for my understanding of the world and rhetorical
theory’s role therein. I wanted to figure out how to accept this way of seeing the
world—seeing the world through its relations rather than as consisting of
independent entities—in a way that would help me and others become better
rhetoricians. I quickly realized this would not be an easy task, and though in
many ways, I’ve only just begun (as I end) this project, in this postscript, I’ll
outline some of the main tenets of a revised theory of pathos and look forward to
consider what future research might address.
A revised theory of pathos should 1) accept that affect and emotion are
intimately related, 2) acknowledge the numerous theories of affect and emotion
that might be used for differing rhetorical purposes, and 3) invoke an
understanding of rhetorical situations and events that are malleable, layered, and
recursive. Returning to the arguments of my early chapters, a revised theory of
pathos should resist the desire to treat affect and emotion as separate concepts
that refer to fundamentally different phenomena. The most obvious problem this
theoretical division creates is a fissure in the scholarship, resulting in two
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seemingly separate traditions in the field with scholars who study one concept
but not the other (e.g. scholars like Laura Micciche, Daniel Gross, or Michael
Hyde and Craig Smith who pursue studies of emotion independent from

scholarship on affect). The dearth of conversation between scholarship on affect
and emotion prevents the theoretical advancement of both areas of study—and
especially reconfigurations of the concept pathos in our field.
If we understand that affects and emotions are defined in numerous ways,
for numerous purposes, it would seem in our best interest to examine our
tendencies to rely on particular traditions and to question what blind spots might
be revealed through an expanded understanding of both concepts. As I suggested
in Chapter Two, there are a number of prominent affect theories (several of which
I didn’t even detail in this dissertation, e.g. Lawrence Grossberg’s or Eve
Sedgwick’s) that allow us to isolate different aspects of rhetoric. When someone
mentions “affect” in our field, most are quick to assume it means the fleeting
bodily intensity associated with Massumi. But just as there are times when
Massumi’s version of affect seems most useful in isolating a particular aspect of
rhetoric, there are times when an understanding of affect as exigence and
constraint might produce more diverse analyses. When we make this decision—in
choosing one version of affect or emotion to inform our studies—we ought to also
consider which versions we are overlooking and to what ends. Might we be—
purposefully or not—leaving out versions of emotion or affect that could continue
to complicate (in some cases, trouble) our rhetorical investigations? In my albeit
brief analysis of the case in LeRoy, I tried to employ understandings of affect and
emotion that at times seemed incompatible, but in doing so, I hoped to reveal
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how we might see the affects and emotions of this case as primary forces, not as
after-the-fact responses to what happened in the event.
Affect theory encourages us to seek out more complicated rhetorical
projects and objects of study. But we need to be careful about defining and
choosing these objects, knowing that the objects we isolate are attached to affects
and emotions that we also choose to foreground or not. In keeping with this
sentiment, my analysis of LeRoy did not draw out finite borders of the event or
focus on isolated rhetor-audience interactions. This produced a case study that,
following Massumi and many other scholars I’ve referenced in this dissertation,
was more exploratory in nature. I hoped to find the affects and emotions in this
event that existed beyond and slipped between traditional discourse—to call
attention to, for example, how news and social media contributed to the
progression and transmission of the symptoms, emerging prior to and along with
the more traditionally rhetorical aspects of this case. A truly revised theory of
pathos should work against traditional humanistic approaches to rhetorical
study, which means (re)considering what is rhetorical in the first place.

Looking Forward
In keeping with the longstanding ethical aims of pathos, I hope this
project has created an opening to more carefully think about the ethics of
studying more recent conceptualizations and theories of affect and emotion. As I
emphasized in my final chapter, ethics become important when deciding what it
means to identify and study particular rhetorical objects. Though there has been
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no shortage of scholars who have suggested that we expand our rhetorical studies
to include nontraditional texts, discourses, and objects, no one has yet considered
the emotional and affective stakes of doing so. I hope that my analysis of the case
in LeRoy illustrates that the ethics of pathos aren’t contained just in the ways that
the news media used emotional appeals or in the way I used emotional appeals to
describe the case. I hope that what also became apparent is that choosing an
object of study has ethical implications for the emotions that we highlight and
ignore. For example, there are emotions, among the girls themselves—desires to
belong or for acknowledgement of their symptoms as legitimate—that
contributed to the development of the case. Focusing our attention just on the
most obvious emotions in this case—fear and pity—fails to capture its emotional
and affective complexity.
As I look forward in my own studies, I’d like to more thoroughly pursue
psychoanalytic theories of affect and desire. In my unfortunately brief study of
psychoanalytic approaches, I realized that “desire” would likely be an important
addition in a revised theory of pathos that would more extensively account for the
affective investments of each of us and might give clues into how rhetoricians can
better identify and make use of those investments. Because there are many
central terms in psychoanalysis that describe the work of affect and emotion, this
sort of study would begin by mapping out the relationships among concepts like
enjoyment, pleasure, desire, affect, and emotion.
The final opening I hope this dissertation has produced is for rhetorical
analyses of how emotions and affects are biologically experienced and
transmitted. Perhaps most closely related to Massumi’s understanding of affect
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as bodily intensity, these analyses would be useful in better investigating how we
might consider biological processes as rhetorical. Teresa Brennan’s The
Transmission of Affect is an incredible work that takes many of the first steps in
considering how affects are transmitted biologically and relatedly how affects
play a primary role in agency and persuasion. The “transmission of affect,” she
suggests “capture[s] a process that is social in origin but biological and physical
in effect” (3). Her theory accounts for the physiological aspects of affect
(hormones and phermones passed between us), but also recognizes these
processes as inextricably social—an understanding that seems especially
important for studying rhetorical events that emerge through biological, social,
mediated, and discursive interactions.
Further study into the biological transmission of affect would also
encourage us to focus our attention on the role of the senses. Brennan suggests
that we rely on all our senses (especially smell) to produce knowledge. However,
contemporary theories of the “self-contained individual,” she asserts, prevent us
from acknowledging the role affect plays in knowledge-making and other
processes we often consider to be solely cognitive. Like many others cited in this
dissertation, Brennan suggests a major obstacle in theorizing affect is the lack of
language and vocabulary to sufficiently describe affective experience:
At present we only have a rudimentary language for connecting
sensations, affects, and words, for connecting bodily processes and
the conceptual understanding of them. The development of that
language requires an attention to the pathways of sensation in the
body, and attention that is more concentrated and sustained than
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the attention received by the body hitherto. This is the precondition
of beginning to formulate bodily knowledge more accurately and to
pass it on by the verbal means that increases the rapidity of human
understanding. (153)
Focusing our attention on “pathways of sensation in the body” has potential not
just for better understandings of bodily knowledge; these pathways are avenues
for communication and persuasion. Further studies might consider the role these
pathways play in rhetorical relations—especially as they contribute to the
production, expression, and experience of emotion.
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Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of English, University of Wisconsin –
Milwaukee, 2009-present
Courses Taught:
English 101: Introduction to College Writing
English 102: College Writing and Research
English 102 Online: College Writing and Research
English 215: Introduction to English Studies
English 230: Writing with Style
English 240: Rhetoric, Writing, Culture: Rhetorics of Affect and Emotion
English 701: Teaching College Composition (co-taught w/ Dennis Lynch)
Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of English, Ohio University, 2007-2009
Courses Taught:
English 151: Rhetoric and Writing I
English 153: Visual Rhetoric
English 306J: Women and Writing
English 308J: Rhetoric and Writing II
Administrative Positions
Mentor for Faculty Teaching Composition Online, UWM, 2013
Mentor for Graduate Teaching Assistants in English, UWM, 2010-2013
Member, Writing Program Administration, UWM, 2010-2013
Member, Composition Advisory Committee, UWM, 2010-2013
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Awards

Chancellor’s Award, UWM English Department, 2012, 2013
James A. Sappenfield Fellowship, UWM English Department, 2013
UWM Graduate School Travel Award, 2010-2012
UWM Center for Women’s Studies Graduate Research Paper Award, 2nd place,
2010
Publication
“Considering Rhetoric as a Global Human Enterprise.” Review of Feminist
Rhetorical Practices: New Horizons for Rhetoric, Composition, and Literacy
Studies by Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa Kirsch, Enculturation: A Journal of
Rhetoric, Writing and Culture 16 (2013).
National Conference Presentations
“Persuasive Bodies and Phantom Rhetorics,” Rhetoric Society of America, San
Antonio, TX, May 2014.
“Inventing Without A Thought: The Influence of Affect Theory on Rhetorical
Studies,” Rhetoric Society of America, Philadelphia, PA, May 2012.
“Aristotle’s Fear: A Performative Feminist Rereading,” Conference on College
Composition and Communication, St. Louis, MO, March 2012.
“Teaching Emotion: Emotion as the ‘Phantom Limb’ in the Composition
Classroom,” Conference on College Composition and Communication, Atlanta,
GA, March 2011.
“Rereading Aristotle’s Emotions,” Feminisms and Rhetorics, Mankato, MN,
October 2011.
“Contemporary Representations of Women’s Anger: Michelle Obama as Angry
Black Woman,” Popular Culture and American Culture Associations Conference,
St. Louis, MO, March 2010.
Regional Conference Presentations
“Writing Program Assessment: Recontextualizing, Rethinking, Reforming
Curricula,” UWM Graduate Student Composition Conference, Milwaukee, WI,
April 2010.
“Student Writing as Performance of Self,” Marquette University Graduate Student
Conference, Milwaukee, WI, December 2009.
“First-Year Composition Instructors’ Values, Practices, and Theoretical
Preferences,” College English Association of Ohio, Columbus, OH, March 2008.
“Mrs. Dalloway: Falling in Love with a Moment, ”Accredited Colleges of the
Twin Cities English Majors Conference, St. Paul, MN, May 2005.
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UWM English Department Presentations

“Using Blogs for Reflective Writing in FYC,” English Department Orientation for
Online Teaching, August 2013.
“What Does It Mean to Critically Interpret?” English Department Graduate
Teaching Assistant Orientation, August 2012.
“Getting Ready for the Classroom: Sample Student Texts,” English Department
Graduate Teaching Assistant Orientation, August 2011.
“Working with The DK Handbook in Composition Classes,” Co-presented with
Anne Wysocki, Writing Program Composition Forum, March 2010.
“Working with Course Goals,” Co-presented with Nic Learned, English
Department Graduate Teaching Assistant Orientation, August 2010.
Service
Judge, Virginia Burke Writing Contest, UWM, 2013
Reader, UWM Writing Program Assessment, 2010-2013
Member, First-Year Reader Committee, UWM, 2010, 2012
Member, Ohio University Graduate Student Advisory Committee for Issues in
College Teaching, 2007-2009
Reader, Ohio University Writing Program Assessment, 2009
Additional Professional Experience
Participant, “New Materialisms,” Rhetoric Society of America Summer
Workshop with Byron Hawk and Thomas Rickert, June 2013.
Participant, “Nonrational Rhetorics,” Rhetoric Society of America Summer
Workshop with Diane Davis and Debra Hawhee, June 2011.
Professional Memberships
Coalition of Women Scholars in the History of Rhetoric and Composition
College Composition and Communication
National Council of Teachers of English
Rhetoric Society of America
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